The Legitimation of Proto-institutions Among Multiple Stakeholder Communities: A Two-Phase Process Model. by Awad, Mohamed Hassan Ahmed
  
 
 
 THE LEGITIMATION OF PROTO-INSTITUTIONS AMONG MULTIPLE 
STAKEHOLDER COMMUNITIES: A TWO-PHASE PROCESS MODEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
MOHAMED HASSAN AHMED AWAD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION  
Presented to the Department of Management  
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
 
June 2019 
 
 
ii
DISSERTATION APPROVAL PAGE 
Student: Mohamed Hassan Ahmed Awad 
Title: The Legitimation of Proto-institutions Among Multiple Stakeholder Communities: 
A Two-Phase Process Model.  
This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in the Department of Management by: 
Andrew Nelson Chair  
Michael Russo Core Member  
Alan Meyer  Core Member  
Naomi Zack  Institutional Representative 
and  
Janet Woodruff-Borden Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School  
Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School. 
Degree awarded June 2019 
iii
© 2019 Mohamed Hassan Ahmed Awad 
iv 
DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
Mohamed Hassan Ahmed Awad 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Management 
June 2019 
Title: The Legitimation of Proto-institutions among Multiple Stakeholder Communities: a 
Two-Phase Process Model 
New social entities are critically in need of different types of resources in order to 
survive and diffuse. In order to access these resources, a new social entity needs to be 
deemed legitimate by the multiple stakeholder communities who control these resources. 
The criteria upon which a social entity is evaluated are likely to vary among the different 
stakeholders, possibly leading to conflict and uncertainty. Existing research has focused 
on the efforts of a focal actor in legitimating a social entity. However, little research has 
investigated the contestations between the different stakeholder communities around the 
social entity and how these dynamics could shape the legitimation process. In this study, I 
employ a distributed and inclusive analytical approach to uncover the process through 
which a new social entity is contested and legitimated among multiple stakeholder 
communities simultaneously. I investigate three local solutions that emerged in the city of 
Eugene, Oregon to alleviate the issue of homelessness. I employ an inductive approach 
with grounded theory analysis to induce a two-phase legitimation model for proto-
institutions. The model hinges on the role of issue interpretation and contestation between 
issue narratives. This study contributes to the growing literature on institutional 
complexity and issue fields through capturing the complexity of legitimation as it unfolds 
in a changing field, between multiple stakeholder communities with shifting criteria of 
legitimacy.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Legitimacy is a fundamental concept in the study of institutions and organizations 
(Deephouse, Tost, Bundy, and Suchman, 2017; Scott, 2013) defined as “a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” 
(Suchman, 1995: 574). To be judged as legitimate, i.e. “appropriate for its social context” 
(Tost, 2011), has been shown to be crucial for an organization’s performance and 
resource acquisition (Pollack and Rindova, 2003; Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Ashforth and 
Gibbs, 1990; Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978), for the growth and survival of industries (Scott, 
2013; Russo, 2001), and for the emergence new ventures and categories (Tracy, Delpiaz, 
and Phillips, 2018; Navis and Glynn, 2010; Aldrich and Fiol, 1994).  
The study of legitimacy involves the examination of its various constituting 
elements: the subjects seeking legitimacy, the entities in position to confer it (i.e. 
sources), different dimensions of the concept (i.e. criteria), the context where the 
interactions take place, and the dynamics of interactions between these various elements 
(i.e. the legitimation process) (Suddaby, Bitektine, and Haack, 2017; Deephouse and 
Suchman, 2008). An expansive body of literature in organization studies examines 
various combinations of these elements and how they affect organizational outcomes 
such as processes of diffusion of organizational forms (Hannan and Carroll, 1995), ideas 
(Fiss and Zajac, 2004), and practices (McLean and Benham, 2010; Kennedy and Fiss, 
2009), and subsequent institutionalization of organizational phenomena (Jung and Mun, 
2017; Gray, Purdy, and Ansari, 2015; Jepperson, 1991).   
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However, over the past decades, researchers have examined “only one or at most 
two combinations” (Deephouse et al., 2017) of the legitimacy components, with a few 
exceptions (Wedlin, 2006; Scott, Reuf, Mendel, and Coronna, 2000). This narrow focus 
can be attributed to limitations in journal space (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008), or 
theoretical/empirical framings that privileged certain actors or dynamics (Suddaby, 2010; 
Vergne, 2011). The approach has hindered the development of a comprehensive 
explanation of this fundamental concept (Deephouse et al., 2017; Greenwood, 2016). In 
my dissertation, I heed the call for a more ambitious analysis of the complexities of 
legitimacy (Deephouse et al., 2017; Barley, 2017; Hinings, 2006).  
One crucial research gap caused by the aforementioned approach, and the subject 
of this dissertation, is that “legitimacy scholars have been unable to understand how 
legitimacy manifests among different audiences” (Suddaby et al., 2017:470). Most 
organizations and practices are subject to legitimacy demands from multiple stakeholder 
communities, both externally (Pache and Santos, 2010) as well as internally (Drori and 
Honing, 2013). Each stakeholder group will evaluate the fit of the social entity based on 
different sets of criteria that could potentially conflict with other communities, and share 
resources and support accordingly. The need to navigate these dynamics increases the 
uncertainty surrounding the prospects of growth, institutionalization, and other 
organizational outcomes (Wooten and Hoffman, 2008; Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). 
Researchers have long lamented the dearth of theoretical and empirical accounts of the 
legitimation process that take into account the diversity of stakeholder groups, beyond 
one or two, and the different sets of criteria these groups potentially use when evaluating 
the legitimacy of a social entity (Deephouse et al., 2017; Suddaby, et al., 2017; Fisher, 
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Kuratko, Bloodgood, and Hornsby, 2017; Fisher, Kotha, and Lahiri, 2016). The gap in 
our understanding is especially pronounced when analyzing emerging social entities such 
as new ventures, practices, organizations, or categories. These new social arrangements 
are understood as new combinations of cultural materials (Rao, 1998) with the potential 
for being accepted or rejected by stakeholders (David, Sine, and Haveman, 2013). They 
are subjected to more intensive legitimacy contestations among multiple stakeholder 
communities (Tracey and Delpiaz, 2018; Fisher et al. 2017; Lee et al., 2017; Fisher et al. 
2016; Uberbacker, 2014; Helms, Oliver, and Webb, 2012; Zietsma and McKnight, 2009). 
I refer to these new social arrangements as proto-institutions to capture their status as 
“narrowly diffused and only weakly entrenched, but that have the potential to become 
widely institutionalized” (Lawrence, Hardy, and Phillips, 2002: 283).  
Thus, the research question I tackle in this dissertation is how proto-institutions 
are legitimated among diverse stakeholder communities.  
Research on the legitimation dynamics among multiple stakeholders offers an 
interesting contradiction, one that highlights the theoretical gap in the literature. Answers 
abound for the question of who confers legitimacy on an organization with researchers 
examining sources of legitimacy including nation-states (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991), 
regulators (Russo, 1992), accreditations and professional bodies (Suddaby and 
Greenwood, 2005; Reuf and Scott, 1998; Scott, 2013), the media (Bansal and Clelland, 
2004; Lamertz, and Baum, 1998; Elsbach, 1994; Elsbach and Sutton, 1992), industry-
level isomorphism (Hannan and Carroll, 1995), or as emanating from inter-organizational 
relationships such as strategic alliances (Oliver, 2001) and partnerships (Kumar and Das, 
2007). Recent developments have started to heed previous calls to focus on the specificity 
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and diversity of the stakeholder communities which act as sources of legitimacy 
(Bitektine and Haack, 2015; Drori and Honing, 2013; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008) 
and the dynamics of legitimation as a multi-level social process, Bitektine and Haack, 
2015; Tost, 2011).  
However, very few studies have analyzed the legitimation process taking into 
account multiple stakeholder communities simultaneously and inclusively. A few notable 
contributions from Lamin and Zaheer (2012), Panhke, Eisenhardt, and Katila (2015), Huy 
et al., (2014), and Drori and Honing (2013) have attempted to tackle this research 
projects, however, the research gap persists. In summary, all these studies either excluded 
a whole swathe of potential sources of legitimacy (i.e. stakeholder groups) from the 
analysis, focused on one or two criteria of legitimation, or privileged legitimacy as a 
property of the subject organization. Thus, we still lack an informative analysis of the 
dynamics animating the contestations between these different multiple communities. I 
will return to these studies, and the scaffolding they provided for a deeper analysis of 
legitimation, in the literature review section. 
  In contrast to these initial efforts, this dissertation adopts a more inclusive and 
integrative approach to analyzing legitimacy, focusing on two goals. Primarily, I examine 
the empirically and theoretically underexplored dynamics of legitimation among diverse 
stakeholder communities with the purpose of uncovering how the legitimacy of the 
subject organization is constructed and re-constructed through the interactions between 
multiple sources and criteria of legitimacy.  Ultimately, beyond elucidating the dynamics 
of legitimation among various stakeholder communities, my goal is to connect this blind 
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spot to the well-trodden territory of strategic responses and actions (Fisher et al., 2017; 
Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Oliver, 1991).  
In examining the criteria of legitimacy, the second goal of the study is to explore 
the undertheorized role of the material in the formation of legitimacy judgments. Studies 
of the criteria of legitimacy have long been confined to the symbolic aspects of 
organizations, both conceptually and empirically, with scholars focusing solely on 
rhetoric and language as the main conduits of legitimacy (Suchman and Deephouse, 
2008). I extend the study of legitimacy criteria to explore how the interactions between 
the sources of legitimacy and the material aspects of the organization, such as the 
physical location and structure where an organization is nestled, can affect the 
legitimation process (Hallet and Ventresca, 2006). Thus, I respond to recent calls to bring 
back the duality of organizations and institutions as symbolic and material phenomena 
(Jones, Boxenbaum, and Anthony, 2013). I will employ the novel concept of experiential 
legitimacy (Nilsson, 2015) to explore these dynamics.  
At this point, I would like to explicitly detail my fundamental orientation towards 
legitimacy in order to substantiate my choices in methods, context, and overall analytical 
approach in this study. Ontologically, I take the position that legitimacy, institutions, and 
organizations are socially-constructed concepts (Suchman, 1995; Berger and Luckmann, 
1991).  I analyze legitimacy-as-process, also referred to as legitimation, as opposed to 
legitimacy-as-property; an asset or a resource for an organization that can possessed or 
exchanged in certain quantities (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Kostova and Zheer, 
1999) or that shifts around a threshold to render an organization as legitimate/illegitimate 
(Fisher et al., 2016). Rather, the study of legitimation privileges a 
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constructivist/interpretivist lens where legitimacy is a dynamic and “socially constructed 
outcome that emerges as part of the contestation and co-creation” (Suddaby et al., 2017: 
462) between the various stakeholder communities tangled with the organization. Thus, 
to study legitimation is to analyze the interactions, meaning-making, interpretations and 
the “ongoing process of social negotiation” (Suddaby et al., 2017: 459), through which an 
organization can be simultaneously legitimate and illegitimate, depending on the source 
of evaluation, and the criteria employed by a source to evaluate the organization at a 
certain point in time (Tracey, Delpiaz, and Phillips, 2018; Drori, and Honing, 2014; Huy, 
Corely, and Kraatz, 2014; Johnson, Dowd, and Ridgeway, 2006).  
Methodologically, I conducted an inductive, qualitative study, employing a 
multiple case study design (Yin, 2009) and an interpretivist, grounded-theory data 
analysis strategy (Gioia, et al., 2012; Strauss and Cobin, 1998). A few reasons justify my 
choice of methodology. First, as mentioned earlier, little research on legitimacy 
investigates the dynamic relationships between multiple stakeholders and multiple 
criteria (Deephouse et al., 2017; Sudabby et al. 2017; Fisher et al. 2017; Uberbacker, 
2014) save for a few studies (Rueede and Kretuzer, 2015) which mostly focused on either 
two stakeholder communities (Drori and Honing, 2013; Lamin and Zaheer, 2012) or 
narrow dimensions of legitimacy (Tracey et al., 2017). These gaps in the existing body of 
research around a phenomenon of such fundamental importance (Barley, 2017) provides 
strong support for an inductive, theory-building approach (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007). An inductive approach aligns with the goals of “generating novel ideas, revealing 
effective processes, coping with complexity such as configurations, emergence, and 
equifinality (Eisenhardt, Graebner, and Sonenshein, 2016:1115). It is also best suited to 
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capture complexity and multivocality (Eisenhardt, et al., 2016) as it allows for the 
inclusion of the different type of data collection methods (Toubiana and Zietsma, 2017). 
Inductive approaches are especially suited for explicating process and how-questions 
(Langley, 1999) if coupled with in-depth analysis of a few theoretically sampled 
revelatory cases (Eisenhardt et al., 2016; Yin, 2009), offering high potential for 
developing new insight into an understudied phenomenon (Langley and Abdallah, 2011) 
Analytically, I selected an interpretivist approach to data analysis to answer my 
research question through the generation of “grounded theory” (Corley et al., 2012; 
Corely and Gioia, 2011; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). This confirms with Barley’s (2017) 
emphasis on the importance of interpretive grounded work for “developing adequate 
accounts of the social construction of legitimacy”. These approaches are ideal for 
capturing the diversity of meanings, values, goals, expectations and other elements 
constituting and jostling in a dynamic social system (Gioia et al., 2012; Thornton et al., 
2012; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Hence, this data analysis strategy allowed me to capture 
how the different sources of legitimacy socially constructed legitimacy and to “ground 
their insights and abstractions to the context through quotes, observations, and thick 
description” (Reay and Jones, 2013: 442). In presenting my findings, I took advantage of 
the space in the dissertation form to explicate the legitimation process through narrative 
and grounded theory analysis (Langely, 1999). The thick description of the field (Van 
Maanen, 1995) enhances the rigor of my study, especially aspects transferability, 
transparency, and authenticity (Aguinis and Solarino, 2019). 
Contextually, two crucial elements provide focus and richness to this dissertation. 
First, I added more nuance to the study of legitimation by focusing on emerging instances 
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of social organization. Research on the processes of emergence of new organizational 
entities, such as new institutions, forms, practices, and other collectives, have received 
much less attention in organizational theory (David et al., 2013; Zietsma and McKnight, 
2009; Walsh, Meyer, and Schoonhoven, 2006) compared to the focus on existing ones. 
Findings from this growing line of research emphasize the additional legitimacy demands 
and challenges organizational forms face under conditions of emergence (Fisher et al., 
2017; Anthony, Nelson, and Trispas, 2016; Navis and Glynn, 2011). The liability of 
newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) faced by these organizational forms means they lack the 
taken-for-grantedness that established (institutionalized) entities have, and therefore are 
subject to more scrutiny, questioning, and contestation among their stakeholder 
communities.  
I explore this process of local validation i.e. legitimation of new organization 
forms (Johnson, Dowd, and Ridgeway, 2006) to bring out the richness of the legitimation 
process. I employ the concept of proto-institutions, defined as “practices, technologies, 
and rules that are narrowly diffused and only weakly entrenched, but that have the 
potential to become widely institutionalized” (Zietsma and McKnight, 2009; Lawrence, 
et al., 2002) to refer to these social entities seeking legitimation. The term highlights the 
centrality of legitimation, and consequent institutionalization, as the ultimate goal of the 
social entity (Suchman, 1995).  
Second, the process of legitimation is constituted through contestation and social 
negotiation among multiple stakeholder communities (Suddaby et al., 2017). Thus, I 
elected to analyze contestations around proto-institutions emerging in an issue field. This 
particular type of field emerges around a focal issue and “can be analytically identified by 
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the set of actors that interact and take one another into account” (Zietsma et al., 
2017:400). In these relational spaces, fragmented and diverse sets of actors coalesce into 
distinct communities (Zietsma, Groenwegen, Logue, and Hinings, 2017; Grodal and 
O’Mahoney, 2017) which share common meaning systems. (Scott, 2000; Hoffman, 
1999). Further, these fields are marked by contestation over the meanings, values, and 
social goals, rooted in the different logics employed by each community (Furnari, 2018; 
Lirtico and David, 2018; Zietsma et al., 2017; Raynard, 2016; Greenwood, Raynard, 
Kodeih, Micelotta, and Lounsbury, 2011; Meyer and Hollerer, 2010). The issue field of 
HIV/AIDS treatment, investigated in Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence’s (2004) seminal 
work, highlights this phenomenon and how it influenced the process of institutional 
entrepreneurship among different actors. Thus, the proto-institutions emerging in these 
fields provide a rich context for exploring the complex legitimation dynamics between 
different stakeholder communities.  
I focus specifically on the legitimation of the proto-institutions implemented to 
alleviate the suffering of the homeless population in Eugene, Oregon, a mid-size city in 
the Pacific Northwest of the United States. This field presents an exemplary context of 
the multi-party and political struggles of issue fields (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2017; 
Ferraro, Etzion, and Gehman, 2015; Lawrence and Dover, 2015).  Notably, and following 
prior research (Grodal, 2018; Grodal and O’Mahoney, 2017), I refer to the various 
stakeholder groups and/or audiences as stakeholder communities (the ones emerging from 
my analysis are local government, business, non-profit organizations and activists, 
neighborhood boards, the homeless). Each community brings a distinct set of goals, 
interests, and expectations into this social evaluation process. I frame homelessness as a 
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grand challenge, a term used to refer to these “ambitious problems that lack a clear single 
solution, and encompass incomplete, contradictory, or changing requirements that often 
unfold in complex systems” (Grodal and O’Mahoney, 2017). Homelessness can be 
conceptualized as a “specific critical barrier(s) that, if removed, would help solve an 
important societal problem with a high likelihood of global impact through widespread 
implementation.” (George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi, and Tihanyi, 2016). Homelessness 
can be construed as a manifestation and one of the major challenges in urban poverty. 
Based on my data analysis, I develop a two-phase emergent model of the 
legitimation process that explains the complex dynamics of evaluating proto-institutions 
in issue fields. In Phase-1, stakeholder communities evaluate the emerging proto-
institution as a proposed model of action to settle the contestation between the multiple 
stakeholder communities in the field. These contestations arise due to the conflicts 
between how every stakeholder community interpret the issue and develop varying 
definitions and tactics to solve it. These “narratives” engender the criteria for evaluation 
that every stakeholder community champions in the negotiation process around the proto-
institutions. In Phase-2, an implemented proto-institution is re-evaluated for possible 
expansion, thus triggering stakeholder communities’ interactions. Stakeholder 
communities re-interpret the issue, incorporating the performance of the proto-institution 
in the new narratives. These narratives frame the ongoing contestation process and the 
consequent future of the proto-institution.  
Besides this emergent model, my analysis of legitimation criteria highlights two 
important phenomena related to the criteria of legitimation. Phase-2 legitimation is 
characterized by pragmatic magnification with all stakeholder communities in the field 
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justifying their position on the proto-institution using calculative approaches such as cost-
benefit analysis, or framing their position in terms of managerial, financial, or political 
resources. Also, I provide early insight into the role of materiality in legitimation through 
investigating experiential legitimacy, evaluations rooted in subjective experiences. I find 
that evaluations rooted in emotions or embodied experiences such as how a stakeholder 
experience the locations, or physical space of a proto-institution are characterized by 
experiential stickiness. The legitimation criteria do not change over time, even in the face 
of contradicting objective facts.  
My dissertation makes three contributions to the field of legitimacy. I explicate 
the legitimation process as it occurs between multiple stakeholder communities, 
grounding it in issue interpretation. I provide a model for examining how organizations 
can dynamically exist as legitimate and illegitimate, depending on the interactions 
between sources, subjects, context, and criteria of legitimacy. Thus, I elucidate processes 
of local validation (Johnson, et al., 2006) and the antecedents to diffusion/entrenchment 
of new social entities (Helms et al., 2012). Lastly, I expand our knowledge on the 
emergence, contestation, and shifting of legitimation criteria over time.  
This dissertation is structured as follows: In the next section, I review research on 
legitimacy/legitimation literature, highlighting the specific research gaps this dissertation 
addresses. I cover the foundations, sources, subjects, and criteria of legitimacy as well as 
an overview of the legitimation process. Section 3 provides a detailed account of my 
methods and data analysis process. I detail my findings and analysis in Section 4 in two 
parts: Section 4.1 is a thick description of the issue field, highlighting the various 
stakeholder communities, events, and developments, as reconstructed from my data 
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analysis. Section 4.2 detail an emergent process of legitimation. I discuss my findings 
and how they contribute to research and practice in Section 5, before providing a few 
avenues for future research and a brief discussion on the limitations of this study. Section 
6 concludes the dissertation.  
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II.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
Legitimacy: Foundations 
 
To refer to the body of research on legitimacy as expansive would be an understatement. 
Scholarly interest in the topic can be traced back to Max Weber’s work on administrative 
bureaucracies and authority (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008, Johnson, et al., 2006). The 
Weberian formulation of legitimacy placed an interpretive approach at the core of 
organizational analysis. For a social practice or role to garner resources and endure, he 
concluded, it has to conform to certain maxims or rules such as social norms and formal 
laws (Weber, 1924). Consequent research built on this Weber’s work to expand the 
conceptualization of legitimacy as a socially constructed account of fit between an entity 
and “larger social network in which it is nested” (Berger, Ridgeway, Fisek, and Norman, 
1998). Thus, for an entity to be considered legitimate, it has to be in accord with “the 
norms, values, beliefs, practices, and procedures accepted by a group." (Zelditch, 2001).  
 From this initial formulation, legitimacy research expanded as the concept was 
incorporated into different theoretical and empirical approaches. One early line of 
research, which continues to exert much influence on legitimacy scholarship, is the 
resource-dependence approach which emphasized the value of legitimacy as a resource 
that can be gained or lost depending on the strategies and actions the organization choose 
to undertake (Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). Organizations that 
engage in more appropriate strategies are likely to gain more legitimacy (Galaskiewicz, 
1985) and, consequently, will have more leeway and resources to employ structures and 
strategies as well as to develop new products and markets that can enhance organizational 
performance (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Child, 1977).  
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The focus on legitimacy as a commodity or a resource, with a focal organization 
vying to gain and maintain it (Suddaby et al., 2017; Suchman, 1995), lead to a productive 
stream of research, particularly in strategic management research. For instance, Elsbach 
and Sutton (1992) show how, in the incidence of illegitimate action by organizational 
members, the focal organization can not only overcome the negative consequences of 
these actions but also use them to gain further legitimacy and resources for the 
organization. The authors qualitatively analyzed eight incidents by individual members of 
radical social movement organizations, EarthFirst and ACT UP. Their findings show that 
these organizations managed to enhance their legitimacy and gain further endorsement 
from their institutional environments through conforming to institutionalized practices 
and decoupling the legitimate organizational structure from the individual members’ 
actions. Elsbach (1994) elaborated on the role of impression management in gaining and 
maintaining organizational legitimacy through analyzing how managers use of verbal 
accounts to protect organizational legitimacy following controversial events.  
Deephouse (1996) further examined the relationship between organizational 
strategies and the external environment through operationalizing legitimacy as the 
outcome of isomorphic strategies. Regulators and the media will confer legitimacy on 
firms that employ the strategies used by other similar organizations, thus helping explain 
the classic neo-institutional question of the similarities between firms (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991). His work was further developed into the strategic balance theory 
(Deephouse, 1999) and optimal distinctiveness (Zhao, Fisher, Lounsbury, and Miller, 
2017; Irwin, Lahneman, and Parmigiani, 2017)  which addresses how organizations in an 
institutional environment need to navigate and balance differentiation from competitors 
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and isomorphism in order to both remain profitable and maintain legitimacy (Deephouse, 
1999).   
 As research on the organizational legitimacy proliferated, Suchman (1995) 
provided much-needed clarity and direction to the concept. He divided the scholars 
investigating organizational legitimacy into two groups: the strategic-focused group, 
whose work is detailed above with its focus on managerial discretion and actions, and the 
institutional group, idealized in the conceptualization of legitimacy as “sector-wide 
structuration dynamics that transcend any single organization’s purposive control” 
(Suchman, 1995). Besides his effort to merge the two lines together through identifying 
the various elements of legitimacy, Suchman (1995) provided the most widely used 
definition of legitimacy (Deephouse et al., 2017, Suddaby et al., 2017; Scott, 2013). 
Legitimacy is defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. This definition highlights three crucial 
components of legitimacy: the nature of legitimacy as a perception based on how 
observers see an entity (Bitektine and Haack, 2015; Tost, 2011);  the multi-level nature of 
the construct as subjectively constructed in the judgment of individuals, yet objectified 
into a social reality residing in a collective stakeholder group (Berger and Luckmann, 
1991); and more importantly, the institutionalist focus on the socially-constructed nature 
of legitimacy as itself the result of an evaluation process of how the entity and its action 
fit with socially-constructed references (Johnson et al., 2006).   
Aldrich and Fiol (1994) further galvanized research in legitimacy. The cited work 
signaled out legitimacy as a “more important issue than previously recognized” (:646) in 
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the social processes governing the emergence of new industries. The authors attempted to 
bridge the institutional focus on cognitive legitimacy, the taken-for-grantedness aspect of 
legitimation, with the emphasis on sociopolitical legitimacy, a hallmark of the strategic 
approach discussed earlier (Elsbach, 1994; Elsbach and Sutton, 1992). Anchoring their 
analysis on the “liability of newness” (Stinchcombe, 1965), Aldrich and Fiol theorized 
various strategies that industry pioneers can adopt on the institutional level to build trust 
across the organizational and interindustry level, eventually leading to the legitimation of 
the new industry, with a focus on socially-constructed processes such as framing and 
story-telling. Beyond merely survival, Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) theorized legitimacy 
as crucial for the procurement of the resources needed for new venture growth. Other 
research connected legitimacy with the emerging organizational identity of new 
industries (Clegg, Rhodes, and Kornberger, 2007; Foreman and Whetton, 2002) and 
further investigated the importance of legitimacy in the context of multinational 
enterprise (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999) bringing more nuance to the different analytical 
levels and stakeholders where legitimacy evaluations can happen.  In addition to the 
demands for institutional legitimacy, even with the organization as the focal point, 
Kostova and Zaheer (1999) theorized the role and tension brought upon by the need for 
internal legitimacy, defined as “the acceptance and approval of an organizational unit by 
the other units within the firm and, primarily, by the parent company” (p. 72). 
Starting with the early 2000s, scholarly interest shifted towards the dynamics of 
institutional change opening up new venues for analyzing legitimacy dynamics. Scott and 
colleagues uncovered more dynamics of legitimation through their work on healthcare 
providers and hospitals (Reuf and Scott, 1999; Scott et al., 2000) highlighting the role of 
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accreditation and certifications agencies as a source of organizational legitimacy. 
Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) analyzed the role of rhetoric strategies and the 
discursive struggles of achieving legitimation during periods of institutional upheaval. 
Huy, Corely, and Kraatz (2016) analyzed how the emotional responses of middle 
managers affected how they judge the legitimacy of organizational change agents.  
As this brief summary of legitimacy shows, research on the topic proliferated over 
the past few decades to include various theoretical foundations, contexts, foci, and 
methods. However, a few elements are common among this body of research, especially 
as it pertains to organizations and management studies. These can be summarized as the 
answer to four main questions: who legitimates, what is legitimated, how the process 
unfolds, and what the consequences of attaining legitimacy are. Researchers employed 
different combinations of these four basic building blocks to address the role of fit 
between a social entity and its environment. From the early strategic approaches to the 
current attention to institutional change, researchers have tended to focus on the 
organization(s) as a target of legitimation, a single entity as the legitimating source, and 
on the cognitive and regulative dimensions of legitimacy as the main criteria for 
fit/misfit. The legitimation process is then connected to different outcomes such as 
resource acquisition (Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978) and the diffusion of organizational 
forms and practices (Kennedy and Fiss, 2009). 
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Table 1: Major empirical articles investigating legitimacy 
  Article Subject of 
Legitimacy 
Sources of 
Legitimacy 
Criteria of 
Legitimacy 
Methods/Data 
Elsbach and Sutton 
(1992) 
Two social 
movement 
organizations 
The media 
representing society at 
large 
Pragmatic Qualitative: 
interviews and media 
accounts 
Elsbach (1994) 
 
Cattle industry in 
California 
 
Internal members of 
the industry 
External evaluators 
Regulative 
Cognitive 
Qualitative: 
interviews and media 
accounts 
 
Deephouse (1996) Banking industry Regulators,  
The media 
representing the 
society and large 
Regulative Quantitative: media 
accounts, financial 
statements 
Lamertz and Baum 
(1998) 
Canadian 
companies 
The media 
representing society at 
large 
Cognitive Qualitative: media 
accounts 
Reuf and Scott 
(1999) 
hospital 
organizations in the 
San Francisco MSA 
Professional bodies Normative Quantitative: archival 
data 
Arendt and Bigelow 
(2000) 
Hospital 
organizations in 
Massachusetts 
External evaluators Cognitive Qualitative: archival 
data 
Human and Provan 
(2000) 
Two networks in the 
US wood-products 
manufacturing 
industry 
Internal evaluators 
External evaluators 
Internal 
External 
Mixed Methods: 
interviews, surveys, 
and archival data 
Stew and Epstien 
(2000) 
Industrial 
organizations, 
Fortune 500 
The media 
representing society at 
large 
Stockholders 
Cognitive Quantitative: 
financial statements, 
media accounts, other 
archival data 
Pollack and Rindova 
(2003) 
Public organizations 
IPOs 
the media representing 
society at large 
Pragmatic Quantitative: media 
accounts, financial 
statements 
Bansal and Clelland 
(2004) 
organizations from 
polluting industries 
The media 
representing society at 
large 
Corporate 
Environmental 
Quantitative: media 
accounts 
Suddaby and 
Greenwood (2005) 
Big Five 
Accounting firms 
Government regulators Cognitive Quantitative: texts 
including testimonial 
transcripts and 
supporting 
documents 
Navis and Glynn 
(2010) 
  
Firms in satellite 
radio 
  
Securities analysts 
The media 
representing society at 
large 
Pragmatic 
Cognitive 
Mixed methods: 
archival data 
Desai (2011) US railroad firms The media 
representing society at 
large 
 
Moral Quantitative: press 
releases 
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Table 1 (continued). 
  Article 
Subject of 
Legitimacy 
Sources of 
Legitimacy 
Criteria of 
Legitimacy 
Methods/Data 
Lamin and Zaheer 
(2012) 
Firms  Wall Street Normative Quantitative: media 
accounts 
    The media 
representing society at 
large 
    
Drori and Honing 
(2013) 
  
Single organization 
  
Employees 
The market 
Internal 
External 
Qualitative: 
ethnographic 
fieldwork, 
interviews, and 
media accounts 
  
Pahnke, Katila, and 
Eisenhardt (2015) 
  
  
Young firms 
  
  
Venture capitalists 
Corporate venture 
capitalists 
Government funders 
Pragmatic 
  
  
Quantitative: patents, 
archival data 
  
  
Rueede and Kreutzer 
(2015) 
  
Single inter-
organizational 
partnership 
  
 Two partners 
  
Internal 
External 
Qualitative: 
interviews, media 
reports, and 
observations 
  
Weidner, Weber, and 
Gobel (2016) 
  
Social enterprises 
worldwide 
  
The two partners 
External partners 
Inter-partner 
legitimacy 
External 
Quantitative: surveys 
  
Hempel and Tracey 
(2017) 
Single organization The media 
representing the elite 
The media 
representing The 
British citizenry at 
large 
Normative Qualitative: media 
accounts, archival 
records 
Tracey, Delpiaz, and 
Phillips (2018) 
Single organization External audiences Local-level 
Category-level 
Qualitative: 
interviews, media 
accounts, 
observations 
Desai (2018) Law enforcement 
agency/year 
The public Pragmatic Quantitative: public 
survey data 
The dynamics of legitimacy that this dissertation will explore relate to the three 
main aspects of legitimacy: who legitimates a social entity i.e. sources, what is 
legitimated i.e. subjects of legitimacy, and how an entity is evaluated i.e. the criteria of 
legitimacy. My goal is to investigate two overlooked aspects in legitimacy studies. First, 
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organizations are increasingly becoming a venue for political and social activity, not 
merely an agent for economic growth. As firms engage in, and become subject to, the 
political dynamics of external and internal stakeholder communities, the question of who 
legitimates the organization becomes even more crucial, especially as these multiple 
entities attain enough power to affect the future of the organization. Research in strategy 
has begun to tackle these relationships such as that between firms and activists groups 
(Baron, 2003; Reid and Toffel, 2009), corporate political action (Oliver and Holzinger, 
2008), and stakeholders relations (Henisz, Dorobantu, and Nartey, 2014). However, as I 
will showcase in the next part, research on how this multiplicity of stakeholder 
communities engage in legitimating organizations is scant.  
Further, as mentioned, organizations across all sectors are increasingly called 
upon to tackle an increasingly complicating array of social and environmental issues, 
involving multiple and often highly contesting stakeholder communities (George et al, 
2016). One touted approach for dealing with these issues revolves around a distributed 
experimentation process where multiple solutions are designed and implemented 
concurrently and those that are judged as effective are institutionalized and diffused to 
the termination of others (Ferraro et al., 2015). This approach calls for a nuanced 
consideration of the legitimacy mix, bringing the “who legitimates” question to the fore. 
Experimentation with solutions demands the participation of multiple stakeholder 
communities who are part of or affected by the focus issue. As mentioned, it is expected 
that the socially-constructed values, goals, and criteria of legitimacy of each of these 
communities will differ (Fisher et al., 2017; Grodal and O’Mahoney, 2017). Thus, any 
proper assessment (i.e. evaluation) of a solution as successful and/or diffusible will 
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inevitably require the inclusion of various stakeholder communities and an understanding 
of the dynamics of legitimation between them.  
Integrating all stakeholder communities in the legitimation process requires more 
sensitivity to the time component. Multiple sources of legitimacy are embedded in the 
legitimation process. The flow of time could affect the dynamics by changing the type of 
stakeholder communities involved and the criteria used for evaluations. Hints on the 
effect of time on legitimacy can be gleaned from recent studies. David and Litrico (2017) 
found that stakeholders are likely to shift their positions between opponents and 
proponents of specific practices over time, depending on which stakeholder group is 
more involved with the core issue. Similarly, a few studies found that the criteria for 
evaluating the fit of an organization can change over time (Drori and Honing, 2014; Huy 
et al., 2014). Thus, it is crucial to analyze the interactions of multiple stakeholder 
communities over time, incorporating the changes in the context, the subject, and the 
criteria of legitimation. 
Importantly for the criteria of legitimacy, research has long captured legitimacy 
through analyzing language and rhetoric. However, I will argue, in line with a trickle of 
studies, that a fuller picture of legitimacy must include how individuals and groups 
experience the organization as embodied and emotional beings in physical space (Huy et 
al, 2014). This dimension of experiential legitimacy (Nilsson 2015; Hallet and Ventresca, 
2006) is all the more important in the evaluations of new organizational solutions to 
social and environmental issues where at least one of the stakeholder communities has to 
“live” the solutions. Such is the case, for example, with local solutions to homelessness 
such as rest stops where the homeless are allowed to spend the night in designated camps.  
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Before delving deeper into the dynamics under investigation, I will analyze the 
three main elements of legitimacy as they pertain to the research question guiding this 
dissertation, how proto-institutions are legitimated among diverse stakeholder 
communities, highlighting the current state of the literature, with a focus on the research 
gaps I tackle empirically. 
Who Legitimates: The Challenge of Multiple Stakeholder Communities 
As mentioned, and despite the expansive body of literature on legitimacy summarized 
above, one important aspect of legitimacy remains regretfully understudied. Research on 
the sources of legitimacy, generally referring to “an entity that makes either explicit or 
tacit judgments about a focal organization” (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008), has largely 
focused on one or two stakeholder communities and how they assess the legitimacy of the 
organization. The challenge of understanding how a diversity of stakeholders assess and 
grant legitimacy to an organization have received little attention, an often-lamented gap 
in our knowledge (Suddaby et al., 2017; Fisher, et al., 2017; Deephouse et al., 2017; 
Uberbacher, 2014; Lamin and Zaheer, 2012; Zott and Huy, 2007). In this section, I will 
showcase existing research on the sources of organizational legitimacy and how scholars 
identify the collective communities who have “the capacity to mobilize and confront the 
organization” (Meyer and Rowan, 1983).  
Internal and External Sources of Legitimacy 
The most basic division of internal and external stakeholders is a good place to 
start and can be regarded as the foundational analytical tool for research on sources of 
legitimacy. External stakeholders include professional bodies, unions, investors, state 
regulators, accreditation agencies, the media, and the general public. Legitimacy with 
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external stakeholders is crucial for the very existence and survival of an organization as 
“most stakeholders will not transact with entities they regarded as illegitimate” 
(Deephouse al., 2017). Thus, these sources are crucial for securing resources for the 
organization (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Pollock and Rindova, 2003; Zimmerman 
and Zeitz, 2002), for maintaining the right to operate (Heinsz and Zelner, 2005; Kostova 
and Zaheer, 1999), or increasing financial performance (Lamin and Zaheer, 2012; 
Heugens and Lander, 2009; Stew and Epstien, 2000). 
Less studied than its counterpart, internal stakeholders include distinct groups 
within the organization such as workers, managers, and board members. Recent research 
has highlighted the role of these stakeholders to the legitimacy processes in an 
organization. For instance, Drori and Honing (2013) conceptualized internal legitimacy 
as “the acceptance or normative validation of an organizational strategy through the 
consensus of its participants, which acts as a tool that reinforces organizational practices 
and mobilizes organizational members around a common ethical, strategic or ideological 
vision”. Using an in-depth longitudinal analysis of an Israeli firm, the authors examined 
the role of internal stakeholders in organizational legitimacy through validating and 
enacting organizational practices. Taking a micro-level approach, research in institutional 
work also highlights the efforts internal stakeholders engage in to maintain the internal 
legitimacy of rules and institutions following everyday disruptions (Heaphy, 2013; Lok 
and de Rond, 2013).  
It is worth noting that the myriad of stakeholders may seem intractable, however, 
not all groups are involved in the legitimation process at every point in time (Reuf and 
Scott, 1999). Analysis of organizational legitimacy have parsed and identified different 
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groups as the main legitimating agents for the organization depending on the context 
(mature, new venture, new practice etc.) and the dimension of the legitimacy under 
investigation (regulative, cultural/cognitive, moral/normative, inter-partner etc.) (Zietsma 
et al., 2017). For instance, the pioneering work of Reuf and Scott (1999) on the 
healthcare system highlighted the diversity of legitimating stakeholder communities, 
however, they emphasized the “normative assessments by industry-wide professional 
associations” as more salient for the hospital population under investigation in the study. 
Drori and Honing (2013) analyzed moral, pragmatic, and cognitive legitimacy within an 
organization, but focused only on how two related internal stakeholders, artists, and 
programmers, interacted with the changing organizational context over time.  
The State and Society-at-Large 
Much attention in legitimacy has focused on the powerful institutional agents in 
an organization’s external environment. Researchers have analyzed the role of the state as 
a legitimating agent (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2005; Russo, 2001; Kostova and Zaheer, 
1999). Beyond the state as the legitimating source, other research used a bird’s eye view 
with a broader focus on society-at-large as a legitimacy source. The density dependence 
research in organizational ecology (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008) posited that the more 
widespread a practice or an organizational form is, the more legitimate it must be. Thus, 
the number of adopters in a population is an indication, or rather a proxy, of how 
legitimate that population perceives the practice (Hannan and Carroll, 1992; 1995).  
However, as noted by institutional theorists, adoption in-of-and-itself does not signal the 
institutionalization of a practice as organizational behavior can be guided by other 
considerations (Zucker, 1989). Further, the rich dynamics and relationships between the 
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different stakeholder in the process of legitimation (Johnson et al., 2006; Lawrence et al., 
2001) are lost in this approach. As many studies show, adoption of an emerging social 
arrangement, be it a practice, a venture, or a market category, is a highly contested 
process (Jung and Mun, 2017; Hensel, 2017) with many possible variations (Fiss et al., 
2012; Fiss and Zajac). Rather, adoption occurs as a product of meaning-making (David 
and Litrico, 2017; Meyer and Hollerer, 2010) and work by institutional entrepreneurs to 
frame and change the dynamics of the field and the perceptions of the other stakeholder 
communities (Gray et al., 2015; Navis and Glynn, 2010; Briscoe and Safford, 2008). 
These dynamics play out at the risk of the new social arrangement disintegrating as it 
navigates the conflicting demands of these various stakeholder communities (Younkin, 
2016; Pache and Santos, 2010) 
Another often used proxy for society-at-large is the media. The role of the media 
as a source of legitimacy features prominently in many studies starting back from 
Elsbach’s (1994) work on the California cattle industry, which melded insights from 
impression management with an institutional and strategic approach to legitimacy. The 
media allows for an account of the society-at-large legitimacy of a particular entity 
(Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). For instance, Bansal and Clelland (2004) used media 
accounts from two media sources, the Wall Street Journal and Press Release Newswire to 
analyze the interplay between illegitimating media accounts of a firm’s environmental 
performance, the firm’s response to these accounts, and stock price performance. The 
authors theorized that negative information about the firm in media outlets “influences 
investor judgments of a firm’s environmental legitimacy” to external stakeholders such as 
investors and the public, thus leading to a drop in stock price. Desai (2011) used media 
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accounts to examine the “defensive institutional work” (Maguire and Hardy, 2009) that 
organizations engage with to defend the industry after a field-wide disruption, thus 
predicting when organizations who are not involved in the disruption would engage in 
damage control efforts. 
 In this vein, Lamin and Zaheer (2012) offer one notable effort to analyze the 
diversity of stakeholder communities. The authors used media responses to delineate how 
firms use different strategies to defend their legitimacy against media attacks. The first 
stakeholder group, what they referred to as Wall Street, was represented by investors and 
operationalized as stock market performance. The legitimacy of organizations with the 
public was collectivized as Main Street and gauged using articles in media outlets that 
mention a firm’s association with sweatshops labor. A measure of normative legitimacy 
perception of the public is then constructed based on the valence of the article either 
positive or negative, and calculated over the 12-year period of the study. The study sheds 
much-needed light on how different strategies can affect legitimacy recovery among 
different stakeholders, however, its account of diversity is rather limited. Aggregating all 
possible public groups into one stakeholder, Main Street, fails to capture the complexity 
of the group which varies from non-government organizations (NGOs) and activists, 
consumers, distributers, and local communities, each group with its own expectation and 
concerns about the legitimacy of the focal organization. Even for the Wall Street group 
which, it can be argued, is more or less homogenous in its financial goals, the reliance on 
stock market price is an indicator of legitimacy does not account other non-financial 
motives for granting legitimacy to an organization. Many of these concerns can be 
attributed to the regression-based analysis of the study and its focus on the effects of 
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strategies over time than to the dynamics of legitimacy as well as to the focus solely on 
normative legitimacy. Lastly, Hampel and Tracey (2017) analyzed the historical press 
releases and media archives of Thomas Cook Agency to show how an organization can 
regain legitimacy after stigmatization. Their main stakeholders were homogenized into an 
Elites vs Society at-large collectivities. However, the focus was on the strategies that 
focal firm rather than on the specific dynamics of legitimation between the two 
stakeholder communities.  
Using the media as a source of legitimacy allows researchers to account for 
society-at-large dynamics of legitimacy; however, the approach comes with a few crucial 
caveats and blind spots. The empirical appeal of prestige media can obscure any possible 
contestation between media sources (Deephouse et al., 2017). Prestige media are usually 
connected to the voice of certain stakeholders to the detriment of others, and thus offer a 
biased account of society-at-large (Carter and Deephouse, 1999). Quantitatively, 
measures of legitimacy in the media have predominately relied on the Janis-Fadner 
coefficient of imbalance (Janis & Fadner, 1965). The measure compares favorable and 
unfavorable mention of an organization in the media to calculate a numerical measure of 
media perception. However, organizations who score the same ratio of favorable to 
unfavorable are treated as equally legitimate, regardless of the actual number of the 
mentions (Vergne, 2011; Deephouse and Carter, 2005). Thus, the accuracy of the 
measure is influenced by the visibility of an organization in the media (Vergne, 2011). 
More importantly, researchers have not used the media to account for the diversity of 
legitimacy judgments between the different stakeholder groups, but rather to portray 
legitimacy at a societal level. The best effort to account for diversity came in the 
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aforementioned work of Lamin and Zaheer (2012) who used the media only to highlight 
the legitimacy judgments of two broad organizational stakeholder groups, Main Street vs 
Wall Street.  
Promising Trends: More Inclusive Approaches 
Recently, research in entrepreneurship is beginning to pay attention to the 
diversity of stakeholders who could possibly grant resources and, thus, are prone to 
evaluate the legitimacy of a new venture (Fisher, Kotha, and Lahiri, 2016; Aldrich and 
Fiol, 1984). One notable theoretical effort used institutional logics (Thornton, et al., 
2012) to disentangle the stakeholders of a new venture into five main communities: 
crowdfunding backer, grant administrators, angel investors, venture capitalists, corporate 
venture capitalists (Fisher, et al. 2017). The authors assign a dominant logic to each 
group then proceed to theorize the best strategies to legitimate the new venture. While the 
effort still focuses on two stakeholder communities, it advances a more nuanced 
conceptualization of investors as a non-homogenous group, with multiple motivations 
and expectations. Tracy, Dalpiaz, and Phillips (2017) follow a similar approach to 
aggregating possible sources of legitimacy in their study of new venture creation through 
translation. An in-depth case is used to analyze a translation episode of an organizational 
form from its origins in Silicon Valley to Italy. The authors highlight and contrast 
different levels of legitimacy, local and category-level, however, they collapse their 
legitimating sources into investors and entrepreneurs, two stakeholders that exert similar 
legitimating pressures.  
Interorganizational relations have also received some attention as a source of 
legitimacy (Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978), the basic premise being that organizations can be 
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perceived as legitimate if they are connected with other legitimate entities in their 
environment. These connections include strategic alliances (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 
1999; Oliver, 2001), board memberships and interlocking directorships (Cohen and Dean, 
2005) as well as seeking certifications from national and international agencies (Richard, 
Zellweger, and Gond, 2017), and accreditations from professional associations (Scott et 
al., 2000). The need to account for a diversity of stakeholder communities is important to 
understand how these organizational forms can gain legitimacy in these contexts, thus 
researchers have introduced the concept of inter-partner legitimacy which refers to “the 
mutual acknowledgment by the alliance partners that their actions are proper in the 
developmental processes of the alliance’ (Wiender, Weber, and Gobel, 2016; Kumar and 
Das, 2007). This line of research, however, focuses on the two partners involved in the 
IOR, and how their actions legitimate the relationships. 
An extension of this line of research, focusing on multi-stakeholders partnerships, 
offers more promise to account for multiple sources of legitimacy. Rueede and Kreutzer 
(2015) analyzed the legitimation work, “the purposeful effort of the legitimacy seeker to 
avoid certain issues while ensuring other issues that are of importance to the conferrer of 
legitimacy”, of a newly-created cross-sector social partnership. They highlighted three 
phases in the legitimation process of the MSP with a different source of legitimacy 
throughout each phase: the two organizations in the partnership, and the humanitarian 
sector. Their analysis suggests that each of these legitimacy sources conferred legitimacy 
on different aspects of the partnership. However, the study does not address the different 
criteria of legitimacy upon which the stakeholder group made their evaluations, rather the 
authors focused on the legitimation strategy work used by the organization.   
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To summarize, various studies have highlighted the complex nature of demands 
and expectations an organization has to manage both externally and internally (Suddaby 
et al., 2017; Bitektine, 2015; Rueede and Kreutzer, 2015; Pache and Santos, 2010; Reuf 
and Scott, 1999) to be granted the legitimacy crucial to gain resources, operate, and 
perform (Deephouse et al., 2017). We currently know little about the uncertainty and 
contestations affecting the legitimation of proto-institutions as it occurs among multiple 
communities i.e. how diverse stakeholder communities construct different legitimacy 
judgments towards a new social entity. Prior research has focused mainly on one or two 
groups as the sole evaluators, a research gap that continues to be lamented in the field. In 
their research on the translation of new ventures between the US and Italy, Tracy et al. 
(2018) point to how “translating an organizational form whose local- and/or category-
level stakeholders exhibit greater diversity may alter substantively how these pressures 
are experienced”. In their recent review of the field, Suddaby et al (2017) underline how 
“legitimacy scholars have been unable to understand how legitimacy manifests among 
different audiences”. Only a few studies engaged with multiple sources of legitimacy 
head-on, scattered between research on new ventures (Fisher et al., 2017), the new model 
of social judgment (Bitektine and Haack, 2015; Bitektine, 2011), and the legitimacy of 
MSPs (Rueede and Kreutzer, 2015). These studies offer a promising theoretical 
foundation to a broader analysis of legitimacy, however, save for a few empirical 
attempts (Haack and Sweike, 2017; Rueede and Kreutzer, 2015; Panke, Katila, and 
Eisenhardt, 2015), the full potential of this line of research remains untapped. 
Importantly, these studies highlight the centrality of contestations between 
stakeholder communities as fundamental to a proper understanding of the emergence, 
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survival, and diffusion of any social entity. These communities control various and 
different resources that the focal entity needs to survive (Fisher et al., 2017; Uberbacker, 
2014). These different sources of legitimacy will only share their resources with the focal 
entity, i.e. the subject of legitimacy, if they evaluate it as fit with a source-specific sets of 
criteria that are likely to vary widely from one source to another (Pahnke et al., 2005). 
These studies suggest that social entities are vulnerable to the contestations between the 
different stakeholder communities due to the different meanings and roles that every 
community could attribute to the emerging entity (Pache and Santos, 2011; Meyer and 
Hollerer, 2010). Thus, every stakeholder community will develop certain criteria for 
evaluating the social arrangement. Contestations occur as a result of the incompatibilities 
of the source-criteria combinations. For a social entity i.e. the subject of legitimation, 
navigating these dynamics requires an understanding of the sources, the criteria, and 
importantly, how these two elements evolve over time. And the stakes could not be 
higher. Failure to properly simultaneously balance the different stakeholder communities 
i.e. to be evaluated as a wrong fit by a stakeholder community, can lead to loss of 
legitimacy and/or stigmatization (Hampel and Tracey, 2017; Lamin and Zaheer, 2012), 
loss of resources (Pahnke et al., 2015), and possible failure and disintegration of the 
social entity (Furnari, 2018; Pache and Santos, 2013).  
These dynamics of contestations are increasingly becoming ubiquitous with all 
forms of social organizing: new ventures (Fisher et al., 2017; Pahnke et al., 2015); social 
enterprises (Weidner, Weber, and Gobel, 2016; Battilana and Lee, 2014); established 
organizations (Hampel and Tracey, 2017; Baumann-Pauly et al., 2016), categories (Navis 
and Glynn, 2010) industries (Lamin and Zaheer, 2012; Zelner et al., 2010) and even 
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entire fields (Desai, 2011). Contestations are likely to intensify as more distinct 
stakeholder communities enter the political fray, exerting new influences and adding to 
the complexity around organizations (Vermuelen, Zietsma, Greenwood, and Langley, 
2016; Ryanard et al., 2016).  
For example, how would these contestations between stakeholder holder 
communities affect new ventures? A new venture needs to navigate conflicting demands 
as it emerges onto a local industry context. Seeking funding, the venture can tap into 
different sources such as crowdfunding, angel investors, government agencies, ventures 
capitalists, or corporate venture capitalists (Fisher et al., 2017). However, each of these 
stakeholder communities has different demands, expectations, and goals. Crowd-funders 
are likely to evaluate the venture based on how it contributes to the community, while 
venture capitalists and angel investors base evaluations mostly on the economic returns. 
Thus, each community will likely use different criteria of legitimacy in the evaluation 
process (Fisher et al., 2016; 2017). However, a pertinent question is if and how the 
evaluation process changes over time as these different communities interact around the 
new venture (Jay, 2013). While researchers have analyzed the various strategies that 
entrepreneurs can engage with (Fisher et al., 2017), we lack a proper understanding of the 
interactions between the different stakeholders and how the criteria of evaluation evolve 
over time.  
Understanding these limitations legitimation conflicts at the nexus of sources-
criteria are more urgent and perplexing for social entities that combine multiple aspects 
of different organizational forms, referred to as hybrid organizations (Battilana and Lee, 
2014). These entities are more common as the line between public, private, and nonprofit 
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sectors is blurred leading to the emergence of organizations that combine elements of 
commercial businesses, nonprofits organizations, private charities (Battilana and Lee, 
2014; Haigh and Hoffman, 2014; Battilana and Dorado, 2010). These hybrid 
organizations are “by nature arenas of contradictions” (Pache and Santos, 2013: 972) 
pulled apart by different demands and pressures from different stakeholder communities. 
Each community evaluates the organization based on different criteria and have the 
power to withhold valuable resources from the organization. For example, a social 
enterprise equally combines for-profit operations with a non-profit mission and 
community goals (Battilana and Lee, 2014). Thus, the organization is legitimated 
externally by the investors, who seek financial return on the organizations assets, the 
community, evaluating based on mission fulfillment, and the local government with its 
own political and social agenda, in addition to internal constituents such as the 
beneficiaries, who evaluate their experience with the organization (Battilana, Sengul, 
Pache, and Model, 2015), and the owners/operators of the organization. Researchers have 
analyzed how social enterprises attempt to balance the conflicting demands of 
performance, profitability, morality, community engagement, and growth. However, we 
still lack an in-depth understanding of how legitimation unfolds as the hybrid 
organization evolves over time with different source-criteria combinations. 
And these dynamics extend beyond the archetype of social enterprises to new 
organizational forms that operate with contradicting mandates from different stakeholder 
communities (Battilana and Lee, 2014) even if these contradictions are not readily 
perceptible (Voronov and Yorks, 2015). For instance, corporations implementing social 
responsibility practices are increasingly facing legitimacy challenges as the fundamentals 
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of commercial success such as profitability and growth are contested (Haigh and 
Hoffman, 2014). Put differently, established organizations can no longer rely on being 
perceived as legitimate with on the shareholders (pragmatic legitimacy) or the market 
category and local government (cognitive legitimacy) as the moral legitimacy of existing 
business models is increasingly questions by social activists and consumers (Baumann-
Pauly, Scherer, and Palazzo, 2016; Palazzo and Scherer, 2006). The legitimacy of a focal 
organization is, thus, constantly being reproduced through the interactions between an 
increasing array of stakeholder communities in increasingly political institutional 
contexts (Zietsma et al., 2017).  
An important element in the source-rooted contestations is the development of 
different and possibly conflicting criteria for evaluating a social entity. In this following 
part, I briefly summarize our knowledge on criteria of legitimacy.    
Criteria of Legitimacy 
One of the more common approaches to legitimacy analysis hinges on identifying certain 
aspects of the concept and delving into the dynamics connecting it to organizational 
goals. Beyond Aldrich and Fiol’s (1994) conceptualization of cognitive and sociopolitical 
legitimacy, two main frameworks are important to this discussion. Scott (2013) identified 
three forms of legitimacy which he associated with the institutional pillars. Cognitive 
legitimacy with its focus on the taken-for-grantedness and conforming to common 
cultural accounts, normative legitimacy “stresses a deeper, moral base for assessing” the 
behavior of an entity, and regulative legitimacy with its focus on adhering to formal laws 
(Scott, 2013). 
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Suchman (1995) elaborated this framework through adding a temporal dimension 
and constructing a typology of twelve legitimacy types. However, subsequent analysis 
has primarily focused on his three basic dimensions of pragmatic, moral, and cognitive 
legitimacy. Pragmatic legitimacy rests on the “self-interested calculations of an 
organization’s most immediate audience” (Suchman, 1995). The more responsive an 
organization is to the stakeholders’ interests and demands, the more legitimacy it will 
gain, what Suchman termed influence legitimacy. This type of legitimacy is close to the 
resource-based view of legitimacy where legitimacy is conceptualized as a commodity 
that can be gained from observers in exchange for concessions and behaviors deemed 
desirable (Suddaby et al., 2017; Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). 
Further, observers are likely to grant dispositional legitimacy to organizations they 
believe “have their best interest at heart” (Suchman, 1995).  
On the other hand, moral legitimacy is not based on what the organization is 
doing for its observers but on an assessment of whether an organization’s actions are “the 
right thing to do”. Thus, it is based on the socially-constructed value systems of a target 
stakeholder (Tost, 2011; Navis and Glynn, 2010). Various aspects of an organization can 
be subject to moral assessment by an evaluating stakeholder. Consequential legitimacy 
focuses on the outputs and consequences of the organization’s actions. Procedural 
legitimacy judges the methods an organization uses to achieve certain results. 
Stakeholders can also grant legitimacy to an organization merely because they perceive it 
as belonging to a favorable category or group. Lastly, the character of the individual 
leaders and member of an organization could be a source of legitimacy if they are judged 
favorably by the stakeholder, what Suchman (1995) terms charismatic legitimacy.  
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 Lastly, cognitive legitimacy can be construed as a form of passive acceptance of 
the existence and actions of an organization as “the way it is” (Suchman, 1995; 
Jepperson, 1991). This form of legitimacy is rooted in the idea of taken-for-grantedness 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1978) an emblematic concept in institutional theory and yet one of 
the most difficult to measure (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Carrol and Hannan, 1989). 
However, this type of legitimacy is regarded as the sine-qua-none of legitimation for an 
organization, where the mere existence of other forms of organization is unthinkable. 
Moreover, Suchman (1995) theorized a second type of cognitive legitimacy. 
Comprehensibility refers to the availability of cultural models for an organization will 
furnish individuals with meaningful and plausible accounts for its existence and actions 
i.e. rendering the organization readily comprehensible to the sources of legitimacy.  
 As pointed out in Deephouse et al. (2017), the bases of legitimacy boil down to 
the four criteria of regulative, pragmatic, moral, and cognitive-culture (Scott, 2013). I 
follow the approach of Deephouse et al., (2017) in using the term criteria rather than 
dimensions or elements which are commonly used. Criteria highlight the evaluative 
nature of legitimacy judgments as well as the socially-constructed, and consequently 
varying, nature of the evaluations, rooted in negotiation, debates, and the history of each 
stakeholder community involved in the legitimation process.  
 The relationship between the different criteria has received less attention in 
legitimacy analysis, not to mention it has been marred by more confusion in the literature 
(Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). Reuf and Scott (1999) argued that not all legitimacy 
assessments are of equal importance for a subject of legitimacy, thus, implying a process 
where different criteria are more salient at different periods of time. They emphasized the 
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precedence of normative legitimacy as the dominant criteria of legitimacy needed for the 
organizations to operate. This criteria, later conceptualized as moral legitimacy 
(Deephouse and Suchman, 2008), relates to how an organization is evaluated as 
conforming to the norms of a certain industry as applied by formal professional entities.  
Closer to the conceptualization used in this study, Suchamn (1995) suggested a 
progression whereby a social entity starts with conforming to some form of pragmatic 
criteria of evaluation, preceding to moral evaluations before ultimately becoming 
cognitive accepted as the way-things-are-done. Throughout this progression, legitimacy 
“becomes more elusive to obtain and more difficult to manipulate, but it also becomes 
more subtle, more profound, and more self-sustaining, once established”. Researchers 
continued to emphasize pragmatic legitimacy as the primary aspect for evaluation for an 
organization i.e. legitimate organizations are successful in serving the interests of their 
main stakeholders (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999). The focus on pragmatic criteria is 
especially pronounced with the creation of new ventures (Uberbaker, 2014) due to the 
focus on sources of financial backing as the main source of legitimacy (Fisher et al., 
2017; Pahnke et al., 2015).  
Only recently did researchers engage with the criteria of legitimacy as a dynamic 
and evolving concept. In their study of change agents, Drori and Honing (2013) proposed 
a more inclusive model where pragmatic, moral, and cognitive evaluations co-occur 
depending on the source of legitimacy. At the initiation of a change process within an 
organization, internal stakeholder communities focus on pragmatic and moral evaluations 
of the proposed change, while external stakeholders push for evaluations rooted in how 
the organization fit a specific industry category i.e. cognitive legitimacy. As the change 
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initiative is implemented, alignment between the evaluations of the internal and external 
stakeholders could possibly lead to the acceptance of the change i.e. cognitive legitimacy. 
Conversely, in another analysis of organizational change, Huy et al. (2014) suggested a 
process of legitimacy evaluating that starts with the cognitive legitimacy, before shifting 
to moral and ultimately to pragmatic legitimacy, i.e. running counter to Reuf and Scott 
(1999). Lastly, Tost (2011) proposed a model where all the various evaluations occur 
concurrently through a process of social construction and interactions between the 
individual, the group, and the local context.  
As this analysis of the literature shows, more research is needed that elaborates on 
and integrates the nature of the legitimacy criteria (Deephouse et al., 2017; Deephouse 
and Suchman, 2008). While researchers are only starting to uncover the dynamics of 
criteria, two findings are particularly important to my analysis: the need for a deeper 
analysis of the variation in criteria depending on the source of legitimacy (Fisher et al., 
2017; Drori and Honing, 2013; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008); and the need to 
understand the content the criteria and it shifts over time through interactions between 
sources and the context (David and Litrico, 2017; Huy et al., 2014; Tost, 2011). 
 The first of these research gap, the source-criteria combination, is crucial for the 
reasons I explained in the previous sections. Simply put, the criteria of legitimacy on 
which a social entity is evaluated will vary depending on the stakeholder community 
engaged in the evaluation process. Social entities are increasingly subject to complex and 
multiple demands from various stakeholders. Hence, understanding the criteria will allow 
a focal social entity to adjust its strategies and attributes to gain a positive evaluation with 
a particular stakeholder community, thus continue to receive the resources it needs 
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(Fisher et al., 2017; Jay, 2013; Aldrich and Fiol, 1994).  Drori and Honing (2013) study 
of internal vs external legitimacy broached these dynamics, albeit it did not tackle the 
criteria directly, rather focusing on the broad legitimation process. The authors do not 
delve into the diversity of these external stakeholder communities or their criteria for 
legitimacy, thus collapsing all these important differences into a simple 
moral/cognitive/pragmatic demands.  
This relates to the second need, analyzing the content of legitimacy criteria as 
socially-constructed. Contestations between multiple stakeholder communities emphasize 
interactions and a process of social negotiation where these interactions shape the 
meaning-making process of the stakeholder communities (Suddaby et al., 2017; Tost, 
2011; Meyer and Hollerer, 2010) Framing legitimacy as a process where the fit of the 
focal organization is reproduced over time suggests a change in how every stakeholder 
community constructs the criteria of evaluation, depending on the evolution of the subject 
organization (Desai, 2018; McLean and Benham, 2010), engagement with other 
stakeholder communities (Hoffman, 1999), and changes in the institutional contexts 
(Rao, Monin, and Duran, 2003; Russo, 2001) to name a few possible interactions.  
Thus, it is established that an organization needs to grasp as much as possible the 
content of the legitimacy criteria at a point in time i.e. the evaluation criteria it needs to 
conform with in order to attain resources and support from a specific stakeholder 
community. More importantly, I argue that it is more crucial to understand the source-
criteria combinations over time. The increasing complexity of organizational contexts 
(Raynard et al., 2013) coupled with high exposure to public opinion through the internet 
and social media (Castello, Etter, and Nielse, 2016) render organizations more vulnerable 
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to disruptions and contentious politics (de Bakker, Hond, King, Weber, 2013; King and 
Pearce, 2010). As organizations reckon with increasing uncertainty around the players 
and key issues at a certain point in time, more in-depth understanding of legitimation 
criteria as socially constructed through the relationships between stakeholder 
communities (Suddaby et al., 2017; Bitektine and Haack, 2015; Suchman, 1995) as 
opposed to static entities (Widener et al., 2016) will allow for the adoption of better 
strategies (Jay, 2013) to achieve fit with the various stakeholders (Deephouse, 1999).  
Investigating legitimation criteria as socially constructed is especially important 
in order tto account for evaluations rooted in emotions and intersubjective experience, a 
recent development in legitimacy research. As mentioned, researchers have studied the 
criteria of legitimacy with a focus on reason and logic i.e. an actor evaluates a subject in 
relation to how it conforms with cause-effect or self-interested calculations (pragmatic 
legitimacy), values (moral legitimacy), or take-for-granted standards such as 
certifications and laws (cognitive legitimacy). These evaluations are rooted in the 
analysis of symbols such as language and discourse (Deephouse et al., 2017).  
However, recent research suggests an increasing role of emotions (Voronov, 
2014) and materiality (Monteiro and Nicollini, 2015; Jones et al., 2013) in various 
institutional processes including legitimacy. Huy et al. (2014) analyzed the emotions of 
employees shifted over the course of an organization change process, leading to different 
legitimacy evaluations. Haack, Farrer, and Sherer (2014) analyzed the role of positive 
emotional evaluations in the legitimation of innovations that do not fit into a familiar 
‘cognitive’ category.  
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So how would the subjective experience of a social entity affect the source-
criteria combination and the legitimation process? A possible answer emerges through 
paying more attention to “the capacity of objects, spaces, technological equipment, and 
other material elements to literally, not metaphorically, construct social life” (Monteiro 
and Nicollini, 2015:63). For instance, Battilana et al. (2015) analyzed a social enterprise 
that hired unemployed people, usually from low-income populations or ex-criminals, to 
manufacture products that are then sold to public consumers. In their analysis, the authors 
highlighted the tension in balancing the mission of the organization to benefit the 
community and the economic demands of maintaining profitable operations. However, 
how would the beneficiaries, those working at the social enterprise, evaluate the 
subjective experience of being in the manufacturing plant, the desks, the meals, the 
technologies, or the relationships between them and management? This particular source 
is likely to develop criteria for evaluation that is entirely different from that of other 
sources such as the end consumers, or the social entrepreneurs leading the operation. Yet, 
this specific source-criteria combination is equally valid as if the beneficiaries evaluate 
the organization as improper or a bad fit, they can negatively affect the operation.  
I capture the intersubjective experience of a legitimacy source through with the 
term experiential legitimacy, defined as, the evaluations of the way the internal subjective 
experiences of field members do or do not reflect legitimated regulations, norms, and 
beliefs. (Nilsson, 2015; Hallet and Ventresca, 2006) 
The last piece in my literature review unpacks the current perspectives on the 
process of legitimation. 
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The Subjects of Legitimacy, Legitimation, and Institutionalization 
 In their review of the literature, Deephouse and Suchman (2008) used the term 
subjects of legitimacy to refer to the “social entities, structures, actions, and ideas whose 
acceptability is being assessed” by a specific community of evaluators. I believe the term 
is apt as it highlights the nature of legitimacy as a socially-constructed product of the “the 
subject’s relation to other rules, laws, norms, values, and cognitive frameworks in a 
larger social system” (p. 54). Management and institutional scholars have studied the 
legitimacy of many subjects including organizations (Elsbach and Sutton, 1992; Reuf and 
Scott, 1999; Hudson and Okhuysen, 2009), markets (Navis and Glynn, 2010), industries 
(Elsbach, 1994; Russo, 2001; Zelner, Henisz, and Holburn, 2009), practices (Stew and 
Epstein, 2000), professions (David, Sine, and Haveman, 2013), teams (Deeds, Mang, and 
Frandsen, 2004), technologies (Hargadon and Douglas, 2001), categories (Lee, Hiatt, and 
Lounsbury, 2017; Callen, et al., 2016), new ventures (Tracy, et al.,2018; Fisher, et al., 
2016; and the list goes on to include even more social entities (Deephouse and Suchman, 
2008; Johnson, 2004).  
 A common theme among most, if not all, of these subjects is the implicit advance 
towards a taken-for-grantedness state i.e. institutionalization, where the subject’s 
existence is resilient all forms of questioning (Scott, 2013; Deephouse and Suchman, 
2008; DiMaggio and Powell, 1999). It is at this level of legitimacy, what Suchman (1995) 
referred to as the peak of cognitive legitimacy, that a subject’s existence, goals, values, 
and fit with the social system are no longer subject to strong evaluative assessments by 
stakeholder group. The subject can thus enjoy its status as accepted (Deephouse et al., 
2017) with the consequent flow of resources and explicit and/or implicit support from 
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society. The achievement of cognitive and cultural legitimacy allows a subject to be 
institutionalized (Scott, 2013; Colyvas and Jonsson, 2011). 
 Much of this research stream subsumes legitimation as a stage in the 
institutionalization process (Scott, 2013; Tolbert and Zucker, 2006), mostly focusing on 
the role of the institutional entrepreneur(s) in propelling the subject forward through the 
different stages. This involves engaging in a collective process of persuasion (Suddaby et 
al., 2017) or translation (Tracey et al., 2017) to construct the legitimacy of a focal social 
entity. Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings (2002) proposed a model of institutional 
change where the moral and pragmatic legitimacy of a new organizational form is 
theorized as the answer to the failure of existing arrangements. Theorization refers to “a 
formulation of why and how the innovation is effective and an identification of the class 
of problems or organizations for whom it is suitable” (Scott, 2013:148). This mechanism 
has been analyzed as rhetorical strategies employed by institutional entrepreneurs 
(Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005) to legitimate new professions (David et al., 2013) and 
industries (Sine and Lee, 2009). It is widely studied as a major mechanism in 
institutionalization that precedes the diffusion of new organizational entities (Scott, 2013; 
Tolbert and Zucker, 2006; Suchman, 1995).  
However, this line of research has not yet provided a legitimation model that 
accounts for the various contestations between the different source-criteria combinations. 
This is likely due to the “tendency to conceive processes of legitimation as heroic acts of 
institutional change” (Suddaby et al., 2017: 462). Focusing on legitimation as an outcome 
of acts by a hyper-muscular entrepreneur (Suddaby, 2010b) provides insights into the 
strategies of legitimation through putting the entrepreneur as the heart of the analysis. 
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Yet, this approach washes out the interactions between the various stakeholder 
communities, the social construction of criteria, and the contestations of the source-
criteria combinations.  
 Legitimation studies offer an approach to analyze how subjects of legitimacy can 
move from challenged and debated, to an accepted and institutionalized state (Deephouse 
et al., 2017). Legitimation refers to the process through which “the legitimacy of a subject 
changes over time” (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Walker and Zelditch, 1993).   
Offering a model that privileges a more distributed and even account of 
legitimation, Johnson et al. (2006) proposed a multi-stage model that follows the creation 
of new subject of legitimation with a phase of local validation. In this phase of the 
legitimation process, local actors, either explicitly or implicitly, “must construe it as 
consonant with and linked to the existing, widely accepted cultural framework of beliefs, 
values, and norms” (p.60).  At the local level “once a subject is validated on the 
collective level”, it can start diffusing into “other, local situations” (Johnson et al., 2006), 
eventually becoming institutionalized (Colyvas and Jonsson, 2009; Zucker, 1991). This 
model assumes the “the presence of active disagreement within the social system, often 
among different stakeholders or between dissident stakeholders and the organization” 
(Deephouse et al., 2017:10), thus allowing for a proper understanding of the interactions 
between source-criteria combinations. 
It is these dynamics of local validation that I investigate in my dissertation, 
building on a handful of studies that attempted to use this approach. Drori and Honing 
(2013) proposed a model of local validation focusing on the alignment between internal 
and external stakeholders. The model highlights the dynamic nature of the legitimation, 
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however, it does not showcases the role of interactions between the various source-
criteria combinations and the nuances of the social construction of legitimacy. Similarly, 
Tracey et al., (2017) offer a model for the translation of new practices that emphasizes 
the different level of types of institutional work that the entrepreneurs engage in to gain 
legitimacy on the local and category level. Yet, the authors focus on investors as the main 
sources of legitimacy and provide less focus on the social construction of the legitimation 
criteria. Huy et al. (2014) analyzed local validation within an organization undergoing a 
major internal change episode. They highlighted the interaction between the subjective 
experience of the employees, analyzed as emotional reactions, and shifts in the 
legitimation criteria.  
I propose that the local validation to capture the dynamics of legitimacy of a new 
practice is debated between the various stakeholder communities. The focus on proto-
institutions allows me to explicate legitimation, the processes in which the stakeholder 
communities around an entity evaluate it for fit and/or appropriateness through 
connecting the actions and purposes of the entity to group-specific cultural frames 
(Colyvas and Jonsson, 2009), from the related and more extended process of 
institutionalization, “the process in which a practice becomes accepted or taken for 
granted and is therefore no longer questioned” (Hossfeld, 2018).  
Summary: The Legitimation of Proto-institution among Multiple Communities 
This goal of this dissertation is to explore the process of legitimation of a social entity 
among multiple stakeholder communities. In this chapter, I reviewed the body of work on 
legitimation with a focus on the three main building blocks pertinent to my research 
questions: who legitimates, what is the criteria for legitimacy, and how the process of 
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legitimation unfolds. My goal was to wade into the expansive body of literature on the 
topic and to hone in on what I argue are the crucial theoretical and empirical research 
gaps.  
The first gap I identify, and the first goal of this research project, relates to the 
sources of legitimacy (i.e. who legitimates). Beyond accounting for one or two sources, 
no prior work investigated how multiple stakeholder communities legitimate a social 
entity. As more organizations engage with their political and social environment 
(Deephouse et al., 2017; Raynard et al., 2013), there is an increasing demand for more 
inclusive accounts of legitimation to account for the growing scope of stakeholders 
whose social evaluation can affect the flow of resources to the organization (Fisher et al, 
2017; Drori and Honing, 2013). However, this process of local validation of legitimacy 
(Johnson et al., 2006) remains unexplored and undertheorized. I argue that the inclusion 
of multiple communities of stakeholders into this process is essential to understand the 
contestations surrounding any organizational claims of “fit”.  
In disentangling these accounts of fit, a second goal is to go beyond the focus on 
the typical regulative, moral, and cognitive criteria of legitimacy (Scott, 2013; Deephouse 
and Suchman, 2008). These symbolic criteria conceptualize legitimation as a purely 
cognitive process rooted in language and rhetoric (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; 
Elsbach, 1994). Conversely, in this dissertation, I will employ the concept of 
“experiential legitimacy” (Nilsson, 2015) to explore how the material aspect of a social 
entity shapes the experience of stakeholder communities and, consequently, legitimation 
process.  
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Importantly, I argue that emerging forms of social organization and emerging 
issue fields are ideal contexts to explore the aforementioned questions. Proto-institutions 
encompass various forms of novel social organizations such as new ventures, new 
organizational forms, and new practices. This quality of newness will allow me to 
investigate the legitimation process as it unfolds i.e. without the interference of the taken-
for-grantedness aspect of existing institutionalized forms. Further, the term provides the 
malleability to include both the symbolic and the material features of organizing which 
allows me to explore new forms as cognitive rules and practices, as well as interactions 
embedded in physical space and material structures. This aspect is crucial for 
investigating experience as a criteria for legitimacy.  
Issue fields, such as those formed around solving local social and/or 
environmental issues, are ideal venues to explore the legitimation process as various 
stakeholder communities experiment with various solutions i.e. proto-institutions (Ferraro 
et al., 2015; Zietsma and McKnight, 2013). In these fields, different communities are 
marked with “opposing interests and different perspectives toward the same issue” 
(Surachiakulwattana and Phillips, 2017). Under these conditions of institutional war, I 
argue that the legitimation of these proto-institutions will be highly contested as each 
community construct different, and possibly incompatible, evaluations of fit and/or 
success.  
 In the following section, I provide a detailed account of my methodology, 
including my context, cases, and analytical approach.  
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III.   METHODOLOGY 
3.1   Research Orientation 
My choices in research methodology are guided by two main orienting principles. 
First, my goal in this study is to generate new theoretical insights into a hitherto 
underexplored territory in legitimation research. Research on the diversity of legitimacy 
sources and the legitimation among multiple stakeholder communities is largely limited, 
save for a few studies (Rueede and Kretuzer, 2015) which mostly focused on either two 
stakeholder groups (Drori and Honing, 2013; Lamin and Zaheer, 2012) or narrow 
dimensions of legitimacy (Tracey et al., 2017). Second, I take the position that 
legitimacy, institutions, and organizations are socially-constructed concepts (Suchman, 
1995; Berger and Luckmann, 1991). Legitimacy is the “product of an ongoing process of 
social negotiation involving multiple participants” is a dynamic process” (Suddaby et al., 
2017). As such, legitimation unfolds on the field level through the interactions between 
different stakeholder communities, as “part of the contestation and co-creation of the 
general social order” (Suddaby et al., 2017; 462). Both these principles make an inductive 
approach the most appropriate for my inquiry (Edmundson and McManus, 2007; 
Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).  
I use an interpretivist approach following a revelatory logic (Langley and 
Abdallah, 2011; Yin 2009). The choice of revelatory cases offers “high potential for 
developing new insight into an understudied phenomenon” (Langley and Abdallah, 
2011). Hence, I chose to analyze an active issue field to reveal the dynamics of 
legitimation of proto-institutions.  
Issue fields are highly political arenas (Zietsma et al., 2017; Wooten and 
Hoffman, 2008), and are ideal for understanding these dynamics because they are 
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characterized by contestation of meaning (Meyer and Hoellerer, 2010). Different 
stakeholder communities “negotiate, govern, and/or compete over meanings and 
practices” (Zietsma et al., 2017: 400) around a focal issue (Wooten and Hoffman, 2008) 
with new field settlements emerging through this contestation process (Helms et al., 
2012; Meyer and Hoellerer, 2010; Rao and Kinney, 2008). These new entities (policies, 
organizations, laws, practices) continue to be subject for future contestation and 
evaluation over time (Huy, et al., 2014; Drori and Honing, 2013). The uncertainty around 
the future growth and possible institutionalization of these emerging settlements, i.e. 
proto-institutions, (Jung and Mun, 2017; Hensel, 2017) offers a great opportunity to 
analyze the legitimation process. 
A qualitative approach is ideal for interpretation as it allows the researchers to 
capture the diversity of meanings, values, goals, expectations and other elements 
constituting and jostling in the social system where the dynamics under investigation take 
place (Thornton, et al., 2012; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). To ground my findings in the 
participants’ voices and interpretations of social reality, I followed a systematic analysis 
approach, proceeding through constructing first-order categories, derived from raw data 
from interviews, news articles, and online sources. (Gehman, Glaser, Eisenhardt, Gioia, 
Langley, and Corley, 2017; Langley and Abdullah, 2011). I cycled between the data, 
categories, relevant research, and the field, comparing and contrasting the various cases 
(Corbin and Strauss, 1998). I collapsed my categories into second-order theoretical 
themes then aggregated these themes into the key dimensions for my emergent model 
(Gioia et al., 2012). Thus, I was able to unpack the different legitimation dynamics while 
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grounding findings in “quotes, observations, and thick description” (Reay and Jones, 
2013; Gioia, et al., 2012).  
3.5   Research Settings: Homelessness Issue Field in Eugene, Oregon 
As mentioned, inductive approaches to generating grounded theory have a long 
tradition of advantaging revelatory cases and theoretical sampling as a way to disentangle 
the understudied phenomenon in question (Langley and Abdallah, 2011; Yin, 2009; 
Lincoln and Guba, 1985). An ideal empirical setting for my project would be an active 
issue field, with a few proto-institutions emerging as field settlements, with different 
levels of contentions to ensure theoretical diversity, and with possible access to the 
various stakeholder communities for broad data collection and in-depth analysis.  
 The Homelessness issue in Eugene met all of these criteria. As I detail in chapter 
4.1, the issue is highly active on the local level buttressed by waves of social mobilization 
from local social activists demanding more resources and policies to alleviate the plight 
of homelessness. The events of Occupy Eugene in late 2011 precipitated high levels of 
engagement between the different stakeholders, evident in the formation of an inclusive 
homelessness taskforce in 2011, the establishment of a specialized Homelessness Work 
Group on the city level in 2013, the election of an ardent homeless advocate to the city 
council in 2016. Further, the city voted to declare a state of emergency on homelessness 
in 2015. The city continues to invest in efforts to understand the effort through hiring 
external consultant companies, the latest report issued in 2019.  
Importantly, homelessness and the solutions that emerged are subject to intense 
contestation between the different stakeholder communities, so much, that The Register-
Guard, the major local newspaper, ran a year-long editorial series chronicling the issue 
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and the different voices involved. As I show in the first part of my analysis, the 
contention centers on how the stakeholder communities in the city have different 
perspectives on the causes of the issue and how to manage it. These contestations are 
crucial for my analysis as these differences in meanings frame how a stakeholder 
community evaluates the solutions available for the issue (Meyer and Hoellerer, 2010). 
Different stakeholder communities have different interests, priorities, and cultural 
repertoires that inform their meaning-making process (Grodal and O’Mahoney, 2017). 
Thus, each community is likely to develop different criteria for evaluating the field and 
the possible solutions to the issue (Suddaby, et al., 2017; Drori and Honing, 2013; 
Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007). 
As a result of this ongoing and contested issue, many policies and programs were 
implemented over the past decade. These include traditional solutions such as night 
shelters, controversial such the anti-camping ordinance and the dog banning law. 
Importantly for this analysis, a few innovative solutions also emerged such as FUSE, a 
data-based implementation of the Housing First model, CAHOOTS, an ambulance-like 
service for the unhoused and mentally-ill, The Rest-Stop Program, a transitionary micro-
shelter, and the Tiny House villages, pioneered in Eugene and now spreading nationally. 
These new programs follow an experimental approach making them ideal to analyze 
under the concept of proto-institutions; they are new, contested between the different 
stakeholder communities, lacking in legitimacy, strapped for resources in, and poised for 
expansion if proven successful. I detail these proto-institutions in Appendix 1 and my 
approach in selecting specific case studies in the next section.  
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Lastly, the small size of the city allowed me to access many of the organizations 
involved with the issue. Also, because these events are currently unfolding, I had a 
chance to gather firsthand data through attending the various meetings, community 
assemblies, investigating the different sites where the proto-institutions are implemented, 
and witnessing the negotiation process around the stakeholder communities as they 
happened.  
Eugene, Oregon 
Eugene is the third largest city in the state of Oregon. Located at the southern end 
of the Willamette Valley, the city has a population of 160,561, as per the 2016 US 
census, and is home to a large student population attending the University of Oregon, 
Lane Community College, and Northwest Christian University. Eugene is located on the 
I-5 corridor which extends all the way from Seattle, Washington in the north near the 
Canadian border to San Diego, California in the south near the Mexican border, 
connecting the entire West Coast of the United States. The city has prospered throughout 
the 20th century, driven by a strong timber industry, prior to a downturn in the 1980s. The 
city continues to recover since the early 2000s with investments in infrastructure aiming 
to attract more high-tech industries. The city of Eugene is divided into eight wards, with 
each comprised of a few neighborhoods (Figure 1). Eugene enjoys a reputation as a 
hotbed for environmental and social activism, famously the site for the FBI’s Operation 
Backfire in 2006 against a chapter of the radical environmental group Earth Liberation 
Front (ELF). The “hippie” legacy of the city continues to draw thousands of attendees to 
the annual three-day Oregon Country Fair each summer.  
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Homelessness in Eugene  
Homelessness is one of the main social problems facing the city of Eugene. The 
number of unhoused people in a city is estimated through a Point-in-Time count (PIT), a 
federally-mandated procedure where volunteers from any city seeking federal funding to 
combat homelessness sweep the streets and count the number of homeless people. 
 
Figure 1: The Eight Wards of Eugene 
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Eugene’s count in 2018 found 1642 homeless people in the city, with 1135 men, 
women, and children completely unsheltered i.e. lacking a shelter at night. Many local 
advocates believe the count underestimates the size of the issue. This number amounts to 
about 0.9% of the population compared to 0.7% for New York with a 6.2% increase from 
the 2017 count. These figures indicate the persistence of the issue in the local arena.  
A few local forums exist that aim to bring together the different stakeholder 
communities in the city including local government, the business community, non-profits 
and the activist community, neighborhood associations, and citizens, and to a lesser 
degree, representatives of the unhoused. One example is the Homelessness and Poverty 
Board (HPB), a city-run platform with 21 members representing the various local 
stakeholder communities. The PHB’s official mandate is to “promote community-wide 
commitment to the goal of ending homelessness and assisting low-income individuals to 
meet their basic needs and achieve self-sufficiency”. It stands as one of the main access 
points for developing and sponsoring local solutions. The city also publishes an annual 
report on Addressing Homelessness to highlight the efforts exerted locally and 
collaboratively with other community members.  
Homelessness in Eugene: Mapping the Field 
I conceptualize the homelessness issue in Eugene as a contested issue field in line 
with the recent conceptualization of these fields as relationship arenas where diverse sets 
of actors and organizations interact over a particular issue (Zietsma et al., 2017). These 
fields are marked by contestation and differences because the issue around which the 
field is formed carries different meanings for each set of actors (i.e. community), 
potentially creating what has been termed a state of institutional war (Furnari, 2018; 
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Surachiakulwattana and Phillips, 2017; Meyer and Hoellerer, 2010). Actors bring forth 
their “distinct identities and their own commitments” (Zietsma et al., 2017) to different 
institutional infrastructure and goals, making issue fields more “contested and dynamic in 
contrast to the settled character commonly ascribed to organizational fields” (Wooten & 
Hoffman, 2008).  
In this study, I focus on the period from 2011 – 2018. This period covers the 
events that instigated many of the ongoing local efforts to address homelessness in 
Eugene. Following on the heels of the Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011, Eugene 
was the site of its own local Occupy Movement. The local efforts re-shaped the field 
around the issue of homelessness. Local activists established camps in downtown Eugene 
to protest the 1% and soon many of the homeless around Eugene joined the camps. The 
campsite quickly grew in size to include tents, food stations, medical stations, and 
sleeping arrangements to service the activists and the local homeless population who 
came in for shelter. Brushes with law enforcement and the city eventually led to the 
dismantling of the camp. The episode galvanized the massive and contentious efforts 
currently underway to introduce new proto-institutions or scale up existing ones to 
address the issue.  
I identify this period as a disruption that marked a local social transformational 
point (Hardy and Maguire, 2010; Lampel and Meyer, 2008; Haveman, Meyer, and Russo, 
2001), shifting the field from established to contested (Zietsma, 2017; Wooten and 
Hoffman, 2008). I explain the mechanisms in this process in Section 4. Starting from 
2012, the issue field around homelessness in Eugene developed rapidly through activists’ 
mobilization. These efforts led to the emergence of a few proto-institutions, comprising 
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new organizational forms and practices, aiming to alleviate the plight of Eugene’s 
unhoused population. The recent history of the field makes it ideal for my inquiry as the 
events are still unfolding, and many of the organizations and individuals who started the 
local initiatives are still available for interviews.  
Core Stakeholder Communities 
From my preliminary research, I identified five distinct stakeholder communities 
that interact around the homelessness field in Eugene. For the purposes of my study, 
these are the communities legitimating the proto-institutions i.e. the sources of 
legitimacy. 
 Local government. Eugene government is highly involved with the issue of 
homelessness, especially after the social mobilization in 2011 triggered by the Occupy 
movement. In this study, I focused on the handful of local officials from the city office 
who handle the policies and implementation of the proto-institutions as well as on the 
Homelessness and Poverty Board. This group also includes the city councilors, the 
elected members in the government representing each of the eight wards of Eugene.  
Non-profit and social activists. There are a plethora of non-profits around Eugene 
that are involved with the issue of homelessness, however, my focus will be upon the 
larger players. These are St Vinnie’s, ShelterCare, SquareOne Villages, Community 
Supported Shelters (CSS), Nightingale, and the Eugene Mission. These organizations are 
usually small, employing a handful of people. Also, I also interviewed many independent 
activists who are involved with homelessness and played a crucial role in developing the 
city’s responses to the issue over the past six years.  
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Business firms and organizations. I focused on the main business associations 
involved with the issue: The Eugene Chamber of Commerce and Downtown Inc. These 
networks represent many of the business firms both broadly across Eugene and 
specifically downtown where much of the recent conflict between businesses and the 
homeless population has occurred.  
Neighborhood Associations. Local citizens are represented in the homelessness 
political debate through the eight wards and 23 neighborhood associations covering the 
Eugene area. I focused on those neighborhoods which are subject to the physical 
manifestations of the proto-institutions. For instance, Community Supported Services 
(CSS) runs three rest-stops across the city in the Whitaker, and Southeast Eugene with 
other proposed for River Road, and Santa Clara areas.  
Homeless population. As the raison d'être for the emergence of my focal proto-
institutions (Hallet and Ventresca, 2006), the unhoused population of the city have been 
heavily involved with the proto-institutions I peruse in this analysis.  
Proto-institutions 
As mentioned, I define proto-institutions as “practices, technologies, and rules 
that are narrowly diffused and only weakly entrenched, but that have the potential to 
become widely institutionalized” (Zietsma and McKnight, 2009; Lawrence, et al., 2002). 
In the context of Eugene’s homelessness field, proto-institutions available for observation 
include multiple organizational forms that aim to alleviate the plight of the homeless 
population. Such organization forms include certain practices or policies such as 
ordinances signifying certain locations as safe for camping, as well as the establishment 
of physical organizational spaces like the Tiny House villages. These initiatives are 
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usually implemented with an experimental approach on a small scale with the potential 
for scaling-up and diffusion if evaluated as successful by the stakeholder communities 
around the issue. This experimental approach makes the proto-institutions ideal for 
examining the legitimation process (Ferraro et al., 2015).  
Criteria for Selecting Proto-institutions 
  “Theoretical sampling is at the heart of theory building from multiple cases” (Ott 
and Eisenhardt, 2017) as it allows researchers to select cases to increase both richness 
and generalizability through a revelatory logic. My goal was to ensure a focus on my 
main unit of analysis, the proto-institutions, while allowing for variations in other 
characteristics I believe are theoretically important. Thus, to increase the theoretical 
diversity I focused on four main criteria. 
• Novelty of approach: this reflects the experimental aspect and the narrowly 
diffused nature of the proto-institutions. I focus on new models. That includes 
new concepts or new implementations of older concepts.   
• Pluralistic: the proto-institution has to involve multiple stakeholder communities 
in a) the creation and/or b) implementation of the model. This allows me to 
capture how the relationship dynamics between stakeholder communities play 
into the legitimation process.  
• Performance: this allows me to capture, to a degree, the relationship between the 
stakeholder communities, legitimacy, and the effectiveness of the proto-
institution. 
Combining these dimensions, Appendix 1 showcases the various programs in Eugene and 
how they vary on each of the selection criteria.   
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Three of these programs were selected as case studies for this analysis, Occupy 
Medical organization, the Rest-Stop program, and the Tiny House villages, based on the 
preliminary work in the first phase of data collection and analysis. All three of the case, 
summarized in table 2, study represents innovative models that go beyond the traditional 
services usually available to local homeless populations. One aspect of this innovation is 
that all three programs are newly implemented and are currently in an experimental 
implementation mode to varying degrees, thus making them ideal for the purpose of this 
study.  
Table 2: A Summary of the Proto-Institutions Selected for Analysis 
Proto-institution Date 
Implemented 
Parties Involved Current State 
Rest-Stop 
program 
2013 Eugene City Council 
Non-profits and activists 
Neighborhood 
Associations 
The Unhoused 
Four operating 
sites, more 
planned 
Occupy Medical 2012 Non-profits and activists 
Neighborhood 
Associations 
The Unhoused 
Business 
One permeant 
site 
More planned 
Tiny Home 
Villages 
2013 Eugene City Council 
Non-profits and activists 
Neighborhood 
Associations 
The Unhoused 
One operating 
site; 
Two in 
development 
 
All cases are also pluralistic and contentious, however, many of the same 
stakeholder communities are involved with each of the initiatives, a common theme in 
Eugene. For instance, the city manager’s office handles all work with the Rest-Stop 
program and the Tiny House Villages. The same group of activists, more or less, are 
involved in creating and advocating for these programs. The business community 
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interests are represented predominately by the Eugene Chamber of Commerce. 
Neighborhood associations are involved as far as those proto-institutions with physical 
space expansion needs. That includes Rest-Stop program and the Tiny House villages.  
Lastly, all three of these cases share a common origin story, rooted in the 2011 
Occupy Eugene Movement. However, each employed a different organizational model, 
as explained below, which added richness to my analysis.  
3.2   Data Sources 
Understanding field processes requires the collection of “longitudinal, rich, and 
varied” data (Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, and Ven, 2013). My selection of data sources 
was guided by my goals to unpack how legitimation occurs over time in a way that 
reflects the richness of the field and the construct (Deephouse et al., 2017; Gioia et al., 
2012). Additionally, in collecting my data, I strove to access the voices of all stakeholder 
communities in the field to avoid marginalizing collective actors in favor of one 
dominant community, a common pitfall in legitimacy research (Hoefer and Green, 2016; 
Bikektine, 2011). 
 Consequently, I draw on a broad set of data sources, summarized in table 3. I 
collected data covering 87 months, starting from October 2011 through December 2018. 
My sources include interviews, media articles, and messages from social media, 
supported by organizational and governmental documents and field visits. This data 
covers the field as a whole as well as the three case studies I focus on for my analysis. I 
detail the sampling process of the proto-institutions in the discussion of the research 
setting, section 3.5. 
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Table 3: Summary of Data Sources 
Data Source Description Use in Analysis 
Interviews 
42 in-depth interviews 
including 22 with social 
activists and NGOs operating 
the proto-institutions; 5 
interviews with 
neighborhood associations 
affected by the proto-
institutions; 6 interviews 
with government officials; 
and 9 interviews with 
unhoused people; one 
interview from the business 
community  
 
Total: 862 single-spaced 
pages 
 
 
 
First Wave:  
7 open-ended interviews, 
each lasting between 40 
minutes and 1.5 hours, 
conducted in 2016 and 
early 2017. All recorded, 
transcribed, and hand-
coded.  
 
Second Wave: 
19 semi-structured 
interviews with key 
informants in all five 
stakeholder groups (social 
advocates, the unhoused, 
business community, the 
local government, and 
neighborhood 
associations), each lasting 
between 40 minutes and 
1.5 hours. All recorded, 
transcribed and coded in 
NVivo. All conducted in 
the years 2017 and 2018.  
 
Third Wave: 
16 semi-structured 
interviews with harder-to-
access informants. Each 
lasting between 15 
minutes to 1 hour, 
recorded, transcribed, and 
coded in NVivo. 
 
 
 
Familiarize with the field 
Identify key communities and 
actors and organizations 
Narrow the focus of proto-
institutions  
 
 
 
Construct the field of homelessness 
in 2011 - 2018 
Elaborate on the different 
stakeholders’ interactions  
Explicate the meaning-making 
mechanisms employed to 
understand the issue and evaluate 
the solutions in the field. 
 
 
 
 
Investigate the emerging process 
from the data collection/analysis 
cycle.  
Validate the relationships between 
the different constructs in the 
emerging model.  
Traditional Media  
Covering the period 2011 – 
2018, and using the 
keywords homelessness, 
homeless, rest-stop, tiny 
house, occupy medical and 
occupy Eugene 
Total: 248 articles, 529 
pages 
 
 
203 articles from the 
Register-Guard 
19 articles from Eugene 
Weekly 
22 articles from the Daily 
Emerald 
4 articles from the Torch 
 
 
 
Establish the timeline for the field, 
in conjunction with the 
informants’ recollections. 
Identify contact for interviews to 
ensure inclusivity of key 
informants. 
Triangulate the interpretations 
emerging from the interviews. 
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Table 3 (continued).   
Data Source Description Use in Analysis 
Official Government and 
Organizational Documents 
 
A total of 17 documents from 
local government and 
nonprofits including reports, 
ordinance, and research 
studies 
 
 
 
 
9 different reports on the 
state of homelessness in 
Eugene and evaluations 
for the existing efforts 
to curb/alleviate the 
issue.  
3 internal memos detailing 
various aspects of the 
issue 
4 Information sheets  
1 Handbook for outreach  
 
 
 
 
Provide insights into the various 
conceptualizations of the issue. 
Validate information from 
informants. 
 
Social Media 223 pages of data 
consisting of text 
exchanges between 
community members 
 
Providing additional insights into 
the contentions in the field 
Access to correspondence and 
ongoing events in the field. 
 
In-depth Interviews. Interviews with key informants from all stakeholder 
communities represent the main source of data for this analysis, given my orientation 
towards interpretation and the social construction of legitimacy (Suddaby et al., 2017; 
Johnson et al., 2006). I conducted three rounds of interviews in a four-year period of 
2016 – 2019. I initially employed a purposeful sampling approach, focusing on 
individuals and organizations that are highly knowledgeable about or experienced with 
homelessness and the issue field (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2017). Initial informants 
were ones whose names appeared frequently in media outlets and in articles covering 
homelessness in Eugene. All interviewees were local residents of Eugene and included 
lawyers, administrators, retired professionals, and students. At the end of every interview, 
I asked every informant to recommend other contacts with the most involvement with the 
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field (Patton, 2001). I focused on interviewing persons who have been directly involved 
with the field of homelessness since the Occupy Eugene events in order to gain a more 
detailed and in-depth account of the field’s development over time. As I iterated between 
the data collection and analysis, I employed a theoretical sampling approach in the 
second and third rounds of interviews to hone in on the phenomenon and the emerging 
concepts (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Additionally, once I decided on the proto-
institutions to be studied, I contacted key persons who were involved in designing, 
implementing, managing, or using the proto-institutions. Lastly, a few roles were carried 
out by a single person, such as a government liaison, or a neighborhood representative. I 
contacted these specific informants to get their input on the issue. The interview protocol 
can be found in Appendix 2.  
The first round of interviews was open-ended with the aim of understanding the 
dynamics in the field of homelessness as a whole. My questions aimed to identify the 
state of the field, how it changed over the past 10 years, the key stakeholder communities 
around the issue, and the key roles and players. Additionally, I focused on the 
informants’ own experience with the field, asking how they understood and interpreted 
the different events and the relationships between the different communities. For 
instance, in my first interview with one of the long-time activists in the field, I broadly 
asked them “How did Occupy start in Eugene?” and “in your opinion, who are the key 
stakeholder communities around the issue of homelessness in Eugene”? This first wave 
of data collection included interviews with six key informants. 
The second wave of interviews employed a semi-structured approach, ideal “to 
obtain both retrospective and real-time accounts by those people experiencing the 
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phenomenon of theoretical interest” (Gioia et al., 2012:19). My goal was to maintain the 
focus on the field development since Occupy Eugene, including the proto-institutions that 
emerged following these events, while allowing my informants to elaborate on the 
dynamics of the issue as a whole. It was during this round that specific categories and 
themes recurred throughout the data analysis process, thus prompting me to include them 
in my interview protocol. For example, when asked to expound on how they evaluate the 
different efforts in the field, informants repeatedly highlighted certain aspects such as 
community support as a key criterion. I probed that aspect when appropriate in the 
following interviews. This second wave comprised of 19 interviews with members of 
each of the five stakeholder communities I identified from mapping the field (the 
unhoused, business community, local activists, the city government, and neighborhood 
associations). In these interviews, my goal was a) to capture the experience of the 
interviewee over the period they were involved with the issue of homelessness, and b) to 
agglomerate the criteria of legitimacy that every stakeholder community used to evaluate 
the proto-institutions at two main points: first implementation and instances of first 
growth. 
Lastly, I conducted 16 interviews in the last wave of data collection in the field. 
This round of interviews served to enrich and validate the emergent themes, ensuring 
saturation (Miles and Huberman, 1984). This wave of interviews predominately included 
persons and/or organizations that had been harder to access during the first two waves.   
Appendix 3 lists the affiliations, codes, durations, and dates of interviewing for all 
interviews.   
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Newspapers and media archives. In line with the mainstream approaches in 
legitimacy research (Deephouse et al., 2017; Lamin and Zaheer, 2012; Vergne, 2011), I 
incorporated archival data into my analysis to triangulate the phenomenon and gain more 
insight into the different stakeholder communities’ understanding of the issue and, more 
importantly, the relationships within the field. I perused articles from the four major local 
newspapers in Eugene by circulation: The Register-Guard, Eugene Weekly, The Torch, 
and the Daily Emerald (Table 4).  
Table 4: The Four Major Newspapers in Eugene 
Journal Description Ownership Circulation Frequency 
The Register-
Guard 
(Source: Website) 
Formed in 1930 and 
serves the Eugene-
Springfield area 
GateHouse media 
in 2018 after 
being owned by 
the local Baker 
family since 1928 
Average 
43,000 
peaking to 
50,000 on 
Sundays 
Daily 
 
Eugene-Weekly 
(Source: Website) 
 
Formed in 1983. An 
alternative newspaper 
focusing solely on 
Eugene. 
 
N/A 
 
Base 
circulation of 
38,000 
copies 
 
Weekly 
 
Daily Emerald 
(Source: website) 
 
Local news publication 
aiming to “serve the 
University of Oregon 
community with 
independent student 
journalism in the public 
interest.” (Emerald 
Media Group, 2018) 
 
Emerald Media 
Group, 
University of 
Oregon’s 
independent 
student media 
organization 
 
N/A 
 
Online, and 
Twice per 
week in 
print 
 
The Torch 
(Source: website) 
 
The official student-
managed newspaper of 
Lane Community 
College. It is an 
autonomous newspaper 
free from censorship by 
the college 
administration, faculty, 
and student 
government. 
 
Published by 
authority of the 
Lane Community 
College Board of 
Education 
through the 
Media 
Commission, 
 
2000 
 
Weekly in 
the Spring, 
Winter, and 
Fall terms.  
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Specifically, I focused on articles addressing the development of the field since 
Occupy Eugene, and, as I narrowed down my focus on the three selected proto-
institutions (Occupy Medical, Rest-Stops, Tiny House villages), I kept abreast of articles 
particularly addressing their development and growth. I also included editorials 
discussing the local homeless problem at large to keep my findings in context. The main 
purpose of this data is to a) construct a richer understanding of the local context around 
the issue of homelessness, and b) augment the interviews from various communities in 
order to alleviate any shortcomings in the data collection such as retrospective bias and 
interview selection bias. Sifting through thousands of news articles over the period of the 
study, 248 news articles were selected for the analysis, with the majority from the 
Register-Guard (203). The articles were coded and included in my data analysis.  
Data from Social Media Platforms. Another source of secondary data came from 
online platforms on Google and Facebook: Homeless in Eugene, Homeless Action, and 
the Human Right Commission Homelessness Work Group. I was informed about these 
groups through my conversations with the early informants during the first wave of 
interviews.  These three groups are active platforms where local developments and news 
on homelessness are posted and debated by all stakeholder communities. I continued to 
ask about similar online platforms during my interviews. Two more were mentioned; 
however, both were private and would not give me access as a member.  My preliminary 
observation of interactions between the members revealed heated and often aggressive 
conversations between prominent activists, local officials, and the unhoused over the 
legitimacy and viability of many proposed solutions. The groups are open to the public 
and currently has more than 1000 members. However, only about 20 – 25 are active 
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members comprising many of the Eugene activists and a few government officials. 
Following a similar approach as that I used with the news articles, I sifted through these 
messages for those related the focal proto-institutions. I believe access to these online 
discussions added richness to my account of the contestations occurring around the proto-
institutions in the field. Additionally, I used the groups as a way to identify potential 
informants and to develop my interview protocol and data analysis. I identified and coded 
those posts which were directly related to the proto-institutions, iteratively using the same 
coding scheme for interviews (Vaast and Urquhard, 2017).  
Official documents from the government and other organizations. Lastly, I 
perused 17 official documents from the local government and nonprofits such as CSS, 
NHS, and Occupy Medical. These data, in conjunction with the information available on 
websites, provided insight and documentation to the various events in the field. The 
reports included the results of studies conducted by internal and external consultants on 
the issue, with the latest report issued in winter, 2019. I identified these documents by 
scouring the websites of the local government (https://www.eugene-
or.gov/3470/Homelessness) and those of the different organizations (http://occupy-
medical.org/; http://communitysupportedshelters.org/; https://www.squareonevillages.org; 
https://nightingaleshelters.org). I also asked my informants to share any documents they deemed 
useful to my research.  
The inclusion of multiple data sources that encompasses primary data, such as 
interviews, with secondary data such as news articles and social media group messages, 
is crucial to ensure rigor in qualitative studies through providing compelling evidence and 
triangulation (Ott and Eisenhardt, 2017; Howard-Grenville, Golden-Biddle, Irwin, and 
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Mao, 2011) as well as in constructing detailed timelines for the field and the proto-
institutions (Bertels, Hoffman, and DeJordy, 2014).  
3.3   Data Analysis 
The purpose of this study is to build “intermediate theory” where I draw on prior 
work, specifically the rich body of knowledge around legitimacy and issue fields, to 
propose new constructs (Edmondson and McManus, 2007; 1165). My data analysis 
adhered to the approaches commonly used for generating and analyzing grounded theory 
(Gioia et al., 2012; Strauss and Corbin, 1998).  
I employed a multi-phase analysis, which I present below, iterating constantly 
between the raw data, the emerging concepts, and relationships, and the relevant research 
on institutional fields, legitimacy, and social movement research (Gioia et al., 2012; 
Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Locke, 2001). I started the analysis process closely on 
the heels of data collection and both activities preceded in tandem (Langley, 1999; 
Lincoln and Guba, 1985), thus allowing me to modify and further develop my interview 
protocol and coding scheme to further hone in on the emerging themes. This conversation 
between data collection and analysis is crucial to achieving proper category saturation 
(Suddaby, 2006). I used NVivo 12 software for most of the coding and analysis of the 
qualitative data, except for the first few interviews which were coded by hand. Table 4 
below details the data structure emerging from my analysis.  
Phase 1. I began my analysis by constructing a thorough database that included 
my transcribed interviews, media articles, government, and organizational documents, 
social media messages, as well as transcripts from online videos. The goal of this part of 
the analysis was to a) construct a timeline for the field of homelessness in Eugene in 2011 
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– 2018 highlighting the key events in the field, and b) map out the various communities’ 
interactions and mobilizations, relative to the field as a whole and to my cases studies, the 
three proto-institutions (Yin, 2009). My goal is to build a highly contextualized narrative 
(Langley, 1999; Pettigrew, 1990) around the legitimation process in order to investigate 
how field changes affect legitimation and the linkages between the various moving pieces 
in the analysis. This first phase was integral to construct the “thick description” of the 
field in Section 4 (Van Maanen, 1995) while providing a way to organize the richness 
and complexity of multi-stakeholder legitimation process (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). I 
relied on the personal narratives from the interviews and detailed analysis of news 
articles from the four major publications in the city. The timeline (Section 4, Table 7) 
highlights the major interactions where communities got involved around the field. 
Additionally, I constructed a detailed timeline for each of the proto-institutions in the 
analysis, highlighting the various stages and stakeholder interactions around each over 
time.  
Phase 2. Next, I began my coding process with first-order analysis (Gioia, et al., 
2013). In this phase of the analysis, my goal in coding any piece of data was to capture 
how the various actors interpreted the issue of homelessness as a whole and the 
relationships within the field, in their words (Gioia et al., 2012). Thus, all rounds of 
coding for a particular piece of data began with a complete reading of the document 
followed by attribute and descriptive coding (Saldana, 2015) to ensure proper attribution 
of data to stakeholder communities. This process of open coding (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998) allows for a broad analysis of the phenomenon. In interpretivist tradition, the goal 
was to capture the variance between the stakeholder communities and distill it into 
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narrative accounts for the reader (Gehman et al., 2017). I continued this phase by 
comparing and contrasting between the accounts of the three proto-institutions over time 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). It is important to highlight that my goal in this stage was not 
to explain differences, but rather to bring out the various interpretations of the rich field. 
Thus, various categories with similar but slightly different meanings emerged in this 
phase, for instance, informants referring to the unhoused as the deserving poor while 
others referring to low-income locals.  
As I continued to add more data to my analysis in the form of interviews and 
news articles, I refined my coding schemes, before collapsing the codes into first-order 
categories (Nag, Corely, and Gioia, 2007). This was achieved through comparing and 
contrasting the different coded sentences over time across all proto-institutions and 
informants. For instance, I categorized mentions of the deserving poor, homeless youth, 
and the playoff between chronically homeless and vagrants into the first order category 
of “who are the homeless”. Similarly, I constructed the first-category of “Whose 
responsibility” from collapsing coding for mentions of government planning, affordable 
housing and section 8, homelessness is a choice, and systemic problem.  
Phase 3. As I analyzed the changes in the field through the interpretations of the 
informants, it became clear that, beyond the Occupy Movement, certain events were 
critical in transforming the development of the issue (Sewell, 1996), and consequently, to 
the emergence and implementation of the proto-institutions. I bracketed these junctures in 
the field (Langley, 1999), partitioning my timeline into three distinct periods, a three-
week phase around Occupy Eugene, a second phase focused on decriminalizing 
homelessness following Occupy; and a relatively quieter phase afterwards, Post-
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Whoville. The first two phases were characterized by high mobilizations and interactions 
between the stakeholder communities. The field dynamics in these three phases varied 
widely and affected the legitimation process, thus, I employed these field phases in the 
theorizing process (Eisenhardt, 1989), mapping them over the core proto-institutions.  
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Table 5: Data Structure 
First-Order Categories Second-Order Themes Aggregate Dimensions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Roots of the issue: 
- “Anything can happen to anybody virtually. Just takes a couple of incidents in your 
life, illness.” 
- “Homelessness is a hydra rearing multiple heads: unemployment, lack of 
affordable housing, substance abuse and mental illness” 
Who are the homeless? 
-  “when business cycles turn down, and rents get crazy high, there is no safety 
valve for those who are poor. 
-  “there's an accurate perception that homelessness is correlated with and linked 
with higher rates of drug use than in the general population, higher rates of mental 
illness than the general population, and higher rates of criminality”.  
-  They call the travelers, the folks that come through when ... almost like gypsies.  
Whose responsibility to act 
- “That's unacceptable. The city needs to, whether it's the city, the county, or the 
state, or even the federal government, needs to step in and say, "This can't go on."  
- “From what I can tell with the city, they fight with the county a lot on who's 
responsible,  
What to do 
- “Lane County needs a public shelter system. There is none. 
- “Hire the homeless to deliver and pick up trash bags from camps, provide cheap 
camping toilets that use plastic bags for waste, put more trash cans and public 
restrooms or port-a-potties where needed.” 
- “When you talk to bureaucrats, they say the only way it can be solved is with 
money. That's not ... It's with attitude. It's with a culture.” 
Diagnostic 
Analysis 
Prognostic 
Analysis 
Issue 
Interpretation 
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Table 5 (continued).   
First-Order Categories Second-Order Themes Aggregate Dimensions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impact/Outcome 
- “we gotta do something that can house more people and give safety and stability 
to more people. “ 
- Resources 
“They had to actually put a clause in there that said, "We'll allow this to happen, 
but we won't pay a dime.” 
Subjective Experience 
- “They see people living here and they see that it's clean. There's not trash.” 
- “they don't want anything downtown where it's going to be seen by their 
imagined travelers who come from all different countries to see things like the 
Paris Games, the Olympics and other things. “ 
Emotional  
- “I love living here. I love my community and I helped build my house. So, I'm 
going to live here forever” 
Subjective wellbeing 
 -  “I want the homeless themselves to feel empowered.  You can provide a 
place that people are down and fell lower than low. They show up every day. 
They sleep and they leave and they come back again or you can provide a place 
that creates hope and people being a part of their own solution.” 
Dehumanizing 
-  “they can go to the Mission, and they can sleep in a room with 200 other people 
or whatever, and be in that institutionalized environment. But that's also in some 
ways dehumanizing to people's individual beings.” 
Humanizing 
-  “this is not charity. They shouldn't [only[ be helped if they, in some way, act in 
a deserving way to be helped. ” 
Pragmatic 
Evaluations 
Moral 
Evaluations 
Legitimation 
Criteria 
Experiential 
Evaluation 
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Table 5 (continued). 
First-Order Categories Second-Order Themes Aggregate Dimensions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NIMBY 
-  “that's the biggest problem that community-supported shelters is facing, is 
trying to set up camps in areas by neighborhoods with families.” 
Neighborhoods 
- "We're losing our minds. We cannot deal with the issues downtown  
- “that we can not have rest stops just concentrated in one part of town like it is 
in Whitaker, the poorest part of town 
Funds/Money 
- “80% of our funding comes from private donations from individual community 
members, or family foundations.” 
-  “$4500 I 24 hours was pretty nice. So, that's what paid for three of the huts 
here. And then a lady just recently bought one and donated it to us.” 
Dwellings 
- “We designed the Conestoga hut as a shelter that would be easier to put 
together with volunteers and that could be put in a matter of hours and be 
done.“ 
Access to Service 
- “the rest stops are actually high barrier, like, there's lots of questions we ask  
Community 
- our villages, where you share, support one another, you share responsibilities, 
you're working together to take care of your facility,  
Siting 
The Living 
Experience 
Points of 
Contention 
Funding and 
Operations 
Governance 
Decision Making 
“The board at SquareOne Village does ultimately have the decision-making 
power but is very reluctant to overturn decisions made by the council, who runs 
the place” 
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Phase 4. This phase is when I began investigating my data for deeper patterns, 
through linking the emergent first-order categories into second-order themes. I employed 
various coding approaches towards this end. I engaged with the data through initial 
coding in order to bring about the different dynamics and interpretation within the field 
(Charmaz, 2014). With my focus on process, I paid special attention to the actions of the 
various stakeholder communities. This is the phase where I engaged more actively with 
the relevant literature. Using provisional coding (Miles, Huberman, and Saldana, 2014), I 
incorporated an initial list of codes into my analysis based on the general themes and 
concepts I expect to encounter in my data (Miles and Huberman, 1984; Lofland, 1995). 
These codes, table 6, allowed me to hone in on instances of evaluation as used by the 
informants. I also used process coding throughout this stage of coding given my focus on 
temporality to capture actions (Saldana, 2015). Lastly, I used axial coding to reassemble 
into second-order themes (Charmaz, 2014; van Maanen, 1979) which capture the 
meanings of my data at a higher level.  Axial coding focuses on identifying the 
relationship between the different codes and categories (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). For 
instance, I noticed that the first order categories of the roots of the issue, who are the 
homeless relate to a diagnostic analysis of the field, as conceptualized in research on 
collective action frames (Benford and Snow, 2000), while categories such as whose 
responsibility to act highlighted action, similar to a prognostic analysis. Thus, I collapsed 
these first-order categories into second-order themes of diagnostic and prognostic 
analysis. 
Phase 5. Moving to a higher level of analysis, I continued distilling my emerging 
themes and concepts into more generalizable concepts. This phase of the analysis 
76 
incorporates theoretical coding (Saldana, 2015; Glaser, 1978) with the goal of developing 
the core categories, what researchers refer to as “aggregate dimensions” (Langley and 
Abdallah, 2011), and the possible relationships between them. 
Table 6: Initial List of Codes 
Concept Description 
Proto-institution The new practice or model under examination.  
Community Voluntary collection[s] of actors whose interests overlap and whose 
actions are partially influenced by this perception” (O’Mahony & 
Lakhani, 2011: 7), and who all have disparate interests for wanting 
to participate.  
Moral Legitimacy References to rights, norms 
Pragmatic Legitimacy References to interests 
Eugene Culture References to local culture 
Contention or conflict References to conflict between communities 
Contention or conflict Reference to conflict within a community 
   
The issue of homelessness in Eugene offered a rich and complex field, thus, it was 
crucial to decide on the most important categories for the focus of this dissertation. For 
instance, building on previous research, I collapsed the themes of diagnostic and 
prognostic analysis into the aggregate dimension of issue interpretation (Furnari, 2018; 
Litrico and David, 2017).  
 Phase 6. In this phase, I developed various representations for the core 
dimensions and the relationships between them, traveling between the data and the 
analysis, ultimately developing an emergent, grounded model that captures the 
legitimation process. I focused my inductive theorizing efforts on the process of 
legitimation, connecting the three emerging main dimensions (issue interpretation, 
legitimation criteria, and points of contention). I connected the core dimensions emerging 
from my data analysis with existing knowledge on legitimacy. For instance, Litrico and 
David (2017) have analyzed the process of issue interpretation and how it evolves over 
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time. Similarly, Hoffman (1999) identified the role of narratives in framing the social 
negotiation between the different stakeholders in an issue field. I connected my emergent 
core dimensions with these established concepts and to the changes in the field. Next, I 
attempted to explain the arrows i.e. the mechanisms propelling the process forward 
through time and connecting the various core concepts. Through iterating between 
different combinations of concepts and mechanisms, I arrived at a model that best 
captured the legitimation process as it unfolded in the field.  
 Many other themes that were identified during my analysis, covering topics on 
the emergence of cross-sector partnerships, social movement cooptation, goal 
displacement, and strategic responses of stakeholder communities, will not be covered in 
the findings here as they do not relate to the research questions but provide fodder for 
future research.  
3.4   Strategies to Ensure Rigor 
The question of ensuring rigor in qualitative studies has long been debated. For 
this study, I relied on the strategies identified by Gibbert and Ruigork (2010) and Aguinis 
and Solarino (2019), focusing on the concepts of validity and reliability.  
Starting with validity, I used triangulation, employing multiple data sources 
including interviews, news articles, field observation, and data from the social media 
platform, to ensure construct validity. I ensure internal validity in two ways: first, through 
developing a high-level theoretical framework for my emergent model and relating it to 
existing research in the discussion section of this report; and second, through rooting my 
coding in existing research on legitimacy further bolster the internal validity my study 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). I address external validity, or generalizability, through 
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employing a multiple case study design within the field, thus improving my analytical 
generalizability (Eisenhardt, 1989) as well as through providing a clear and theoretical 
rationale for my case selections, detailed in a previous section, and lastly, through 
providing a thorough thick description of the field (section 4.1).  
Lastly, for reliability, I employ a few strategies to ensure both transparency and 
replicability (Aguinis and Solarino, 2019). I provide an in-depth account of the research 
setting and my sampling procedures. My data analysis and coding strategies are detailed 
in the previous section. I enhance replicability through recording all interviews and using 
verbatim transcription prior to coding. I also present long extracts from the data 
throughout the findings and analysis sections of this report (Silverman, 2005).  
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IV.   FINDINGS 
This section covers the findings and analysis of this field study, organized in two parts. 
The first part builds a thick description of the field of homelessness in Eugene between 
the years 2011 – 2018, starting with the Occupy Eugene events (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985). The legitimation dynamics I analyze in this study are embedded in and highly 
influenced by this rich and contentious context. This period witnessed a surge in social 
activism around the homelessness issue in Eugene that embroiled the different 
stakeholder communities in the field (identified in the Methodology section) in a conflict 
over the issue, its roots, causes, and possible actions. These events were crucial for the 
emergence of the proto-institutions as well as the mechanisms driving the legitimation 
process. Table 7 summarizes the field and the interactions of the stakeholder 
communities.  
 In the second part, I detail my in-depth analysis of the field dynamics, introducing 
an emergent two-phase process model of legitimation. I will start by briefly analyzing the 
triggering events that changed the status of the field from established to contested, 
triggering stakeholder interactions. I then detail every phase of the legitimation process 
and how it unfolded for every proto-institution. I finish with a summary of the emergent 
model in its entirety.    
4.1   The Issue Field: Homelessness in Eugene (October 2011 – December 2018) 
All three proto-institutions at the core of this study have their roots in the Occupy Eugene 
movement and the consequent waves of local grassroots activism around the issue of 
homelessness. Between the years 2011 – 2018, Eugene was the site of a groundswell of 
social activism that brought the plight of the local unhoused population to the forefront of 
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the socio-political life in the city. As figure 2 shows, homelessness has decreased in 
Eugene in the years 2011 – 2013 before trending back upwards in 2014 – 2018. This 
figure is based on the Point-in-Time count (PIT), a volunteer-led effort conducted in 
January of each year to count the unhoused on the streets. Most local activists and the 
unhoused population believe the number greatly underestimates the size of the problem 
because it traditionally does not take into account those who are couch-surfing, 
temporarily housed, children and youth, and those who are hiding from the count for any 
reason. Thus, local government, social activists, nonprofits, the business community, the 
citizenry, and the unhoused engaged had to reckon with the issue. 
 It was through a contentious process of clashes and settlements between the local 
stakeholder communities in Eugene that the proto-institutions emerged as experimental 
solutions to addressing different aspects of homelessness. Thus, an analysis of the 
dynamics of legitimation of these new organizational arrangements has to start with an 
overview of the historical context where they emerged before focusing on an analysis of 
the emergence and growth of each proto-institution.  
 
Figure 2: Point-in-Time Count of the Homeless in Eugene (TAC Report, 2019) 
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I construct a history of the field of homelessness in Eugene and how it shifted in 
the period 2011 – 2018.  I identify three distinct phases: the first spans the Occupy 
Eugene events in mid-October 2011 to the dismantling of the Occupy Eugene campsite 
on December 24th, 2011; the second starts with formation of the Opportunity Eugene 
Task Force, spearheaded by Eugene’s then-mayor Kitty Piercy, and ends with law 
enforcement officers’ aggressive dismantling of Whoville, a major homeless camp in 
downtown Eugene in mid-March 2014; and the third spans the aftermath of Whoville 
through the end of 2018, a period marked by the establishment of the first self-managed 
homeless rest-stop in a residential neighborhood in Eugene as well as the opening of 
Emerald Village, the first full-service Tiny House village in Eugene.  
Figure 7 provides a summary timeline for the field 2011 – 2018, highlighting the 
three main phases, the key events, and the changes in the mobilization of the different 
stakeholder communities. Higher mobilization usually leads to more interactions between 
the different communities. The communities in the table are denoted as S: social 
advocates, H: homeless, G: local government, N: neighborhood associations, and B: the 
business community. The stakeholder interactions are denoted by the double-headed 
arrowed connected two stakeholder communities (Hoffman, 1999). The strength of the 
interactions varied over time with higher mobilization leading to more interactions. I 
capture the increasing interactions in three levels. Thick arrows mean high direct 
interactions level between two stakeholder communities, a result of high mobilization. 
Thin arrows indicate periods of moderate interactions. Thin dashed arrows indicate a 
period of low interactions. I will use stakeholder interactions map throughout my analysis 
to showcase the various stakeholder communities interacting around a proto-institution. 
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Further, OM: Occupy Medical; RSP: Rest-Stop Program; OVE: Opportunity Village 
Eugene (Tiny House village); EVE: Emerald Village Eugene (Tiny House Village). 
Darker gradations indicate more stakeholder interactions. 
Following this section, I provide a detailed account of the three case studies I used 
to untangle the legitimation dynamics of proto-institutions before presenting my analysis 
of these dynamics in the next chapter: The Rest-Stop Program, The Tiny House Villages, 
and Occupy Medical.   
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Table 7: Timeline for the Field of Homelessness in Eugene (2011 – 2018) 
Phase Key Events 
Stakeholders Communities 
Mobilizations 
Stakeholder Communities 
Interactions 
S H G N B 
 
Phase 1: 
 
A Surge in 
Homelessness 
Activism 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase 2: 
 
Decriminalize 
Homelessness 
S.L.E.E.P.S 
and Whoville 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase 3: 
 
Post-Whoville 
Oct 15, 2011: First Occupy Eugene March 
Oct 21, 2011: OE moves to Alton Baker Park 
Oct 27, 2011: OE moves to UO campus 
Nov 4, 2011: Occupy Eugene moves to WJP 
Dec 14, 2011: Taskforce is formed 
Dec 23, 2011: unhoused dies in campsite 
Dec 24, 2011: City closes down OE Park.  
 
 
 
 
Feb 5, 2012: OM move to downtown Eugene 
Mar 12, 2012: Taskforce issues report 
Apr 8, 2012: OM moves to Park Blocks 
Nov 11, 2012: S.L.E.E.E.P.S begins 
Dec 10, 2012:  City approves OVE 
Dec 12, 2012: City  approves Conestoga hut 
 
 
 
 
 
Jul 10, 2013: City Council considers an RSP 
Aug 13, 2013: OVE opens 
Sep 23, 2013: Rest-Stop program is approved 
Oct 13, 2013: Whoville in downtown Eugene. 
Oct 28, 2013: City approves two rest-stop locations 
Dec 13, 2013: First rest-stop opens 
 
Jan 27, 2014: CSS hosts a second rest-stop 
Apr 5, 2014: police shut down Whoville 
 
Sep 11, 2014: Lease renewed for OVE 
 
Aug 30, 2014: NHS in South Eugene 
Oct 28, 2014: Eugene declares a housing crisis 
Mid-Dec, 2014: city adopts Housing First 
 
May 1, 2015: EVE is announced 
Aug 4, 2015: NHS moves to Autzen stadium 
 
Feb 17, 2017: NHS moves to the Whiteaker 
Feb 27, 2017:  City aims the RSP permanent,  
Apr 15, 2017: NHS moves to South Eugene 
May 17, 2017: Construction begins on EVE 
 
Jun 18, 2018: OM moves to Springfield 
Sep 18, 2018: residents move to EVE  
 
H G 
S 
N B 
 
 
. 
 
 
H G 
S 
N B 
H G 
S 
N B 
H G 
S 
N B 
84 
Phase 1: The Surge of Homelessness Activism - Field Disruption 
(Oct 17, 2011 – Dec 17, 2011) 
On September 17, 2011, one thousand people gathered in downtown Manhattan in 
New York City to protest social and economic inequality in the United States. A few 
hundred of the protesters spent that night camped out in the nearby Zuccotti Park. Over 
the next few days, the protestors continued to march around the streets of downtown 
Manhattan, sparking road closures and tensions with the police and 80 arrests. It was not 
till videos of Deputy Inspector Anthony Bologna pepper-spraying and physically penning 
down female protesters that the protests grabbed the attention of mainstream media. By 
early October 2011, between 15,000 and 30,000 protesters marched down the streets of 
New York City including students, the unemployed, union representatives, and many 
others and by November The Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement became a global 
social movement with more than 700 chapters and protests in cities across the world and 
the United States.  
Occupy Eugene 
“This experiment in life and resistance is known as Occupy Eugene. To 
those taking part, it's an intensive experiment in community reconstruction 
and regeneration.” (Jonna and Monroe, 2011) 
The first instance of the Occupy movement in Eugene happened on October 15, 2011, 
with somewhere between 2000 and 5000 people participating in a march around 
downtown. Students from the University of Oregon started organizing the movement, 
taking cues and hints from the OWS events in New York City. The student-led 
committee organizing the march reached out to a few of the social activists in Eugene, 
seeking to build coalitions and to increase mobilization. Eugene has long been a hotbed 
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for social activism and grassroots movements (Powell, 2016) from the 1960s anti-war 
movements, the peaceful hippie culture of the 70s epitomized in Ken Kesey and the 
Oregon Country Fair, to the more radical anarchism of the1990s and early 2000 riots 
(Castillon, 2018). Thus, the call to mobilize fell on the welcoming ears of seasoned social 
activists, as one of those most involved with the movement recalls  
All of us were called together on Facebook posts. We were seeing what 
was happening in New York. And as social justice activists here in the 
Pacific Northwest, we were like, "Hmm, when's that wave gonna hit?" 
'Cause you could see it was kind of going across the nation. I had friends 
in September right when it happened, saying, "Well, okay, it's time for this 
to go on, and the students are taking leadership. And so some of the older 
activists who've done this a couple of times, run some campaigns, you're 
gonna be in consultation status." (#RF1) 
 
Following the march, the protesters pitched their tents at the Party Blocks, a large open 
area downtown that is reserved for the open-air local-goods market “Saturday Market”. 
Occupiers took turns staying overnight under the guidance of the older social activists, 
many of whom were lawyers and/or had experience with sit-ins from previous protests. 
Despite the city’s strict anti-camping and loitering ordinance, the occupiers were allowed 
to camp in this public space without any serious altercations with law enforcement. This 
highlights the fact that Occupy garnered the sympathy if not the support of many local 
citizens from the different communities. One of the more seasoned social activists 
emphasized that sea change in how the city approached these protests 
… definitely a change in philosophy about how the city was thinking 
about community protest and community demonstration … By the time 
Occupy Movement happens and we have this group of people who are 
willing to actually negotiate with the city on our behalf who are 
upstanding people, in the faith community, well-known, and they walk 
into the city manager's office to propose mediation, it's completely 
different than, "Let's just bean bag those protesters and show 'em who's 
boss!" That mentality had changed to, "Well, if we invited you to a 
mediation, would you attend? (#RF1) 
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And it was during that first week that “a lot of the infrastructure that continued to be the 
main components of the protest camp coalesced” including the general assemblies and 
the consensus model for making decisions, all adopted from Occupy Wall Street. The 
consensus-based decision-making model often referred to as the Norman Rockwell Town 
Hall, would prove challenging as the goals of the protests changed over the next few 
weeks.  
 Despite the presence of the more experienced peacekeepers and lawyers, tensions 
between protesters and law enforcement quickly escalated and a few activists were 
booked or arrested, mostly on trespassing charges. A civil liberty lawyer stated that  
Overall I would say that that was the biggest frustration for me throughout 
Occupy Eugene was people's, and I deal with this all so It wasn't just 
Eugene that's like this, but people's focus and interest in the sexy ‘let's get 
arrested and make some signs and march around town without taking a 
step back and figuring out how does this actually help to achieve the goals 
that you are supposed to articulate and set for yourself. (#NR1) 
After a week of negotiations with the city, the protest camp moved to Alton Baker Park, a 
413-acre city-owned park by the Willamette River. The expansive park has been known 
as a refuge for many of the city’s unhoused population. As explained by a former 
unhoused Occupy protestor 
I usually stayed over in Alton Baker Park because there's a lot more trees 
in that park and there's a bathroom in the park that's open and so there's a 
lot more acceptable resources in that area. And it was close enough to 
downtown to walk into town. (#LW1) 
It was during that one week in the park that Occupy Eugene began to embrace 
homelessness as one crucial manifestation of the poverty and inequality at the heart of the 
movement. Some of the unhoused in the park joined the protest camp out of curiosity or 
simply in search of warmth, food, and security in numbers. The camp expanded with 
more committees proliferating and specializing in specific tasks such as communications, 
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negotiation, security, etc. to ensure the smooth functioning of the movement.   
 The one-week stint at the park is a remarkable milestone for Occupy Eugene 
because it brought homelessness as a possible cause for the movement. However, the 
inclusion of the unhoused as part of the campaign, coupled with the stress of moving the 
entire camp to the park and the consensus-model of decision making, incited a lot of 
disagreement and contention within the movement. The camp spiraled into the most 
dysfunctional period of its time, with tensions escalating between the “housies”, 
protesters who lived in houses, and the unhoused newcomers. The general assemblies 
descended into what one local activist described as 
Lots of shouting. We learned a lot about how middle class our 
assumptions were in a lot of cases. There were homeless folks that were 
everywhere that we went, and some of them tried to come to Gas 
[General Assemblies] only to be told that they didn't know how to say it 
right. They weren't following the process. And here we'd shown up in 
their living room to tell them that. (#AM1) 
As another organizer recalls, 
Once it steered more towards the homeless and the general assembly 
meetings became much more dysfunctional. I can remember several that 
we had naked, mentally homeless people running around asking people for 
money during the meetings. It was really tough organizing. (#NR1) 
The contention was also felt on the other side of the conversation, that of the unhoused. A 
few of those living in the park decided to join Occupy Eugene to campaign for the 
homelessness issue.  
A lot of times the unhoused folks' involvement was actually looked at 
negatively by the Occupiers and the other people towards them. And by 
the time they had moved over to the park that I had called home, over at 
Alton Baker Park, I was like ... A lot of us that were living in that park had 
an attitude of actual resentment towards these folks. We're like, "Here's all 
these privileged folks that have houses, that are playing homeless with us 
out in the streets, but then, they're mad at us because we're here." (#LW1) 
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It was during this shift that the Occupy Eugene made its third move to a property owned 
and controlled by the University of Oregon. The move was especially provocative for the 
city, given the influence of the university. However, as one of the camp leader pointed 
out, the provocation was intentional as the choice of this particular location was meant to  
Piss them off ... And then also because we wanted the students to see it. 
And get some student involvement from it. It was a conscious decision to 
broaden people's knowledge of what we're doing. And that protest camp 
really had become a homeless protest camp (#LC1) 
The move was also critical to many of the social activists hoping to get the university to 
take a more active role in alleviating the social issues around the city that are not campus-
related.  While occupying university campus, Occupy Eugene shifted back to functional 
operation with the mediation team leading the negotiations between the protest, the 
university, and the city.  
 The negotiation concluded on November 4th, with the Occupy camp moving to its 
last location at the Washington-Jefferson Park (WJP), a 21-acre urban park in the middle 
of the Whiteaker neighborhood in West Eugene. The Whiteaker, a working-class 
neighborhood, is home to the Eugene Mission and Lindholm Center, the two main 
centers for homeless services in Eugene. It was at the WJP that  
What began seven weeks ago as a political protest in the spirit of Occupy 
Wall Street has turned into a downtown encampment of Eugene's 
homeless and street people. (Downtown camp turns into homeless haven, 
2011) 
Similar to Alton Baker Park, WJP has long been a refuge for the unhoused 
population due to its proximity to the river and services as well as the welcoming attitude 
of the neighborhood’s residents. As more of the unhoused and the poor joined the camp 
in search of food and security, it exploded to the size of a small town, servicing about 
1100 people a day. General assemblies were held every night and would usually go on for 
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3-5 hours in search for consensus on decisions regarding the organization of the camp 
and the negotiation with the city. There were three kitchens cooking for the protesters and 
campers, a library, a medical tent, and a budding media presence.  As the leading 
newspaper of Eugene, The Register-Guard, puts it 
Occupy Eugene has turned upside down in the weeks since it settled in 
Washington-Jefferson Park. It began as an outlet for rage directed toward 
the tiny percentage of bankers and financiers who have escaped suffering 
during an economic crisis they helped bring about. Now Occupy Eugene 
resembles an ad- hoc welfare agency, providing a modicum of creature 
comforts and social support for homeless people and others in need 
(Extend the Exemption, 2011) 
As the camp grew in size, it drew both criticism and support from Eugene residents with 
some appreciating that the unhoused citizens of the city have a safe and warm place for 
the cold Eugene winter. The camp continued to draw in donations of warm clothes, food, 
and sympathizers. On the other hand, the large homeless camp was a thorn on the side of 
the city, drawing exasperation from the more conservative constituents, many of the 
opinions that  
Eugene taxpayers have been footing the bill for Occupy Eugene since 
October, and now the occupiers want an indefinite free camping extension 
past Dec. 15. We are in tough economic times and we need those tax 
dollars for other city services. The campers refuse to go to the Eugene 
Mission, where they could live indoors and have free meals. Instead, they 
prefer to be an eyesore at a time when there are already a lot of transients 
and vacant businesses downtown (Letters in the editor’s bag, 2011) 
Dissatisfaction was palpable among the activists as well, some of whom felt that the 
move to WJP was a concession to a ploy by the city to break the camp and end the 
Occupy protest.  As one of the advocates stated 
Anybody that knows anything about activism or homeless things or 
anything in Eugene knows, once it goes to WJ, that's where things are just 
done. The city gets there you over there and then they break things up. 
(#LW1) 
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On the other hand, the camp organizers continued to negotiate an extension from the city 
to keep the camp through the winter. The camp advocates highlighted that, with its strict 
rules against the use of drugs, alcohol, and weapons, the camp successfully kept many of 
the unhoused population of the city safe, clean and sober. These assertions came as a 
response to the health and safety concerns brought up by the City Manager and the Police 
Chief in a letter to the city Mayor where they warned that the camp will  
decline at an increasing rate as the weather worsens, the camp population 
changes, and services to and within the camp fail to keep up with the 
demands of an increasingly unhealthy and unsafe environment (Russo, 
2011, quoting Ruiz and Kerns Letter). 
However, on December 13th, the city council voted 5-2 to extend the camp and allow the 
protesters and the unhoused to continue to use the WJP till January 11th. The granting of 
the extension is the watershed moment where Occupy Eugene embraced homelessness as 
the issue at the heart of the movement. That focus was echoed by members of the 
nonprofits organizations who served the unhoused as well as with a few of the city 
councilors, who praised the “positive impact on the community” and suggestions that 
Occupy Eugene could help the city develop more innovative approaches to help the 
unhoused.  
 The disagreements with the city, specifically members of the city council and the 
community who opposed the camp, came to a head by the third week of December. At 
this point, the sprawling camp had a geodesic dome which was used to hold general 
assemblies and as space for the unhoused to huddle at night in search of warmth. As one 
of the camp members’ recalls, the organizers made the case that  
… they need a heat source. And so, we had negotiated for a heat source 
with burning stove that we created to keep those guys warm at night. And 
there, we needed an emergency vote of the council to allow for a 
temporary... To allow for that to occur. And in order for that emergency 
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vote to occur, we needed the unanimous vote of the City Council that said, 
"You can make this emergency vote” (#RF1) 
One of the conservative councilors, however, refused to vote for an emergency vote to 
take place, thus shutting down the possibility for a heat source.  Homeless advocates 
utilized this opportunity to ignite more debate and negotiation around the marginalization 
of the homeless in Eugene.  
 On December 23rd, Rick Youngblood, an unhoused man from Florence, Oregon, 
died at the WJP Occupy from injuries sustained from a fight with two other unhoused 
people in the camp. According to the organizers, Youngblood had a heart condition and 
was prone to fights. And while fights happened every night on the camp, many of the 
organizers believe that law enforcement intentionally brought in unhoused people from 
other parts of the city to the camp, with the intent of sowing chaos. A camp leader angrily 
recounts these episodes 
the city, the police department... And this is not anecdotal, I've been there, 
when they would drop off very troubled people at camp, and they kept 
doing that. And so, it would create conflict and escalate. It was people that 
we couldn't take care of, and... or people who had beef with people at 
camp, and it was a very fragile balance of what was going on there (#RF1) 
On December 23rd, the city council voted to 5-2 to revoke the exemption from the anti-
camping ban and, therefore, to dismantle the WJP camp in what became a highly 
contentious confrontation with the Occupy organizers. The Register-Guard provided the 
rationale for the vote that “By granting special privileges to Occupy Eugene and 
approving the expenditure of public funds to pay costs associated with the encampment, 
the city had acquired a measure of responsibility for it” (Occupation couldn't go on, 
2011). The death of an unhoused person, other lesser offenses, and the public costs 
involved with keeping the camp running, provided enough reasons for the city to disband 
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the camp. That the camp was closed down on Christmas Eve of 2011 left many social 
activists with a bad taste in their mouths. However, the Occupy Eugene events, October 
17 – December 24, had a profound effect on the landscape of homelessness in Eugene 
and, importantly, were the crucible where the proto-institutions under study in this report 
were forged. 
An Innovation Mandate 
 Importantly, as I explain in more details in the next chapter, Occupy Eugene, 
bolstered by the momentum of the Occupy movement, pushed the entire local community 
to re-evaluate the mix of services available to alleviate the struggles of homelessness and, 
importantly, to consider more innovative solutions. That effect started within the Occupy 
camp when homelessness took over as the main cause for the movement. For many early 
organizers of the camp  
I really think the decision was kind of forced upon us. I think we would've 
preferred it to stay a protest camp 'cause at the beginning, none of us 
wanted to manage a homeless camp. It was a protest camp. It was not 
meant for people to live there on a long-term basis. And so that's not what 
we wanted initially. But as we were learning more about it, many of us 
who were involved in it had no real background in issues affecting 
homelessness. We quickly learned. And there was a real shift, so by the 
time just before the camp was shut down, we realized that we needed to do 
more to help the unhoused and do it in non-traditional ways, which one of 
the things is having a place for people to safely camp. (#LC1) 
That shift in goals and overall strategy cost the movement many of the participants, 
especially of the younger generation who felt that their student-led movement was rather 
hijacked by “the unhoused people, and they're here just because they have a way to 
shelter themselves legally. And that's the only reason they're here”. That loss of young 
energy could have spelled the end of the surge of homelessness activism; however, the 
increasing awareness of the problem and the newly-galvanized activists who carried the 
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cause would not relent under the pressure from the city.  They continued to push the local 
city government towards developing better approaches to the problem. Speaking in 2018, 
a local activist explained 
It became really clear that the city's plan of action was to wait it out, to 
appease it and act like they were going to do good things and wait for 
people to get distracted by the next bright shiny object that was going to 
get their attention. I think the city has been surprised now, seven years 
later that the campaigns and the people have persevered. I also think that 
they weren't counting on the baby boomer older folks that became 
involved in Occupy for the first time ever who are retired and have all the 
time in the world to go to city council meetings and budget meetings and 
to learn all of the ropes of all of these different processes and social 
service agencies. (#NR1) 
Facing that pressure, the city’s first move was to punt with councilors issuing a challenge 
to the Occupiers to figure out a 10-year solution to the homelessness problem. However, 
the move was quickly repudiated by the activists as well as the nonprofits in Eugene. A 
coordinator for White Bird Clinic, one of the major services providers in Eugene, called 
the challenge unrealistic, exclaiming "We need a secular (homeless) shelter. We need day 
programs. We need housing programs. Occupy Eugene is not going to solve that," 
(Russo, 2011). 
 Eventually, after a 4-4 vote in a city council requiring a tiebreaker by the mayor, 
the city agreed to form a taskforce to study the homelessness in Eugene and provide a 
workable plan with innovative solutions. The members were appointed by the Mayor and 
included 58 members representing city council and the mayor, city staff, Human 
Services, the faith community, neighborhood leadership, the city Human Rights 
Commission (HRC), the city Sustainability Commission, Occupy Eugene, and 
community members. The inclusive group is to meet starting January 2012 with a final 
report due by March 2012. The Opportunity Eugene Task Force marks the end of the first 
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phase of the changing landscape of homelessness in Eugene in 2011 – 2018.  
 All three proto-institutions, the case studies, I describe in the next chapter have 
their roots in Occupy Eugene camp and the task force that emerged from the direct civil 
action during these few weeks of Occupy. As I show later in the emergent mode, Occupy 
Eugene presented a crucial institutional jolt to the settled field of homelessness around 
Eugene, restructuring the relationships between the actors in the field (Venkataraman & 
Van de Ven, 1998) and creating opportunities for action Creates (Williams & Shepherd, 
2016).  
Phase 2: S.L.E.E.P.S and Whoville – Emergence of Proto-institutions 
(January 2012 – March 2014) 
The second phase I identify in the field starts following the shutdown of the Occupy 
camp in WJP and the formation of the Opportunity Eugene Taskforce by Mayor Kitty 
Piercy. The last campers left the WJP site on December 27th, 2011 to the dismay of many 
of the activists and members of the community. The camp provided shelter for a large 
number of the city’s unhoused. With the shutdown, some of whom managed to find 
places to go to like the Mission, however, the vast majority went “back to sleeping in 
alleys, sleeping by the river, wherever they can”. Crucially, the goals and energy of the 
movement continued with different arms of Occupy started 
… taking on a new life. And that's where you'll see the folks that have 
been doing the medical tent, try to figure out how to regroup and continue 
on with their work. And the folks that had been doing the library, like how 
do we re-group and keep doing things that are educational and keep 
getting people excited about some of those new forms of organization 
themselves. (#RF2) 
And it was these organizations that, over the next few years, evolved into the three proto-
institutions at the core of these studies. For instance, a group of volunteer health 
practitioners set up an independent tent at a new location in Downtown Eugene by 
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February 5th, 2012, pioneering a new model of free healthcare for all, Occupy Medical.  
 Under pressure from activists and the local communities, the Opportunity Eugene 
Taskforce conducted a thorough study of the homelessness issue in Eugene. The 58-
members were divided into separate committees and met five times during the first three 
months of the year. The final report and recommendations, published on March 12th, 
2012, included six recommendations (Full report is available in my database): 
• Identify and establish potential sites for a safe and secure place to be, 
opened by October 1, 2012, independently financed with oversight by 
a not-for-profit organization or agency. 
• Create and Support Day Use Community Centers 
• Improve Traditional and Non-Traditional Health Care Access 
• Continue and Expand Existing Services to the Homeless 
• Improve Laws and Ordinances that Criminalize and Block Homeless 
Individuals 
• Create a Commission to Continue to Explore Homelessness Solutions  
The task force, however, could not garner enough support with the Occupiers and the 
local activists’ community, many of whom remained skeptical about the city’s intent to 
invest in any of these recommendations. A local activist and one of the members in the 
task force was of the belief that 
a lot of the reason for the [purchase 00:11:58] patient from various parties 
in the task force had to do with keeping the Occupy people busy rather 
than addressing any issues but it was still pretty useful. But none of the 
recommendations that were made in any of the reports were ever done 
anything with. I hear that there was a similar group about 10 years 
previous to that that had the same effect, as in no effect. People came up 
with an amazing series of recommendations that would do really good 
things and none of them were ever tried. (#AM1) 
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The major misgiving with many activists was the lack of a realized plan or budget to 
provide a safe and legal space for the unhoused to spend the night. As mentioned, Eugene 
had a rather strict anti-camping ordinance which prohibited camping and sleeping in any 
public areas. Unhoused persons were routinely ticketed and or arrested under this 
ordinance, which compounded their legal standings and made it more difficult to apply 
for jobs or to find places to live.  
 To this cause, a group of Occupiers seized on the recommendations to create a 
village for the unhoused where people can live in small cabin-like structures. This group, 
led by a local pastor and of the prominent figures in Eugene, hashed the model with the 
Opportunity Eugene taskforce offering the city minimal involvement  
What we'd like to do is create this village of tiny houses where we give the 
homeless a place to be. We want the city to identify a piece of property 
they own, that they will lease to us for $1 a year. (#NB1) 
The group called the model Opportunity Village and engaged with the task force to 
decide on the basic requirements such a model would need to gain approval with the city. 
The model, at first, was met with oppositions from neighborhood associations and the 
city council. By October 31st, however, the city council voted 7-1 to direct city officials 
to research possible sites for locating a homeless village. The council was clear in their 
voting that this directive  
doesn't mean they eventually would allow a newly formed nonprofit called 
Opportunity Village Eugene to establish a homeless village on a property. 
Rather, councilors said, they want details about potential locations before 
deciding whether to move forward (Russo, 2012) 
The change of direction by the city council came also as a result of the ongoing pressure 
by homeless advocates who adopted a new strategy. A few ex-Occupiers, disillusioned by 
the city’s slow pace and existing policies, partnered up with a few of the unhoused for a 
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street-based campaign. The goal of S.L.E.E.P.S (Safe Legally Entitled Emergency Places 
to Sleep), was to get the city to revoke the anti-camping ordinance which bans people 
from sleeping in public spaces. S.L.E.E.P.S launched its first protest camp in the Wayne 
Morse Free Speech Plaza on November 11th, 2012, ramping up the pressure on the city. 
The campaign, led by a former head of Opportunity Village and an unhoused person, set 
up tents and occupied the plaza in protest of the anti-camping ordinance which they 
argued was illegal, based on Jones v. The city of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 
2006) ruling which states that the city cannot criminalize unhoused people for sleeping in 
public when there are no available beds. The S.L.E.E.P.S campaign was evicted from the 
plaza in January 2013, sparking another 2-year battle with the city on the limits of free 
speech and the constitutional right for camping protests.  
 Thus, it was under this pressure that the city council made the decision to approve 
a homeless village on city property on a trial basis. The village would be run by a newly-
formed a 501(c) (3) organization. As will be discussed in the next chapter, Opportunity 
Village Eugene (OVE) became the kernel for the Tiny House villages in Eugene. The city 
also approved the inclusion of the Conestoga Hut as a possible structure to be used in the 
village. The Conestoga is an innovative shelter space that was designed and built by a 
local Eugene Workshop and provides additional space, some insulation as well as a door, 
thus making it a step above a regular tent, albeit more expensive. The huts, as will be 
discussed later, played a key role in the development of the Rest Stop program as well. In 
the meantime, the approval of OVE was met with local support with the Register-Guard 
praising it as  
Eugene's newest, cutting-edge tool for carving a new piece in the local 
housing puzzle that is both pragmatic and compassionate. Increased 
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houselessness and decreased taxes have left Eugene and the rest of the 
country in a quagmire that demands out-of-the-box thinking.” (Stacey, 
2012) 
On the other hand, many members of the activists and the unhoused community were 
skeptical about the potential of the project, mostly due to the strict rules required for 
access and the capacity of the village   
Opportunity Village is great. But it was very like the elite homeless 
moment all of a sudden because they wanted to be successful so bad that 
they did not accept disabled people. They did not accept pets I don't think 
… It was because it needed to be a model that worked. It was the first 
model. If it didn't work, then they would say, oh, didn't work. So they ... 
Very quickly it became clear that it wasn't for everybody. It was 30 huts. 
(#AT1) 
Thus, instead of settling the field, the approval of OVE was a watershed moment for the 
local community members, further buttressing the efforts to introduce more solutions and 
grassroots mobilization. 
 S.L.E.E.P.S campaign was at the center of the second wave of mobilization and it 
gathered more steam following the approval of OVE. They represented a challenge to the 
city because they were  
… a very organized political campaign that came out after the protest 
camp at Washington Jeff closed. And so they were a small contingent of 
people that were doing S.L.E.E.P.S. while Whoville was going. And they 
had homeless people who were the protest campers and housed people that 
were supporting that camp and helping them move from spot to spot to 
spot because they had strategic moves. (#RF2) 
The group also relied on the support of the many civil rights councils who offered legal 
advice and representation on volunteer basis. Their strategy revolved around occupying 
public places with camps in order to draw attention to the plight of homelessness. As one 
local resident described the first S.L.E.E.P.S camp 
they had this great protest strategy. Because they knew that they had 24-
hour notice to move, by law, what they started doing was, they set up in 
the county courthouse and they were pristine. They were like the military. 
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They were clean because they wanted no, "Oh we had to close it down 
because it's dirty." They really wanted to make the protest saying we need 
legal places to sleep and they had a lot of support. (#YB1) 
The clash with the city came to a head on December 29th when Emily Semple, also 
known as Brave Beatrice, was arrested for refusing to vacate the Freedom Plaza, citing 
her constitutional right to camp and protest on public land. The altercation brought more 
media attention to the movement and their fight for free speech and legal places to sleep.  
  Further, a group of the unhoused population split up from S.L.E.E.P.S to from 
Whoville, mini homeless camps that are composed and managed exclusively by the 
unhoused. Similar camps have started following the shutdown of Occupy Eugene, 
whoever, the new iteration had the specific goal of protest, not just shelter. Whoville, 
named after the depression-era camps Hoovervilles and whimsically borrowing the name 
from Dr. Seuss’s popular children’s novel, Horton Hears a Who! (Suess, 1982), were 
intended to showcase that the unhoused can take responsibility for themselves and where 
they live if allowed the right to legally camp on public land. As with S.L.E.E.P.S and 
Occupy Eugene, Whovilles kept moving from one location to the next over the next two 
years, constantly getting evicted by law enforcement.  
 By 2013, this strong stream of local activism conflated with another major shift in 
the field. In August of that year, the Eugene Mission became a clean and sober facility, 
meaning it would not be allowing any individuals with addictions and/or mental health 
issues into its night shelter. As a local pastor and social activist puts it 
For the community experience, it was like overnight. We just woke up one 
morning and now there's no longer a facility in town where anyone with 
an addiction issue can go to get help. They did that for safety reasons. 
They did that because they wanted to improve the quality of services … It 
wasn't mean spirited against people with addictions. They just said, 
"You've got to be clean and sober to be here because we just don't have 
the capacity" (#NB2) 
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Given that in 2013, at least 33% of the homeless population in Eugene suffered from at 
least one form of mental health and/or addiction (about 540 people), the decision by the 
Mission meant that many of those people were left out on the streets with no place to stay 
at night. Around the same time, the city of Eugene and Lane County announced plans to 
clean and repair the wetlands bordering the Willamette River. For the many homeless 
people who took refuge in the forests and parks around the river, this plan was an 
eviction notice.  
 Thus, all these factors kept the pressure on the city council to collaborate with the 
local community to provide legal spaces for the unhoused beyond OVE, which opened on 
August 13th, 2013. In an op-ed in the Register-Guard, the founder of S.L.E.E.P.S 
admonished the city’s strategy of disbanding Whoville shelter and ticketing the unhoused 
was “astoundingly expensive, wasteful and counterproductive. Hoping that harassment 
will make people go away when they have absolutely no place to go is magical thinking.” 
(Stacey, 2012). 
 In mid-September 2013, one of the city councilors, Alan Zelenka, took up the 
cause of S.L.E.E.P.S and proposed what became known as the Rest-Stop program; 
temporary legal campsites that can host up to 15 unhoused persons on city or county land. 
The sites are to be operated by nonprofit organizations with the city only providing the 
public land as a lease. The first of these campsitess would be allowed to operate on a trial 
basis for 90 days after which the city council would vote on further expansions. In 
September 23rd, the City Council voted 6-2 to approve the proposal and authorize the city 
officials to site the first rest-stop, which opened on December 13th.  
 While the rest-stop deliberations were underway, 30-50 unhoused campers set up 
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a Whoville on city property in Downtown Eugene. This particular camp was larger than 
other Whovilles and in a more central location, thus causing a lot of consternation with 
the public, especially the majority of the city’s federal employees, and businesses 
working downtown. The campers demanded that the city designate the location as a self-
managed rest-stop under the newly-minted Rest-Stop ordinance. However, due to the 
centrality of the location, the city council was overwhelmingly opposed to the request and 
threatened to shut down the camp. In January 24th, 2014, law enforcement set up a fence 
around Whoville, signaling the city manager’s intention to clear the camp. As the 
tensions arose, social activists and the local community approached mayor Kitty Piercy to 
bypass the council’s decision through declaring an emergency to legalize Whoville.  
 Mayor Piercy, however, decided on January 28th not to declare the emergency. In 
her op-ed in the Register-Guard, she explained her decision saying 
Eugene, by charter, has a city council/city manager form of government: 
Councilors who are duly elected from each ward vote on city policies, and 
empower the city manager to implement those policies. I do not take this 
form of government or all of our separate duties lightly. I do take my 
responsibilities for the well-being of all in our community seriously, and 
do my best to thoughtfully respond to the many needs (Piercy, 2014) 
The Mayor, however, directed the city manager not to clear the site till after the holiday 
season and to expedite the opening of the second rest-stop location, granting the Whoville 
a 30-day reprieve. Local activists strongly objected to the decision. A leading member of 
S.L.E.E.P.S and Occupy Eugene responded in another op-ed that while the rest-stops and 
reprieve are promising 
It is essential that those "alternatives" be put into place within the next 30 
days, and that Whoville residents are not evicted before they have a safe, 
legal place to go. The city government has a responsibility to protect the 
health and safety of every citizen of this city, including the residents of 
Whoville. Evicting 40 people in a manner where they will not have access 
to adequate sanitation and a place to sleep will degrade the quality of life 
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of the community as a whole and will put individual lives at risk. 
(Valkyrie, 2014) 
In February 27, the city council voted to close down Whoville on April 1st, thus allowing 
enough time for the activists to clear out the site and find accommodations for the 40+ 
unhoused campers in the newly created rest-stops or otherwise. The deadline was further 
extended to April 14th following a meeting with the managers of the unhoused camp in 
March 27th. 
 The ensuing events remain a sore spot in the relationship between the local 
government, the unhoused, and social activists in Eugene. According to the Whovillers 
and local activists, law enforcement surrounded the camp on April 5th and preceded to 
clear out the site before all the residents were relocated. According to the camp manager, 
following the March 27th meeting, they were in the process of moving people to other 
camps at Alton Baker Park and other parks around the city when police officers showed 
up 
So I still had a lot of disabled people and like KC, and KC was one of my 
young kids that helped me out a lot around the elderly. So there's lot of 
people there that were left that are very fragile and they came in on the 
5th, and we were told the 14th, so it was like, they'd seen that I was 
strategically moving the camp and breaking it down, behind their backs. 
Cause they wanted to come in and just shut us down and more or less push 
us out into the woods, which they ended up doing. (#NS1) 
The campers alerted the social activists who negotiated the deal with the city about the 
sudden eviction. The activists who rushed to the site were indignant because only 24-
hours prior to the eviction, they had hatched out a complete shutdown plan with the 
police department and the city. As one of the attorney and activists involved in the 
negotiation explains 
They totally, so this is where it's so frustrating for me because I feel like I 
was completely lied to. Because we had hatched the plan on how our 
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volunteers were going to shut down camp. Our volunteers were going to 
do it. We were telling them how many dumpsters to order. (#RF2) 
And it was these plans that the activists regretted sharing with the camp  
[We] end up misinforming this entire group of vulnerable people based on 
the lies of the city when in fact they knew that in 24 hours, at 9 AM, they 
were going to show up with 40 police officers and shut that place down 
their way. Not our way, their way. (#RF2) 
The shutdown of the Whoville camp in downtown Eugene marks the end of the most 
active phase of street protests in the city around the issue of houselessness.  
 This phase was a watershed moment for the field of homelessness in Eugene for 
two important reasons. First, the battle lines were drawn between the different 
stakeholder communities, centering on the right of the unhoused to sleep in public spaces 
without fear of prosecution. The anti-camping ban, Eugene City Code 4.815 (Appendix 
5), was the target of both ire, from the unhoused, the local advocates, and support from 
local businesses, the city government, and the neighborhood associations. The Rest-Stop 
program and the Tiny House Village both were allowed as exemptions from the ban, 
enshrined in the city ordinance. This goal of decriminalizing houselessness continues 
through the next and final phase and is echoed across the United States with court cases 
and judicial rulings in many states. Bans on sleeping in public places increased by 31% in 
the years 2006 – 2016, according to a survey of 187 cities by the National Law Center on 
Homelessness and Poverty (Zaveri, 2018). Statewide campaigns in California, Colorado, 
and Oregon are currently pushing to lift many of these bans.  
 Second, it was in the years immediately following Occupy that the push for more 
innovative approaches to alleviating the challenges of homelessness crystallized into two 
crucial innovations in the field. First, Occupy Medical innovative model of free-health-
for-all offered many of the unhoused and low-income families’ access to healthcare. 
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Second; the Conestoga Hut was developed by a team of local tinkerers. The structure 
offered shelter and safety to the inhabitants at a low cost while being more aesthetically 
pleasing than the typical shelter tent. In the next chapter, I discuss the emergence and 
influence of the Hut on the emergence of the rest-stop program.  
Phase 3: Post-Whoville – Expansion of Proto-institutions 
(April 2014 – December 2018) 
In the next four years following the shutdown of Whoville, the activity in the field shifted 
from direct action and protests towards a more focus on further experimenting and 
developing the few programs that were started in after Occupy. Thus, these were 
dominated with the contentious negotiations between the different stakeholder 
communities around the effectiveness and viability of the Rest-Stop program, the future 
development of Opportunity Village Eugene (OVE), the effect of houselessness on the 
Downtown business area, and affordable housing.  
 The relative decline in direct action is partly due to the engagement of many of 
the activists with the new organizations or directly with the local city government. For 
instance, a few activists got involved with the Human Right Commission of Eugene 
(HRC), a 13-member board appointed by the city council with a subcommittee on 
homelessness. The subcommittee, Homelessness Work Group, lacks any reinforcing 
power however it was formed as a liaison connecting the HRC and the city of Eugene 
with the unhoused population. It is responsible for researching issues related to 
homelessness and providing recommendations to the city council and city manager. Other 
members got involved with the Housing Policy Board (HPB), a county-level forum that is 
more focused on long-term solutions to homelessness through increasing available 
housing for low and very low-income families i.e. affordable housing. 
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 In the meantime, the experiment with OVE was proven successful enough for the 
local city government to renew the lease for the land on September 11, 2014. The 
organization changed its name to SquareOne Villages, a signal of its intention to expand 
through opening up its next, Emerald Village Eugene. Unlike OVE which was comprised 
of a combination of Conestoga huts, raised tents, and a few cement structures, Emerald 
was conceived as the archetype Tiny House village with fully functional permanent 
housing targeting very low-income individuals. A possible site for the development of the 
village was identified in January 2015 in the Whiteaker neighborhood, home to OVE and 
two of the existing rest-stops as well as the Eugene Mission. The Rest-stop program 
continued to develop with Community Supported Shelters (CSS), the nonprofit operating 
the two operating rest-stops, studying the possibility to open a third location. 
 S.L.E.E.P.S continued to exert some pressure on the local city government to 
legalize camping in public land. However, the energy of the group decreased, especially 
as a few of the leading figures in the campaign moved away from Eugene. Their efforts 
over the past two years were proven effective in highlighting the urgency of the issue 
when Eugene City Council and Mayor Kitty Piercy declared a housing crisis. The city 
called upon Governor Kate Brown and the Oregon State Legislature to assist Eugene and 
similar cities in dealing with the housing crisis. By the end of 2016, the city endorsed the 
Housing First model for managing the issue. The approach was first pioneered in New 
York in the 1990s. The basic concept is, instead of the traditional approach where 
housing is provided as a reward for the chronically homeless once they become clean or 
sober, individuals are selected and placed in permanent housing first where they receive 
the supportive services they need to rehabilitate. The adoption of this policy was a 
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precursor for the conversation on affordable housing which continues to dominate the 
socio-political spaces around homeless in Eugene till now. The approach informs the 
ongoing policy battle around the implementation of a Construction Excise Tax of 1% on 
all housing development in the city to fund affordable housing.  
 Whoville continued to be problematic for the city. Following the aggressive 
shutdown of the camp downtown in April 2014, the city attempted to follow through on 
its promise to relocate the camp to another site where it can possibly join the rest-stop 
program.  The city demanded the camp be drastically smaller in size to match the 
experimental nature of the program and to avoid aggravating the residents of the 
neighborhood where it will be located. However, despite these conditions, it was proven 
difficult to find a proper site for the camp, self-managed through nonprofit called 
Nightingale Hosted Shelters (NHS). The camp was moved three times around the city 
before being located to a land property owned by the Eugene Mission in the Whiteaker in 
February 2017. This coincided with the City Council vote to adopt ordinance 205+B6576 
which repeals the sunset date for the Rest-Stop, thus making it a permanent program in 
the city’s repertoire for managing homelessness. The city also expressed its intent to have 
one rest step in each Ward of Eugene’s eight wards.  
The residents of the Whiteaker, however, objected to being hosts to all rest-stops 
in addition to the Mission, OVE, and the then-in-progress Emerald village. On April, 
15th, 2017, NHS moved to South Eugene on an experimental basis on marking the first 
rest-stop at the heart a residential neighborhood and outside the Whiteaker. At this point, 
the camp consisted of six Conestoga huts and was self-managed by the husband-wife 
team of Nathan Shower and Tracey Joscelyn, two unhoused locals who met at the 
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Whoville encampment of 2013. The camp remained under strict review process before 
any further expansion into full-on rest stop capacity. The capacity was doubled to twelve 
after the site was approved as a Rest-Stop in October 2017. 
Summary of the field of homelessness in Eugene (2011 – 2018) 
In September 2011, homelessness in Eugene was a dormant social issue. The unhoused, 
numbering in 1700+ in the most conservative estimates, had little access to shelter at 
night and were prohibited from sleeping in public under the city’s strict anti-camping 
ordinance. The Eugene Mission and the car-camping sites provided the only reprieve for 
less than 500 of the homeless in the city each night. Occupy Eugene, started in October 
2011 as a social justice movement and quickly morphed to adopt the cause of 
homelessness.  
 I identified three main phases in the field (figure 3). In the first phase, activism 
around homelessness spiked as the main Occupy camp became a large homeless shelter 
and occupiers taking up the cause of the unhoused. This phase ended in December 24th, 
2011 with the city disbanding the Occupy Eugene camp following the death of a 
homeless person in a fight. The phase changed the field through increasing local 
awareness, galvanizing local social activism, and pushing the local city towards more 
innovative solutions.  
The second phase started with local city government acquiescing under the 
relenting pressure of Occupy Eugene to launch a community-level taskforce to research 
the homelessness issue in the city and provide recommendations to the local government. 
Latching on to one of the recommendations from the Opportunity Eugene Taskforce, a 
group of citizens, activists, and faith organizations gained approval for a transitional 
micro-housing facility, Opportunity Village Eugene. The village could house 30 
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previously unhoused people for up to a year. The intensifying protests from grassroots 
street campaigns, S.L.E.E.P.S and Whoville, pushed the government to approve a Rest-
Stop program, an innovative model of transitional housing, where 15 individuals are 
housed in sites owned by the city or county and operated by nonprofit organizations. The 
end of this phase happened when a major Whoville downtown was refused the Rest-Stop 
designation and had to be dismantled by law enforcement for breaking the anti-camping 
ordinance. This phase played a major role in empowering the unhoused population as the 
protesters demanded self-managed camps. These confrontations with the city and the 
preconceptions of homelessness pushing the local community towards innovating new 
models and solutions to the homelessness crisis.  
Lastly, the final stage in the period under study follows the shutdown of Whoville 
camp all through December 2018. In this phase, the different local communities debated 
the potential, effectiveness, and growth of the new organizations that emerged through 
the past two phases; Occupy Medical, the Rest Stop program, and the Tiny House 
villages. Thus, this phase was marked by the decline in direct street action as local 
activists focused on engaging directly with the local communities through working with 
the aforementioned organizations and/or joining government forums on homelessness. 
The increased awareness of the diversity within the unhoused body, and the subsequent 
differences in support and resources needed, started adopting a more nuanced approach 
to the policies and programs targeting homelessness.  
4.2   The Legitimation Dynamics of Proto-institutions 
In this chapter, I develop my analysis of the legitimation process of proto-institutions, 
delving into the relational dynamics within the issue field (Wooten and Hoffman, 2016; 
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Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). The process model emerging from my analysis hinges on 
a few key concepts: the interactions between stakeholder communities, the proto-
institution i.e. the subject of legitimation, points of contention, and the criteria of 
legitimation; and cognitive mechanisms: issue interpretation, narrative construction, 
engendering criteria, and framing. These specific concepts emerged from my data 
analysis as explained in the previous section and through the iterating with existing 
literature.  
I construct a two-stage model of legitimation. Phase-1 legitimation centers on 
how the proto-institution is evaluated during the development and first experimental 
implementation stage. Phase-2 legitimation explains how the proto-institution is 
evaluated for possible expansion following that first experimental implementation. The 
second-stage adds performance assessment from the previous stage as an additional 
factor in the legitimation process. Figure 3 provides a simplified model and briefly 
describe it here, before detailing how it unfolds with each proto-institution. I will provide 
the full model in the Discussion section. 
Phase-1 Legitimation. A proto-institution is first evaluated for fit, i.e. 
legitimated, during its development as a proposed model of action. As the stakeholder 
communities attempt to make sense of the field and the issue following a field disruption, 
they engage in a process of issue interpretation (Litricio and David, 2017; Hoffmann, 
1999). Every stakeholder group socially constructs a narrative about the issue that 
defines and frames it to reflect the group’s perspective (Meyer and Hoellerer, 2010; 
Mahon and Waddock, 1992:12). 
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These narratives serve two purposes. First, narratives define the issue and a 
repertoire of possible actions for a stakeholder group through answering four questions: 
what are the roots of the issue? who are affected by the issue? Whose responsibility is it 
to act? And what can be done? These four questions correspond to the process of 
diagnostic and prognostic analysis associated with collective action frames (Furnari, 
2018; Benford and Snow, 2000). The answer to the question of “how a proto-institution is 
evaluated”, i.e. its legitimacy, stems directly from how the proto-institution serves the 
goals and interests of a stakeholder group as defined in the cultural narrative (Wooten and 
Hoffman, 2008). Second, a constructed narrative frames how a stakeholder engages with 
any given proto-institution. The narrative engenders legitimation criteria which 
consequently frames how the stakeholder community evaluates the various points of 
contention that emerged around the proposed proto-institution throughout the negotiation 
process with other stakeholder communities. The negotiation ends once an agreement is 
reached and the proto-institution is implemented on an experimental basis.  
 Phase-2 Legitimation. Following an experimental phase, the proto-institution is 
evaluated for possible expansions, prompting the stakeholder communities to interact to 
agree on a proposed expansion plan. Stakeholder communities engage in a second round 
of issue interpretation to re-assess the field and how it changed following the 
implementation of the proto-institution. Various performance assessments inform the 
issue interpretation process and the narratives of every stakeholder group, possibly 
leading to a change in the legitimation criteria. These criteria frame how a stakeholder 
negotiates with other communities over the points of contention in the expansion plan. 
112 
The diffusion or retrenchment of the proto-institution is the result of the ongoing 
negotiation process and contestations. 
 In this chapter, I detail the emergence of the above process and how it unfolded in 
the issue field of homelessness in Eugene, focusing on three proto-institutions with 
different models that emerged around the same time period. I structure the section per 
legitimation phase explaining the sub-processes of every phase and how they were 
manifested for each of the proto-institutions. First, I will briefly discuss the events that 
led to the emergence of the proto-institutions as they played a major role in the 
contestation process.  
Pre-Legitimation and Triggering Events 
The contestation of multiple stakeholder communities in the legitimation process 
is one of the key pieces in my analysis. Thus, before delving into the legitimation 
dynamics of proto-institutions, I want to dedicate a few pages to analyze the state of the 
field in order to foreground the mechanisms that sparked the contestations between the 
various stakeholder communities (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2017). This speaks to my 
intent to incorporate context into the analysis of legitimation (Suddaby et al, 2017).  
Researchers have argued that proto-institutions emerge as a form of settlement in 
a contentious issue field (Helms, Oliver, and Webb, 2012; Hardy and Maguire, 2010; 
Schneiberg and Soule, 2005; Barley, 1986), following a period of disruption or 
institutional upheaval (Haveman, Russo, and Meyer, 2001). Social movements can 
trigger the disruption of the field, changing its conditions from established to contested 
(Zietsma et al., 2017; Fligstien and McAdam, 2012; Sauder, 2008). However, little 
attention in accounts of institutionalization has been given to the processes and events 
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that trigger the emergence of proto-institutions (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2017; Helms, 
et al., 2012).  
The Occupy Eugene movement disrupted the otherwise established field of 
homelessness in Eugene. As mentioned in the previous chapter, homelessness in Eugene 
was predominately a stable affair, with a few local organizations providing support for 
those affected by the plight and little to no social activism around the issue since the low-
impact mobilizations in 2008. With Occupy adopting homelessness as a cause, the 
movement pushed the problem to the forefront of the local socio-political conversation. 
Occupy transformed homelessness from a background local nuisance to an issue, a 
“socially constructed disruption of an institutional order that structures purposeful 
exchanges between actors” (Lamertz, Martens, & Heugens, 2003) around the emergent 
issue filed. The once established field of homelessness become contested as a result of 
this exogenous shock (Sauder, 2008). Occupy catalyzed the evolution of homeless as an 
issue through three mechanisms: garnering public attention; highlighting the structural 
failure of existing institutional arrangements; and galvanizing social action. Figure 4 
illustrates the shift in the field.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Pre-Legitimation and Triggering Events.  
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activists, the Occupy movement greatest successes were “to put the inequalities of 
everyday life on the national agenda, influencing reporting, public perception and 
language itself” (Chomsky, 2012). It shaped the perception of class in the United States 
that, by 2012, two-thirds of American believed there is a very strong or strong conflict 
between the rich and the poor. A similar dynamic percolated to the local level. As far as 
the public opinion was concerned, homelessness was not a new problem in Eugene, 
however, at the time Occupy started, it was not an issue. This condition is referred to as a 
pre-problem where a “highly undesirable social condition exists but has not yet captured 
much public attention” (Downs, 1972). A long-time resident of Eugene explained the 
cyclical nature of the problem where 
It’s gone like a wave, up and down. There had been time periods where 
they were well organized and being effective and then the city or county 
would demobilize that in a million different ways, suck them into enough 
meetings then down went the effectiveness. Then people would get burned 
out and it would be real low for a while. Then a homeless person would 
die or something would happen and it would spike up again. (#NR1) 
Thus, the unhoused population that came out of their hiding and joined the Occupy 
camps in Alton Baker Park and Washington-Jefferson Park brought the scale of the 
problem again back to the public eye. One of the original occupiers commented on her 
surprise of the size of the problem 
I joined in the first march in Eugene and pretty much stayed with the 
group visiting camp almost every single day, sometimes more than once. 
As it moved around to different places, never slept there, but what we 
found was that every single place we went … we found that there were 
homeless people. And indeed we came to find out over time that every 
single place within walking or biking distance of a store that you could 
turn in cans and bottles had a population of homeless people. There were 
no unoccupied niches. (#AM1) 
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The scale of the problem was also made more visible by the sheer size of the WJP camp 
and the number of the homeless population it served as citizens stopped by to participate, 
donate, or even out of sheer curiosity. A local pastor summed it up saying 
I think the Occupy Movement did a lot to raise people's awareness of the 
nature of the problem, the depth of the problem. At least, in our 
community, just really motivated people to get involved and to start 
actively working on solutions. (#NB1) 
 
 Highlighting structural failure. The increasing public attention to the issue further 
highlights the failure of the existing institutional arrangements to manage the 
homelessness problem, thus advancing the evolution of the issue (Rao, Morril, and Zald, 
2000; Lamertz et al., 2003). A few nonprofits organizations in the city have traditionally 
been responsible for providing services for the homeless/poor populations. That includes 
Saint Vincent De Paul and White Bird Clinic, in addition to a handful of organizations 
that handled low-income housing like Homes for Good and ShelterCare. The city also 
had a Car Camping program that allowed people to sleep in their vehicles on private or 
designated city properties with a maximum of 6 vehicles per site. For the hundreds of 
homeless people with no vehicle, the Eugene Mission was the main night shelter in the 
city, offering approximately 400 beds. Due to the strict enforcement of the anti-camping 
ordinance, which ticketed persons for sleeping or laying down in public with any sort of 
cover, the city’s unhoused population took to camping in the trees and public parks 
around the Willamette River, out of sight of residents and the police but close enough to 
downtown.  
Galvanizing local social activism. While Eugene has traditionally been a hotbed 
of activism, dating back to the Vietnam War and the anarchist traditions of the 1960s and 
1970s, homelessness as a cause has not been on the activist agenda. The last active 
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involvement with the unhoused came in 2008 following the death of Thomas Egan, a 
local homeless vet who was found frozen to death on the streets of Eugene during a cold 
spell. A coalition of community members established Egan Warming Centers, a 
volunteer-based low barrier heated shelters which activate during extremely cold 
weather.  Occupy Eugene, however, was a wake-up call to many activists and residents 
showcasing the size of the problem and opening a channel to get involved. A local 
activist couple explained  
I think --- and I, as many people had, been feeling for a long time, a sense 
of impotence and things were not going well. So as soon as the Occupy 
Movement came up, particularly Jean, just jumped at the idea of being 
able to participate in the Occupy Movement, and we started going to some 
of the first meetings, and that's where we met for the first time, a lot of 
people that we'd get to know a lot more of both homeless and homeless 
advocates. That was it. (#NAE1) 
Other constituents in Eugene saw the benefits that a large homeless shelter could provide 
beyond just alleviating the struggle of homelessness. A local city official offered a more 
pragmatic approach, highlighting the benefit of attracting homeless campers away from 
the river and into the Occupy Eugene camp on WJP  
We don't want people camping by the river because it's horrid for the 
riparian zone, it becomes dense of drug use, and the rest of the populous is 
scared to go there. Crime has increased along the river, the trashing of the 
riparian zone has increased. We spend a lot of money through parks 
cleaning it up. What if we could get people a better place to live? That's a 
really critical thing, because the river's really important. Drainage, erosion, 
plant life, animal life. We need to protect that. (#YS1) 
For many residents, Occupy Eugene was also their first experience with mobilizing for a 
cause. Many would-be activists had a vague idea of the scale of homelessness but they 
believed it was the city’s problem. Occupy Eugene educated many of the would-be 
activists on the hardship of being homeless in Eugene, especially with the strict anti-
camping laws, and in the process energized many of them to get more involved with local 
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activism. A Eugene resident-turned-social activist explains the three mechanisms 
I hadn't been very aware of how the city was and wasn't involved. It 
seemed to me at that time that they weren't doing much. I've come to 
understand over time that they were doing a little bit more than I knew of. 
But still, not that much and Eugene has a pretty punitive though 
selectively enforced anti-camping ordinance. That means that even if you 
set a backpack on the ground, you can be, technically, cited for camping. 
And ... targeting people who look like they don't belong in town or are 
travelers from other places that don't have money. (#AM1) 
 
Importantly, these mechanisms destabilized the field and generated a high level of 
mobilization among social activists and the unhoused population, to the point where a 
critical mass of mobilization was reached that other stakeholder communities in the field 
had to negotiate for a new field settlement (Furnari, 2018). The Opportunity Eugene 
Taskforce was the platform for negotiation that brought all the different stakeholder 
communities to the table to negotiate new solutions.  
A pivotal moment in the field was the convening of the Opportunity Eugene 
Taskforce, on December 14, 2011, at the height of the Occupy Eugene movement. The 
Washington-Jefferson Park (WJP) camp had exploded in size and different communities 
within the city were calling for more innovative solutions to the homelessness issue. The 
task force was a rare point in the field where all the stakeholder communities directly 
interacted with a clear mandate: develop recommendations for solutions to homelessness 
in the city.  
All three proto-institutions spun out of the task force, thus making it a common 
starting point for mapping out stakeholder interactions over time. Tracking the changes 
and growth of proto-institutions in an issue field requires tracking the interactions of the 
various stakeholder communities (Meyer and Hollerer, 2010; Schneiberg and Clements, 
2006). Stakeholder communities mobilized and thus interacted to different degrees with 
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each proto-institutions, resulting in varying degrees of contention over time. The rest-stop 
program was the most contentious one as it directly affected most of the stakeholder 
communities while Occupy Medical was less contentious as the model required limited 
input from the government and eventually left Eugene altogether. Figure 5 illustrates the 
stakeholder communities’ interactions map prior to Occupy, during Occupy, and on the 
establishment of the task force, showcasing the different level of mobilization. The 
homelessness field was settled around the city, with social advocates focusing on the few 
existing efforts. Occupy Eugene camp saw the social advocates increase their 
mobilization triggering more interactions with the local government. Similarly, the 
unhoused community, empowered by the attention from social advocates, began to 
engage openly with the local government. By the time Occupy Eugene Taskforce was 
established, all stakeholder were interacting either directly or through the forum around 
the issue.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
S: social advocates, H: homeless, G: local government, N: neighborhood associations, and B: the business 
community. 
  
Figure 5: Stakeholder communities’ interactions from Pre-Occupy till Opportunity 
Taskforce formation 
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Phase-1 Legitimation: Evaluating the Developing Model of a Proto-institution 
As illustrated in Figures 6 below, Phase-1 legitimation is the first phase in the two-phase 
process I construct in this analysis. The pre-legitimation events that destabilized the field 
create a critical mass of supporters and prompt the different stakeholder communities to 
interact around the issue and decide on possible arrangements to settle the field (Furnari, 
2018).  
Occupy events, and the three mechanisms described above, forced the different 
stakeholder to convene Opportunity Eugene taskforce to provide recommendations to 
alleviate the homelessness issue in Eugene. This marks the starting point of the model.  
Interpreting the Issue and Constructing Narratives 
Issues lack an objective meaning in-of-themselves (Bansal and Penner, 2002) thus 
requiring social actors to construct their own meaning through a process of reality 
construction (Cornelissen and Werner, 2014), what I identify as issue interpretation 
(Litrico and David, 2017). The product of issue interpretation is narratives. Actors 
construct narratives that define the issue and schemata of action for every stakeholder 
communities (Furnari, 2018). Interpretative narratives frame the position of a group on an 
issue and thus, how it evaluates i.e. legitimates, the newly-minted proto-institution.  
The narratives I detail below were constructed through the iterative process of data 
analysis. My initial coding scheme did not include specific codes for issue interpretation, 
however, during my first round of interviews, the connections between how different 
stakeholder communities define the issue seemed to connect with how they evaluated the 
proposed models of action available and to guide their positions throughout the 
contestation process (Meyer and Hollerer, 2010). I consequently, added a few prompts in 
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my interview protocol to see expound on these process in the next rounds of data 
collection (Nag et al., 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Phase-1 Legitimation  
Stakeholder Narratives Legitimation Criteria 
Construct narratives 
Sense-making 
Proposed Model for Action Proto-institution 
Stakeholder 
Interactions 
Negotiations 
over contention 
points 
Implement 
Trigger 
` 
Neighborhoods 
Associations 
Local Government 
Businesses 
The Unhoused 
Social Advocates 
Diagnostic analysis 
Prognostic analysis 
` 
Community 
Moral 
Avoidance 
Environmental Jolt 
Contested Issue 
Field 
Pre-legitimation 
Garner public attention 
Highlight structural failure 
Galvanize local activism 
Frame 
Issue Interpretation 
Experiential 
Pragmatic 
Efficiency 
Legal 
Criteria Generation 
Engender 
121 
Four recurring key pieces were continually evoked during my analysis which I 
delineate as the answer to four questions:  
• What is the root of the issue?  
• Who are the afflicted/ future beneficiaries of any action?  
• Whose responsibility it is to act?  
• What are the actions available?   
 
These four pieces align with previous research on frame construction (Benford and Snow, 
2000; Snow and Benford, 1988). The first two questions are diagnostic in nature, 
identifying the causes of the issue and, consequently attributions of those affected by it 
(Furnari, 2018). The latter two questions are prognostic, identifying “how reality can be 
changed and what is to be done” (Benford, 1993). Importantly, these two distinctly 
analytical processes are inter-related. Actors seek logical consistency whereby the 
solutions they endorse need to fit with how they define the issue and perceive those 
affected by it. Thus, the legitimation criteria used to evaluate the proto-institution is 
rooted in the narrative that each stakeholder group constructs.  
As mentioned, I detail the process of issue interpretation and narrative 
construction for every stakeholder group. The field of homelessness in Eugene was 
highly contested following the events of Occupy. Opportunity Eugene Taskforce brought 
different stakeholder communities together to discuss possible actions and solutions. The 
three proto-institution I analyze in this chapter all emerged during this time of high 
contestation, as a result of the task force. I identify five distinct stakeholder communities 
and three field-specific narratives (Hoffman, 1999; Gerhards, 1995). Two points are 
noteworthy in Phase-1 Legitimation: first, what is contested here is the proposed model 
of the proto-institution. The stakeholder communities are evaluating the fit of the model 
to the problem. Second, stakeholder communities vary in how actively involved they are 
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in the contestation and development of the proto-institutions. Stakeholder communities 
are more likely to get involved if the model conflicts with their narrative for the issue.  
Social Advocates 
For social activists, the root of the problem lies at the local level i.e. homelessness is at 
the core of it a failure on the level of the city and the market to provide adequate housing 
for its most vulnerable members and their families. This position contradicts the common 
narrative of homelessness as an import to the city where the unhoused from different 
cities flock or are sent to Eugene to take advantage of the better social services offered by 
the city. A local advocate explained this popular idea 
Every college town has the same myth. I'm in contact with a fair number 
of homeless advocates and activists in other places in the US. And from 
Boulder, Colorado to- They have really, really cold winters but they have 
the same myth. There may be some self-fulfilling prophecy, a little bit, in 
that myth. 'Cause I've heard fairly credible rumors that there are some 
places in the southwest that do send people. They call it Greyhound 
therapy where they give people bus ticket to anywhere they say they want 
to go. And sometimes there's a little bit of pressure. "Oh well, you don't 
know where you want to go? Well, go here." (#AM1) 
The argument has been used in the past to deter local governments from providing 
services for the unhoused communities. However, local studies conducted on the city and 
county level have shown the minimal impact of the “Greyhound Therapy”. A group of 
prominent advocates in the field lamented the prevalence of this narrative in a 
memorandum to the city manager 
Many worry, in cities all over America, that if we provide quality services 
to homeless, we will attract more homeless people to our city, which will 
be costly. This fear is not borne out by empirical evidence. Studies 
nationwide, including Eugene, show that most homeless people in a 
community are from that community. According to our city’s website, for 
example, most (94%) of Eugene’s homeless have roots here in Eugene… 
73% of Lane County's homeless residents had their last apartment or 
house here in Lane County… Of the 27% who did not have their last home 
in Lane, many cite residency of family members and acquisition of part 
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time jobs as their reasons for locating here. (S.L.E.E.P.S memo to city, 
2014) 
Thus, for advocates, the issue of homelessness is a local problem on the city and county 
level. Interestingly, the size and visibility of the issue in Eugene are attributed to the lack 
of adequate services for those locally afflicted because, as one advocate states “Eugene 
does not have unusually good homeless resources. It has some of the worst homeless 
resources in the country, statistically”.  
The locality of the issue shapes the activists’ community’s perception of who is 
suffering from the issues. The afflicted are perceived as being good and deserving 
members of the local communities who succumbed to hard times. The unhoused are 
perceived as hard-working member of the working class who was pushed to 
homelessness because of a few reasons; a tough economy which forces many 
households to live with the constant threat of becoming houseless. People in Eugene and 
Lane County are poorer and more disabled than any other county in the state. Another 
cause is the strong demand for rentals which pushes the rent far above what low-income 
individuals can afford. A recent report published by an independent research 
organization highlight the low vacancy rate of 2.9% at Lane County (TAC, 2019), 
making it difficult for the 130 newly homeless people who hit the streets of the County 
every month. A local advocate who is working on a bill to support more affordable 
housing explains the rental market in Eugene where  
A lot of our apartment buildings, some are owned by firms up in 
Washington. So they take our rents, they raise our rents, but the market 
will yield. And then we also have the Californians coming up who are 
being flushed out of there with controls that are not done in a way that 
actually helps them better but are helping the middle class. So they're 
coming up here with more money than our locals in our depressed areas 
have, so they buy out stuff, they pay higher rents than our locals can, and 
so our locals are kept on the bottom. (#SM1) 
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Thus, for advocates, the affliction of becoming homeless does not take away from the 
humanity or the locality of the unhoused but is rather a manifestation of the complex 
local dynamics that pushed at-risk populations into a state of houselessness. An activist 
summarized it as  
Being homeless is NOT a way of life. For most people it’s temporary. 
They’re on the street because they don’t make enough money in their low-
paid service jobs to pay Eugene’s outrageous rents. The only thing they 
have in common is that they’re poor and unhoused. (#NP1) 
Naturally, for social activists and advocates around the issue, the responsibility to take 
action to alleviate the plight of this local issue falls to all the stakeholders of the local 
community. Active engagement and advocating to develop solutions to the issue are the 
most important modes of action. Homelessness is not an issue to be ignored or an 
unpleasant sight to avoid, but rather a challenge to engage with, on the personal and/or 
government effort. A local activist and one of the pioneers of Occupy Medical explained 
her decision to keep engaging with the issue   
Over the years I talked with different people, some people think the 
government should intervene, some think they shouldn't, and all those 
different complications. I just started to realize, I'm only going to really 
make a difference if I work on this problem in my own backyard, in my 
neighborhood. (#RSL1) 
Other advocates committed to working with the local government to design and 
implement solutions to the issue. The Rest-Stop program is a prime example of an 
innovative solution that was developed primarily through the advocates pressuring the 
government act upon the problem of lack of temporary homeless shelter. Councilor 
Emily Semple, a local activist and one of the leaders of Occupy Eugene, is a prime 
example of local activists that combine both personal involvement with government 
engagement. As a city councilor representing downtown Eugene, the epicenter of a lot of 
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the contention around homelessness, she explains her relentlessness in pursuing in the 
issue as  
Because you can't give up. Because I'm tenacious, and I'm relentless, and I 
like those two words. I didn't become council because I thought I would 
love it, I did it because I saw a need, and I was in a position ... I don't 
actually have the money to do this. Credit card dying. I just felt diversity 
of tactics. I've been to marches, I've made signs, I've brought the cookies, I 
marched, I've been arrested. What else can I do? Get on inside where I can 
at least push for real changes. (#YS1) 
Affected Community: The Unhoused 
The local community affected by the problem shares a similar interpretation as the 
advocates and social activists. The roots of the problem lie predominantly on the local 
level affecting local members of the community. Houselessness is a product of the many 
factors discussed earlier. The combination of low-income and exorbitant rents puts many 
families and individuals at the risk of becoming houseless. A houseless woman explains 
how, following the death of her husband, she found herself in this peculiar situation 
I got my first social security check and went, "I'm supposed to live on 
this?" It was $740. My rent was almost a thousand dollars a month. So 
with that kind of a disparity, I ended up homeless. Not totally homeless at 
the time, because I was able to get a position taking care of an elderly 
gentleman with prostate cancer. Passed away. I packed up my stuff and 
then I bought myself a new tent, grabbed all my old camping gear, and 
headed for the woods. It's about three months. I lived outside of 
Springfield, on the other side of Fall Creek Reservoir. I was 42 miles out 
of town. But, when it got to the point where everything in the tent froze. 
And I mean everything froze. I said, "It's time to go back into town, where 
I can at least have access to go in where it's warm." (#EG1) 
For many individuals in similar positions, mostly the elderly and the disabled, any 
attempts to rent other property are stymied by the requirements mandated by property 
owners for a rental agreement. Another formerly unhoused person who found residence 
at the Tiny House village bemoaned the failure on side of the housing market and the 
government 
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you need to prove twice your income. So $750 is pretty much social 
security bottom line. Some people make a little less than that. So you need 
to make $1500 to rent somewhere, according to that. Twice your rent. It’s 
just really broken, I don't understand people, this town is going insane on 
reference, on everything you've ever done, on your credit now. If you don't 
have good credit for whatever reason, you won't get in somewhere. The 
double or triple your income is a huge barrier and then rebuilding the 
deposit money to get in somewhere is another one. (#AK1) 
An important aspect of the local issue is the lack of affordable housing. The city in 
Eugene continues to invest in affordable housing, however, only 226 units were opened 
in the period 2010 – 2017, greatly lacking behind the need with a waitlist of over six 
years old. Accessibility to local rentals is further hindered by the long process required to 
gain Section 8 vouchers, a government subsidy for low-income renters.  A local activist 
explained the complexity of the process as 
long, in fact, right now in Eugene, you can't even sign up. The way 
Section 8 works, is it opens up about every two years, two, two and a half 
years. They have an open enrollment period, I think it's like two weeks, 
and both times they've done it since they started this process, they receive 
over 3,000 applications. And you get a lottery number, and it takes them 
over two years to work through those lottery numbers, before people get 
into, get a voucher for Section 8. (#NB1) 
With the absence of affordable housing, many families who are rendered houseless due to 
missing paycheck, disability, or medical bills are forced to rely on their social network 
and the few services available locally. With no proper interventions during the first 6-
months of becoming houseless, those afflicted members move from temporary homeless 
to a condition of chronic homelessness.  
 Similar to the advocates, many members of the unhoused believe the local 
government and community have a responsibility to help alleviate the struggles of 
homelessness. This responsibility centers on working with the local community to make 
more affordable housing and transitionary shelters available. An important avenue for 
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action is to rent protection for low-income individuals. As a houseless person lamented, 
rising rents are  
unacceptable. The city needs to, whether it's the city, the county, or the 
state, or even the federal government, needs to step in and say, "This can't 
go on." Part of it is greed. We'll just be straight up. Those who have 
money, want more money. They're never satisfied with what they've got. 
They always want more. So their bottom line is what they look at. And if 
they can get $1,200 a month for a two bedroom apartment in the trashiest 
part of town, they'll do it. (#EG1) 
 
(Advocates in Oregon won a seminal fight in February 2019 when Governor Kate 
Brown signed the United States first state-wide for rent control and eviction 
protection). 
 Importantly, many of those afflicted by the local issue believe it is the 
responsibility of the government and the local community to remove the stigma of being 
homeless through community education and outreach. Those afflicted by the problem are 
usually categorized broadly and unfavorably in the public eye where the boundaries 
between the different subgroups of the unhoused are blurred. As one formerly unhoused 
individual refrained  
there is still a huge amount of people in this town who think you're bad or 
you're not worthy of housing if unhoused. It's your fault, you're somehow 
a reject from society. That stereotype is so prevalent, nobody cares about 
the stories. They are all just assuming everyone's just a derelict drug user 
or choose they just don't care and they wanna drop out. They think that we 
all just wanna sponge off society and we just don't care, we just wanna do 
drugs and that isn't at all the case. (#AK1) 
 
The local government has the responsibility to educate the public on the reasons a person 
or a family could end up homeless and the transformative experience of living on the 
streets. The behaviors that many housed people associate with the homeless, drug use, 
loitering, panhandling, etc., are mostly consequences of being homeless. One former 
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unhoused person explains  
when you're on the street, one, you're not eating properly. Let's just face 
facts. Two, you're not safe, and you know you're not safe, so you don't 
sleep well. You spend the whole night one ear open and open eye cocked 
because you don't know what's going to happen. When you do not eat 
properly and you do not sleep properly, you become susceptible to 
everything that comes down … and you get sick a lot more, so now we've 
got trips to the hospital, the emergency room or to the doctor's and so it 
keeps adding to the cost because a lot of these people either don't have 
insurance or they've got Oregon health plan, which doesn't really pay. 
(#EG1) 
 
A community outreach advocate explains  
Lots and lots of people think that there are plenty of jobs for everybody 
who wants one. They don't think very deeply about the demographics of 
homelessness. They don't understand the mental health issues and 
invisible disabilities and just outright despair. I mean, justifiable 
depression from being homeless. And they look at the stresses and strains 
in their own life I think, and think, "Oh, it would be so nice if I could just 
not have to work at three jobs" or all that, and they imagine that 
homelessness is a carefree existence. (#AM1) 
 
The Local Government 
 
For the local government, the roots of the issue are not on the local level as much as it is 
on the national level. Local city officials and many city councilors point out the complex 
and systemic nature of homelessness; homelessness is not a local failure but rather a 
conflation of many problems on the national level. A city councilor connects the roots of 
homelessness to a systemic and subtle brand of racism and anti-poverty 
All of that basically started going to hell in the late 60s. The reason being 
is this, the move was instead of when we had the civil rights act, the 
voting rights act of 64, 65. The fair housing act of 1968. Those were all 
pieces of legislation and statutes at a federal level opened up to society to 
people of color, particularly African-Americans. Okay? There were people 
who didn't like that, still don't like that. The race game no longer became a 
race game. It became a game of big government versus small government. 
Basically, we don't wanna pay for poor peoples education, healthcare, 
mental healthcare, housing, all of that. (#GE1) 
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This rhetoric of small government manifested in federal government cuts to many of the 
services that provide for the poorer members of small communities including funding for 
affordable housing. Another contributor to the issue is the cutbacks in federal funding for 
mental health services, as a city councilor explains  
What did they do in the 90s? They started closing and shutting down 
mental hospitals. They started closing down social programs that helped 
women and children who needed to be fed. Infant mortality rates went up. 
Then you started seeing the homeless start coming out because what they 
did was, this is clearly what they did in Eugene, and they did it throughout 
the state of Oregon was when they closed the mental hospitals guess 
where those people went. (#GE1)  
 
Thus, the decline in resources magnified the issue of homelessness throughout the 
country and Eugene is no exception. Local advocates, however, are of the position that 
the problem lies more with the allocation of available funds, claiming the city is directing 
too much of its existing funding towards policing and criminalizing the homeless through 
ticketing detainment with the anti-camping and trespassing laws being the main targets 
for advocates’ ire. Under these laws, people are fined for laying down in public or 
seeking shelters in entryways at nighttime. As a local advocate explains, the unhoused 
population are disproportionately penalized by these ordinances 
90% of every trespass ticket for CP2, Criminal Trespass Two that is 
written in Eugene downtown based on the letter that exists, is written to a 
person that's sleeping, 90%. 90% is written to a person that's sleeping. I 
had happened to get one for leaning against the wall while filming a police 
officer in his duties. (#CJ1) 
The more punitive approach reflects the dilemma faced by local government in dealing 
with the issue. The shortage of funds prevents the city from providing enough support to 
the groups of the unhoused who needs it most like homeless veterans, the elderly, or 
families. The criminal behavior exhibited by some of the homeless groups, especially in 
the Downtown neighborhood threatens local businesses, thus requiring the 
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implementation of more punitive measures such as ticketing. The events of Occupy 
Eugene highlighted the plight of the unhoused who routinely stayed out of sight for fear 
of ticketing, those hiding in the forests and away from the downtown area. The public 
attention that Occupy garnered pushed the government to mitigate the issue. The 
Opportunity Eugene taskforce launched by the city mayor was an effort to placate the 
public furor and open new communication channels between the disparate parties.  
Local Neighborhoods   
The more prevailing sentiments on the unhoused, prior to Occupy Eugene, ranged 
between the ambivalent to the hostile. The roots of the problem were attributed mostly to 
personal failure as much as to systemic failures. Lacking awareness of the size and scale 
of the issue, many neighborhoods perceived of the unhoused as a nuisance in small 
number and a threat to safety and property values in larger conglomeration. The causes 
and experience of being homeless was not something that residents considered, as one 
local residents-turned-activist described her experience with the neighborhood 
They have a very shallow view of what it's like to be homeless. And 
maybe come from a family history of very judgmental ideologies and 
religious background. Protestant work ethic. If you don't work, you're not 
supposed to be able to eat. And these are people that many of them grew 
up in the 70s, when one person working part-time, 30 hours a week, could 
support three people or if they were single, they could live inexpensively 
and save up the money working during the summer to go to college 
without a job with no debt (#AM1) 
 
The Downtown neighborhood has long been at the center of much of the tension between 
local neighborhoods, the unhoused, and the local government. The neighborhood is home 
to many of the local businesses and popular hangouts, thus, it serves as an important hub 
for industry, entertainment, and taxation, drawing residents and paying customers from 
all over Eugene and the neighboring cities. However, downtown is also a draw for many 
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of the unhoused for various reasons because, as a local activist explains,  
That's where people are and that's what's going to draw people. It's not that 
unhoused folks want to be downtown. It's not like they want to be right in 
the middle, getting fucked with the cops all the time, but that's where the 
people are. That's where the resources are. That's where they're going to 
go to try to get help. Folks know these things, so it's gonna be right down 
town out of convenience. That's where the bus stations are. That's where 
everything is. (#LW1) 
 
The local city and the business community continue to clash with the unhoused and 
homelessness advocates’ downtown after Occupy with the city pushing for anti-smoking 
bans, dog bans, and other measures that were perceived by the advocates as selectively 
targeting the unhoused population.   
 In contrast to downtown, the one neighborhood most directly involved with the 
issue was the Whiteaker. As mentioned, the events of Occupy took place predominately 
in the WJP at the heart of the Whit. Residents of the Whiteaker, a low-income working-
class neighborhood, have long been more sensitive to the nuances of homelessness and 
the many subgroups of the unhoused. As a member of the neighborhood association 
explains 
we also don't call the cops as much too. We're a lot more tolerant. There's 
a lot of things that are handled inside the Whitaker that normally outside, 
people rely on law enforcement, which that is their job, I guess, to hold 
people accountable. But here, it's like "Hey, why don't you get out of here? 
You can't sit here. You're fucking wasted". Hey! you're peeing outside my 
house. All of these things happen. You passed out on my porch. It just 
makes it a lot easier to be a little bit more human and compassionate with 
people that are having a rough time. (#SG1) 
 
However, outside of the Whiteaker, the many misconceptions around homelessness and 
the unhoused predominated. Thus, the responsibility to act on the issue fell to the local 
city to police the potential bad behavior of drug trafficking and trespassing and to 
churches to provide support and charity to those who need it. Occupy Eugene raised 
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awareness of the size of the issue and mobilized many of the more progressive members 
of the neighborhood, however, possible actions were directed towards pushing the issue 
as far as possible from the neighborhood, an avoidance approach, and providing more 
services as long it did not affect the interests of the residents. As a neighborhood member 
puts it 
The opposition is going to come down to property values and public 
safety. There's a perception that homelessness, and there's an accurate 
perception that homelessness is correlated with and linked with higher 
rates of drug use than in the general population, higher rates of mental 
illness than the general population, and higher rates of criminality. (#IP1) 
 
This behavior is usually referred to as NIMBY (Not In My Backyard), “the protectionist 
attitudes of and oppositional tactics adopted by community groups facing an unwelcome 
development in their Neighborhood” (Dear, 1992).  As will be discussed later, NIMBYs 
have had a strong effect on the implementation and legitimation of the proto-institution in 
Eugene and in general.  
The Business Community 
Strongly related to the neighborhood association interpretation of the issue, the business 
community perceived the unhoused issue as a nuisance to be avoided at minimal effort, 
with the local government as the main actor responsible for guarding business interests 
against the adverse effects of homelessness. The business perception of the issue came 
predominately from the downtown neighborhood where local business owners had to 
deal with the transient crowds, a subgroup of the unhoused that mostly engaged in 
criminal behavior. This group, as a city councilor explains 
what we've been able to gather the principal sources of sustenance for 
travelers, for vagrants is selling drugs, prostitution or sexual exploitation, 
theft or robbery. What was particularly difficult about this was the sexual 
exploitation part was if they're young enough they do it to themselves, 
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they sell themselves to make money or if they're older, they will recruit 
people to exploit. (#SP1) 
 
Thus, for in the business community, the roots of the issue stems from personal choices 
and failures. For those afflicted by homelessness for other reasons, the business 
community relied on philanthropy and donations to local nonprofits such as Saint 
Vincent. Occupy Eugene did not do much to change the perception of the unhoused. The 
business community main concern continued to center around efforts to keep the 
unhoused population away from downtown and to police bad behaviors from those who 
cannot be moved. A member of the Eugene Chamber of commerce expressed the safety 
concerns   
There's a lot of our business owners who, two summers ago now, they 
came to us and they were just like, "We're losing our minds. We cannot 
deal with the issues downtown anymore." Homeless people coming in and 
vandalizing the inside of shops. One of the store owners got punched in 
the face by a homeless man at 3:00 in the afternoon. He's standing behind 
the counter and just got knocked out. It's like ... it just got to this point 
where it was like, we're losing control of just the public safety downtown. 
(#YQ1) 
 
Summary of Issue Interpretation: Emerging Issue Narratives 
 
With the events of Occupy Eugene, the different stakeholder communities around the city 
engaged in a process of issue interpretation in order to make sense of the issue (Furnari, 
2018; Litircio and David, 2017). Based on this analysis, I identify three issue narratives 
that emerge around the focal issue (Hoffman, 1999), summarized in table 8. 
 A community narrative interprets the root of the problem as predominately local 
with those affected as good and deserving community members who fell victim to local 
misfortunes. Thus, the responsibility to manage the issue falls on the entire local 
community and requires all stakeholder communities to engage and resolve the issue. 
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Local social activists and advocates and the afflicted communities, in this case the 
unhoused, championed this narrative.  
Table 8: Summary of Issue Interpretation Narratives in Phase-1 Legitimation 
 Avoidance 
Narrative 
Community 
Narrative 
Efficiency 
Narrative 
What is the root of the 
issue?  
Personal failure Local Systemic 
Who are the afflicted/ 
future beneficiaries of 
any action?  
Others; non-locals; 
undeserving 
Good, deserving 
community 
members 
Locals and 
nonlocals 
Whose responsibility it 
is to act?  
Personal and the 
government 
The community Personal and the 
government 
What are the actions 
available? 
Avoid Engage and 
resolve 
Mitigate the 
consequences 
Sources of legitimacy Neighborhood 
associations, 
Business 
community 
Social Advocates,  
The unhoused 
 
The local 
government 
 
 An avoidance narrative also emerged where the problems of those afflicted are 
interpreted as predominately a result of a personal failure on their part. This narrative 
contends that people are responsible for their current conditions where their current 
suffering mainly a consequence of bad choices. As a local advocate explains it 
There's this idea in America that we can all be successful if we just pull up 
our bootstraps. We could all make it, and so if you failed, what did you do 
wrong?  
Additionally, communities adhering to the personal failure narrative have directly or 
indirectly experienced a variation of bad behavior from the afflicted group. The labeling 
of the afflicted group as failures and associating them with negative attributes lead to the 
stigmatization of those afflicted (Link and Phelan, 2001) as the label attributed to the 
group is associated with a stereotype, washing the differences within the group (Goffman, 
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1963). A long-time resident of the Whiteaker explains 
it's hard for people to make the distinction between who is a good 
homeless person and who is somebody who might be threatening to them, 
so it's easier to just kind of lump those two together. Or they've been 
burned out or burned from helping before where they've gone out and 
they've had a bad experience. (#AAN1) 
 
The distinction between “us” and “them”, one of the hallmark of stigma (Link and 
Phelan, 2001) lead to the othering of the afflicted group where the “difference is 
translated to inferiority by applying differential moral codes to differing social 
categories” (Krumer-Nevo and Benjamin, 2010; Lister, 2004). The afflicted i.e. the 
unhoused are perceived as not a part of the community. Consequently, the responsibility 
for dealing with the manifestation of the social issue falls to the local government whose 
job is to police and manage this issue as to keep from disturbing the normal rhythms of 
the every-day life of the in-group. Neighborhood associations and the business 
community subscribe to this narrative of avoidance.  
 An efficiency narrative relegates the roots of the problem to outside forces. In the 
case of homelessness, these forces lie more on the national level than to the local. People 
can still become homeless through personal failure and bad decisions. Thus, while those 
afflicted are not explicitly stigmatized, they are still perceived as partly responsible for 
their situation. The combination of personal responsibility and outside forces focuses 
courses of action predominately towards a strategy of mitigating the consequences of the 
issue as they appear within the available resources. The local city government has longed 
adopted this narrative. Following Occupy Eugene, with the pressure from advocates and 
concerned citizen, the local government moved again to mitigating the problem.  
Engendering Legitimation Criteria 
In this part of the model, I identify two components contributing to the legitimation, i.e. 
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evaluation of the proto-institution upon implementation. The issue narrative frames how a 
stakeholder community evaluates a proto-institution, taking into account the different 
attributes of the proto-institution under evaluation. As I detail below, avoidance 
narratives engender experiential criteria, evaluating the proto-institution based on their 
own experience with the issue. Community narratives engender moral or experiential 
legitimacy, while efficient mitigation narrative engenders legal and pragmatic legitimacy 
criteria. 
Avoidance Narrative and Experiential Legitimacy 
Stakeholder communities subscribing to an avoidance narrative frame the issue and those 
afflicted by it as a nuisance to avoid. Thus, when evaluating a proposed model for action, 
i.e. a possible proto-institution, in the field, these communities focus on how it would 
impact their day-to-day life and their interest to avoid the manifestations of the issue. The 
focus on the experiential aspect of evaluation stems from the neighborhood residents 
desire to avoid the unpleasantness of a homeless-serving organization in their day-to-day 
experience. As a proponent of Occupy Medical puts it 
I think some, it's just purely they feel unsafe. And then some, it's just truly 
aesthetic, where they're like, "These people, they leave a mess 
everywhere. For me it's so obvious, but I have the luxury of being able to 
see what happens. For other people, they just see here's all these people, 
and they have owwies, and they come to you, so you're the draw. (#SS1) 
The focus on the experiential aspect results in the common NIMBY effect with most 
neighborhoods objecting to the hosting any of the homeless-serving proto-institutions. As 
a neighborhood association leader explains, public safety becomes an issue because  
There's a perception that homelessness, and there's an accurate perception 
that homelessness is correlated with and linked with higher rates of drug 
use than in the general population, higher rates of mental illness than the 
general population, and higher rates of criminality. (#IP1) 
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Thus, experiential legitimacy centered all evaluations on the fear for public safety and the 
repulsion towards a marginalized group. A local advocate recalls an unnerving 
experience to locate a rest-stop near a residential neighborhood 
Whoa Were people mad! They came out in a mob, like angry villagers 
with pitchforks. We had people who are un-housed there on a panel 
talking about their experience and all this, but it didn't matter. People just 
were mean, and just ... Even we've tried to situate some car camping in 
River Road, and there were maybe 100 people who came who were like, 
"We don't want homeless people in our neighborhood." And this was just 
to have three people with three cars sleeping in an abandoned LTD lot. It 
wasn't like they were asking for much. And this one man, at the end of the 
thing, he said, "If you build it I will come burn it down." (#RSL1) 
The ongoing NIMBY effect pushed all initial instances of the proto-institutions either the 
outskirts of town or to the Whiteaker neighborhood, where already existing homeless 
services were concentrated. A formerly unhoused person described the experience of 
dealing with the neighborhood association 
They have this vision that they see all homeless people being. And then 
they're just stating that this is what real homeless are. We are not all 
junkies, we are not all alcoholics, we are not all this and that, that they say 
negative. We are good people, we are honest people, and it just really 
sucks that they won't ... It took us three meetings to get into this 
neighborhood. And the first meeting, the vote was so bad, I didn't think it 
was gonna work out. (#NS1) 
The experimental implementation of the Rest-Stop program and the Tiny house villages 
showcases these dynamics and how it clashed with One the major points of contention 
that emerged during the negotiation was that of physical space where the rest-stop would 
be sited. The advocates, employing a community narrative, pressured the local city to 
locate the rest-stop within the city limits and close to the human and social services in the 
downtown area. That meant keeping these spots in residential neighborhoods closer to 
public transportation routes. However, the local government, reluctant to offend the 
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voting residents of neighborhoods, sited the first two rest-stops at the industrial zone on 
the outskirts of town. Activist demurred the decision in The Register-Guard 
Homeless advocates say the Northwest Expressway site is too far from 
downtown and the social services that are vitally important to the 
homeless, including the White Bird drug treatment center and FOOD For 
Lane County's Dining Room. Transportation to and from the new site will 
be problematic for some Whoville residents, especially those who are 
disabled and in wheelchairs. (Closing Whoville, March 1, 2014) 
 
Community Narrative: Moral/Experiential Legitimacy 
Community narratives in issue interpretation favor a focus on the moral criteria of 
evaluation i.e. whether the proto-institution in question serves a basic human right. In line 
with serving these basic human rights, there is a concern with how the services are 
provided. A proto-institution should offer a positive experience that restores and 
preserves the humanity of those served. The two communities most likely to employ 
these criteria are the local advocates and social activists engaging closely with the issue, 
and the afflicted population. 
 Following the events of Occupy and the consequent campaigns, both these 
parties entered the conversation with the city and other stakeholder community with the 
determination to implement effective solutions to the issue, beyond the typical night 
shelters. An activist described The Eugene Mission, the only night shelter in Eugene with 
actual capacity, as  
This is 167,000 population and about 1500 homeless. 300 housed at the 
shelter, so at the Jesus Saves, the Christian shelter, what do they call it? 
The mission. There you go. Which is very much a prison camp in essence, 
and it has a lot of strict guidelines as far as property. Bring property, bring 
property out, checking it in at night. There's no controls over if somebody 
steals something from you. They have problems with bedbugs, lice. 
(#CJ1) 
 
One of the main drivers for the Rest-Stop program was the idea that the unhoused are 
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entitled to sleep, a basic right that contradicted with the anti-camping ban. As one activist 
explains, 
in addressing homelessness, part of it is, how can you alleviate the 
suffering for the people who are experiencing it? And that might not help 
them find a home, but it'll help them feel human. And that does help 
someone find a home eventually. (#RSL1) 
 
 However, this focus on the moral obligation towards a marginalized group clashed with 
the avoidance narrative championed by stakeholder communities who feared any 
impingement on their subjective experience. During a siting session with the different 
stakeholder communities, neighborhood residents forcefully sounded their NIMBY 
opposition to the shock of a local advocate who lamented 
Wow! This is the last bastion in society left where people can say this kind 
of hateful, mean things without getting checked by other people." It's 
okay. Because really isn't the homeless caste our untouchable caste? 
They're the ones picking up the garbage. There's a lot of hatred and 
prejudice against people who end up in that predicament. (#RSL1) 
 
A moral obligation to provide basic human rights also played a major role in legitimizing 
Occupy Medical. Many of the unhoused population lacked proper healthcare and, 
consequently, many wounds and ailments are left unattended to further complicating their 
lives on the streets. Thus, for the volunteer-based clinic, one of the most important 
criteria for operations was to provide access and treatment for everyone. A member of the 
organization describes the absence of even basic healthcare for the unhoused 
We had people coming to us that weren't going to the hospital. We weren't 
seeing them in clinics. They just weren't getting care and it was horrible. 
The example that I use is, a gentleman who was on the way to dying of 
Hepatitis, and you don't have to die of Hepatitis. We have fixes for that, 
but he didn't have anything. His skin was orange, his eyes were orange, he 
was peeing brown, he was in extreme pain, losing a lot of weight. He's 
dying of Hepatitis. Coming to us, a little free clinic, the combination of the 
prescription medication and then the herbal supplements helped support 
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his liver and kidneys meant that he was able to recover from his Hepatitis 
and get his body under control. (#SS1) 
 
Additionally, beyond providing for the basic need, stakeholder communities who think of 
those afflicted by the issue as neighbors and members of the community prioritize the 
quality of the experience that a proto-institution would provide. The subjective 
experience of using the services of these new organizations was thus paramount in 
evaluating their performance. For instance, the rest-stop program was intended to go 
beyond basic shelter. As one the pioneers of the rest-stop model puts it  
From the campers' perspective, safety means that the camp will provide a 
place where they won't be hassled by law enforcement officers for 
sleeping in an unauthorized area. It means a place where campers won't be 
sleeping directly on the ground and waking up in huge puddles of 
rainwater (tents at Safe Spot have designated areas on tent platforms). It 
means a place where there are people watching to ensure that personal 
belongings are safe so that residents can go out from the camp and not 
worry about theft. (DeBuhr, 2013) 
The development of the Conestoga Hut directly relates to the intention of local advocates 
to provide an experience beyond the typical tent, usually used to shelter the unhoused 
overnight. One of the problems facing the unhoused is having to carry around all their 
belongings during the day, constantly fearing theft or loss. The hut, as a local advocate of 
the Rest-Stop program, describes it, is 
neat and clean and has a door that can be locked and so that people can 
store their belongings in there during the day when they're out doing 
things. They won't be disturbed. (#AM1) 
 
The experiential criteria is rooted in the nature of the rest-stop and tiny house village as 
transitioning shelters i.e. ultimately aiming to support the unhoused in finding a 
permanent place. Following the housing first model, the new organizations needed to 
allow the unhoused residents to gain the rest and peace overnight in order to better pursue 
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the services needed to put them back on track during the day. Thus, beyond simply 
providing space for sleep but rather, as an activist put it in the Register-Guard, 
Sleeping behind a locked door goes a long way toward getting a good 
night’s sleep. It also makes the daytime less stressful, because you don’t 
have to schlep all your stuff with you everywhere you go. You want to 
know that your possessions are safe, even if you’re not always there to 
protect them. That locked door opens new possibilities. There’s no 
knocking that. (Kahle, 2017) 
Another aspect of prioritizing experiential legitimacy is through communal living. The 
initial success of the tiny house village has largely been attributed by the residents to the 
communal experience of living in the village. Opportunity Village epitomized the post-
Occupy wave of empowering the unhoused. The village operates as a self-managed 
community with the goal of enhancing the experience of the residents as autonomous and 
responsible members of society. A member of SquareOne Villages, the nonprofit 
organization overseeing OVE, underline the role of empowering the residents 
Mostly they were able to help themselves, it's a self-governed community. 
We don't operate it. We oversee it and we make sure it's run safely, 
cleanly and so forth. But they run it themselves, it's a self-governed 
village. We set up a structure with council that they elect. The council 
does the business of the village and we just make sure that they adhere to 
the basic rules and provide them with a minimal amount of support to help 
maintain it. So that's operated very successfully. In fact, the city council 
when they authorized the project it was a six to two vote. And then when it 
came up for renewal they did it unanimously. (#NB1) 
Efficiency Narrative: Pragmatic Legitimacy 
Lastly, stakeholder communities who subscribe to an efficiency narrative are guided by a 
goal of mitigating the issue. This is rooted in a diagnosis of the issue as caused by 
external forces with local manifestations that cannot be ignored, but ultimately, cannot be 
fixed. Thus, through self-sustaining calculations, these stakeholder communities would 
favor solutions that would not affect its resources, engendering pragmatic legitimacy 
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(Tost, 2011).  
 The local city government epitomized this approach. Practically, the local city 
government only decided to interact with the issue of homelessness following the intense 
pressure from Occupy and the increasing visibility of the issue. A local activist decried 
the city’s strategy of only mitigating as opposed to being more proactive 
It took two years of civil disobedience by OCCUPY, SLEEPS, 
WHOVILLE and OURS/WARD 9 to get Opportunity Village and legal 
Rest Stops. The number of Rest Stop beds has lowered since civil 
disobedience stopped! (#ENS1) 
 
However, as explained by city officials, the lack of resources have routinely hindered the 
city’s efforts. A city councilor, discussing the city budget, explained 
when you really compare it to other states, we don't have a whole lot of 
money coming into the community from taxes. So, that means you have 
limited resources to begin with, what percentage of that should spend on 
homelessness? I think we pay a much higher ... we devote a much higher 
percentage of our budget to that, but we have a smaller budget to deliver as 
well. So, yeah, money's an issue. (#NBE1) 
 
This resource efficiency narrative permeated many of the discussions following Occupy 
Eugene where the city government championed volunteer-based initiatives. The reliance 
on volunteers is a pragmatic choice for a resource-constrained party, however, it puts 
many of the organizations and services offered for the unhoused under constant pressure, 
as one advocate puts it 
there's not enough resources. There are not enough funding models. 
Everything in this town wants to be volunteer based. Like, are you getting 
a warming center that's overtaxed? Like all these people volunteer for this. 
And every year people cry, like why are homeless people freezing outside 
when we have this? Because they don't understand, it's a volunteer. 
(#LW1) 
In establishing the rest-stop program, the city continued this pragmatic approach to its 
evaluation. The Rest-stop program ordinance clearly requires all rest-stops to be funded 
143 
and operated by a nonprofit organization with no money from the local city. Thus, CSS 
and NHS, the two nonprofits running the rest-stops have relied almost exclusively on 
donations and charity. The more expensive Tiny House Village, Emerald Village secured 
its funding through 
A lot of fundraising, a lot of charity. City kicked in the system 
development charges, which about 120,000 dollars, but everything else is 
charity, a few grants from some foundations, 40,000 dollars from the 
Collins Foundation, a lot of donor-advised funds from the Oregon 
Community Foundation. But, we had one 100,000 dollar gift that got us 
going to purchase the property, the property was 280,000 and just 
everything from five dollars on up. We had several gifts of 25,000 dollars 
a piece because we told folk that was the cost of a house, not counting the 
land and everything else, just the cost of building the house is about 
25,000 dollars. (#NB1) 
 
Many local advocates, however, greatly disagreed with this pragmatic approach. A 
prominent activist with Occupy and the Opportunity Taskforce criticized the pragmatic 
and efficiency narrative as 
Pathetic and it all comes down to money. To me, especially now after 
eight years of looking at it, it is the classic failure to prioritize money for 
social programs. They always come up with extra money for cops, cops, 
jails, jails, cops. Criminal justice has no limits on the funding, but they 
have gutted mental health. They have gutted all of the public funded social 
net for this community, the county. It's happening all around the country 
(#NR1) 
 
Table 9 summarizes the emergent narratives and the legitimacy criteria engendered with 
each.  
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Table 9: Phase-1 Legitimation – Stakeholder Community Narratives and Criteria 
Stakeholder 
Community 
Narratives Criteria of Legitimation 
Social 
Advocates 
Community 
“Being homeless is NOT a way of life. For 
most people it’s temporary. They’re on the 
street because they don’t make enough money 
in their low-paid service jobs to pay Eugene’s 
outrageous rents. The only thing they have in 
common is that they’re poor and unhoused.” 
(#NP1) 
Moral Legitimacy 
“in addressing homelessness, part of it 
is, how can you alleviate the suffering 
for the people who are experiencing it? 
And that might not help them find a 
home, but it'll help them feel human. 
And that does help someone find a 
home eventually.” (#RSL1) 
 
Experiential Legitimacy 
This is 167,000 population and about 
1500 homeless. 300 housed at the 
shelter, so at the Jesus Saves, the 
Christian shelter, what do they call it? 
The mission. There you go. Which is 
very much a prison camp in essence, 
and it has a lot of strict guidelines as 
far as property. Bring property, bring 
property out, checking it in at night. 
There's no controls over if somebody 
steals something from you. They have 
problems with bedbugs, lice. (#CJ1) 
 
The Unhoused Community 
“When you're on the street, one, you're not 
eating properly. Let's just face facts. Two, 
you're not safe, and you know you're not safe, 
so you don't sleep well. You spend the whole 
night one ear open and open eye cocked 
because you don't know what's going to 
happen. When you do not eat properly and you 
do not sleep properly, you become susceptible 
to everything that comes down … and you get 
sick a lot more, so now we've got trips to the 
hospital, the emergency room or to the doctor's 
and so it keeps adding to the cost, because a lot 
of these people either don't have insurance or 
they've got organ health plan, which doesn't 
really pay. “(#EG1) 
 
Experiential Legitimacy 
The Conestoga Hut is “neat and clean 
and has a door that can be locked and 
so that people can store their 
belongings in there during the day 
when they're out doing things. They 
won't be disturbed. (#AM1) 
Local 
Government 
Efficiency Narrative 
“What did they do in the 90s? They started 
closing and shutting down mental hospitals. 
They started closing down social programs 
that helped women and children who needed 
to be fed. Infant mortality rates went up. Then 
you started seeing the homeless start coming 
out because what they did was, this is clear 
what they did in Eugene, and they did it 
throughout the state of Oregon was, when they 
closed the mental hospitals guess where those 
people went.” (#GE1) 
Pragmatic Legitimacy 
- when you really compare it to other 
states, we don't have a whole lot of 
money coming into the community 
from taxes. So, that means you have 
limited resources to begin with, what 
percentage of that should spend on 
homelessness? we devote a much 
higher percentage of our budget to 
that, but we have a smaller budget to 
deliver as well. So, yeah, money's an 
issue. (#NBE1) 
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Table 9 (continued).   
Stakeholder 
Community 
Narratives Criteria of Legitimation 
Neighborhood 
Associations 
Avoidance Narrative 
“We also don't call the cops as much too. 
We're a lot more tolerant. There's a lot of 
things that are handled inside the Whitaker 
that normally outside, people rely on law 
enforcement, which that is their job, I guess, 
to hold people accountable. But here, it's like 
"Hey, why don't you get out of here? You 
can't sit here. You're fucking wasted". Hey! 
you're peeing outside my house. All of these 
things happen. You passed out on my porch. It 
just makes it a lot easier to be a little bit more 
human and compassionate with people that are 
having a rough time.” (#SG1) 
Experiential Legitimacy 
- “Whoa Were people mad! They came 
out in a mob, like angry villagers with 
pitchforks. We had people who are un-
housed there on a panel talking about 
their experience and all this, but it 
didn't matter. People just were mean, 
and just ... Even we've tried to situate 
some car camping in River Road, and 
there were maybe 100 people who 
came who were like, "We don't want 
homeless people in our neighborhood." 
And this was just to have three people 
with three cars sleeping in an 
abandoned LTD lot. It wasn't like they 
were asking for much. And this one 
man, at the end of the thing, he said, 
"If you build it I will come burn it 
down." (#RSL1). 
 
Business 
Community 
Avoidance Narrative 
There's a lot of our business owners who, two 
summers ago now, they came to us and they 
were just like, "We're losing our minds. We 
cannot deal with the issues downtown 
anymore." Homeless people coming in and 
vandalizing the inside of shops. One of the 
store owners got punched in the face by a 
homeless man at 3:00 in the afternoon. He's 
standing behind the counter and just got 
knocked out” (#YQ1) 
Experiential Legitimacy 
- “There's a perception that 
homelessness, and there's an accurate 
perception that homelessness is 
correlated with and linked with higher 
rates of drug use than in the general 
population, higher rates of mental 
illness than the general population, and 
higher rates of criminality.” (#IP1) 
 
 
 
Legitimating Contested Proto-institutions 
In the previous two sections, I detailed how stakeholder communities construct issue 
narratives through the process of interpretation, and how these narrative engender certain 
legitimacy criteria. The conflicting narratives developed from the issue interpretation 
process first came to a head during the Opportunity Eugene Taskforce and preceded 
through the series of public protests and advocacy campaigns thereafter such as the 
Opportunity Village Eugene S.L.E.E.P.S. These negotiations among “embedded and 
institutionally pluralistic organizations” (Helms et al., 2012) eventually lead to the 
emergence of the new institutional practices i.e. proto-institutions (Rao and Kenney, 
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2008; Barley, 1986; Zilber, 2006).  
 In this section, I elaborate on the contestation process through an in-depth analysis 
of three proto-institutions that emerged around the same time in Eugene. The engendered 
criteria framed how stakeholder communities evaluated proposed models of action during 
the negotiation process. I will focus on the points of contention that emerged during the 
development of the proto-institution and how the role of the narrative/criteria in the 
legitimation of the emergent model.  
 To illustrate the contestation between the different stakeholder communities, I 
will use the source-criteria shorthand to denote the interactions between every 
stakeholder community and the engendered criteria they used to negotiate a point of 
contention. Table 10 below summarized the unique source-criteria combinations in the 
field. I will be using the shorthand version with the first letter indicating the source and 
the second letter denoting the legitimacy criteria.  
Table 10: Source-Criteria Combinations 
  Narrative Source-Criteria Shorthand 
Community  Social advocates – Moral legitimacy 
Social Advocates – Experiential legitimacy 
The homeless – Experiential legitimacy 
S-M 
S-X 
H-X 
Avoidance Neighborhood Associations – Experiential 
Legitimacy 
Business Community – Experiential Legitimacy 
N-X 
B-X 
Efficiency Local Government – Pragmatic Legitimacy G-P 
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The Tiny House Village: Opportunity Village Eugene 
The 58-member task force issued its recommendations in Mid-March of 2012 supporting 
the establishment of a safe and secure place for the unhoused by October of the same 
year. As mentioned, the only places in the city at the time that was open to the unhoused 
were provided either overnight shelter, such as the Eugene Mission, or the few sites 
allowed under the Car Camping program. Figure 7 illustrates how the stakeholder 
communities interacted around the Tiny House Village following the Opportunity Eugene 
Taskforce and on to the development of the model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 7: Stakeholder communities’ interactions around the Tiny House Village 
During its first implementation, the model was driven mostly by the interactions 
between the high mobilization of social activists and the unhoused, from Occupy Eugene 
then S.L.E.E.P.S and Whoville, and the government increasing efforts to mitigate the 
social upheaval through implementing a quick solution to the issue.  
The Tiny House model was the brainchild of social activists. A group of social 
activists organized around the Community Alliance for Lane County (CALC), a local 
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nonprofit formed in 1960 with the goal of creating a just and peaceful community. All 
were local seasoned activists and all were involved with the Occupy Eugene camp in 
some capacity. The group was brainstorming innovative ideas to the problem. As a 
member of CALC recalls that meeting 
The very first thing was around five people sat around in a living room at 
Community Alliance of Lane County talking about possibilities and what 
we could maybe do. And then we reached out to try to find people who 
actually knew what they were doing and gained enough community social 
capital within our organization as it was forming. (#AM1) 
The focus during that time was on providing a legal place for people to sleep that goes 
beyond the typical tent shelters. They started pitching an idea for a new model of 
transitional housing, what is referred to as micro-housing, to the local government. The 
idea touches on the Housing First Model and seeks to provide a safe and secure place for 
a select group of the unhoused for a transitional period. Throughout this period, those 
selected will be allowed to stay in the village while they work closely with the local 
resources to transition to a more permanent habitat. Hoping to capitalize on their existing 
platforms for organizing and public outreach, the group also reached out to local 
churches, a few were already providing different services to the unhoused population. 
Dan Bryant, a pastor and a local activist became involved with the core group and helped 
bring more of the progressive churches on board. Eventually, the group settled on a 
proposal for a transitional housing model, of Opportunity Village Eugen, which they 
proposed to the city. One of the core members of the group explains the rationale behind 
the model 
What we'd like to do is create this village of tiny houses where we give the 
homeless a place to be. We want the city to identify a piece of property 
they own, that they will lease to us for $1 a year. (NB1) 
Points of Contention 
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The tiny house village was proposed as a settlement to the ongoing homelessness issue. 
However, as the model was presented for discussion with the city, the different 
stakeholder communities objected to the project resulting in the emergence of a few 
points of contention where the different legitimation criteria of each community involved 
around the model clashed over the model. Four stakeholder communities were central to 
the negotiation process: social advocates, the unhoused, the local government, and the 
neighborhood associations. Table 11 summarizes the contestation process between the 
different stakeholder communities, rooted in the legitimacy criteria they employed in the 
negotiation process.  
Siting 
One of the main problems facing any sort of shelter for the unhoused is the location. 
Neighborhood residents, as represented by neighborhood associations, were reluctant to 
host these sites in residential neighborhoods for various reasons. Highlighting a narrative 
of avoidance and evaluation rooted in subjective experience, a city councilor who was 
involved with the negotiation process described the neighborhood's position as 
The bulk of the push back fear motivated comes from neighborhood 
people who are afraid that you're gonna build a whole bunch of little tiny 
houses all over my neighborhood and it's gonna create too many people 
and pollution, human pollution. (#SP1) 
The position of the neighborhood associations shaped that of the local government. The 
elected government, while seeking to appease the mobilized communities, was keen on 
not angering the residents of these neighborhoods in order not to lose political cache. 
This extended to a reluctance to offer any city-owned land to the project. The decision of 
where to locate the village, thus, became a highly contentious affair. 
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 To overcome the situation, the social activists avoided instigating any 
confrontations with the neighborhood associations by focusing on sites in the Whiteaker, 
a neighborhood where the residents have the highest sympathy towards the unhoused. As 
a member of the core group describes the process of choosing the location 
We asked the city for land and they said, "Well, we don't have any." And 
we said, "Hmm." And so a person got a hold of some copies of some maps 
from a planning process called Envision Eugene and those including the 
zoning and various overlays and things like that. They were linked to the 
county maps so we could look up who owned what properties and we 
went and we looked for properties that were owned by the city. Ones that 
looked interesting, we looked up on Google satellite and found places we 
thought might be underused and the best ones we went and visited. We 
found the property on Garfield and at the time it was just being used to 
store some equipment, occasional training exercise for the canine unit of 
EPD. (#AM1) 
Funding 
Funding for the project was another point of contention for while the local government 
was willing to mitigate the issue, appropriating funds to build homeless shelters was too 
controversial with tax-payers. To compromise, once a site was located in the Whiteaker, 
the government agreed to rent the land for $1, while providing no further funds from the 
tax-payers. The group behind the model incorporated SquareOne Villages, a nonprofit 
organization, and began fundraising for the village. As the head of the organization 
explains, assuming 24 villagers, OVE has 
a $60,000 budget, the villagers pay $35 a month, that's typically about 
$10,000 a year, so that's one-sixth of the village, five-sixths of it the 
nonprofit is paying for, only one-sixth is being paid for by the villagers. 
(#NB2) 
The Physical Space 
For the city, another contentious issue was how to organize the physical space on the site. 
The village was modeled after the Dignity Village in Portland, Oregon, a highly praised 
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self-governed community that provides transitional housing through a membership 
system. The Portland model is based around tents and a membership system. A couple of 
hold-outs in the city council were against the model as they believed tents would be 
impractical for the purpose of a transitional shelter as well as being unsightly. 
Opportunity Village opted to provide a more stable community through the construction 
of more permanent dwelling units. To ensure the transitional nature of the village for the 
city, the simple structures would not be connected to the utility grid, so they lack running 
water, electricity, or heating, however, the site would contain a public community for 
gatherings and a kitchen.  
The main clincher came with the introduction of the Conestoga Hut as a possible 
vehicle for the new site. The 6-foot-by-14-foot wood-frame structure first appeared 
during the Occupy Eugene camp in WJP when the occupiers sought a small shelter for 
one of the elderly and sick campers. Erik deBuhr, an owner of a local workshop, brought 
out a prototype of a micro-shelter that he had been working on for a while, and to his 
surprise: “ 
The person who lived in it really liked it. She said she was much warmer. That 
was encouraging. 
  
The idea of the design stems from the deBuhr’s interest in communal living. He wanted 
to build a low-cost shelter that can provide adequate sleeping and security condition 
while being compact enough to fit in parking lots and backyards without occupying too 
much space. The proto-type was collecting dust for a while when the Occupiers 
approached him to with their request.   
The incorporation of the Conestoga Hut highlights the two evaluation criteria the 
social advocates pushed for in legitimation of the new model. It addresses moral 
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legitimacy by providing a safe and humane place to sleep. It also addresses experiential 
legitimacy through its innovative design. The hut is built from inexpensive material used 
in creative ways. It provides insulation to the occupant, a door, a window, and enough 
space for a small-sized bed and two pieces of luggage or bags. The design solves one of 
the major issues for the unhoused in transition, that of a safe place to leave their items. 
The locked door thus facilitates the rehabilitation process at the core of the Opportunity 
Village model. For the local government, the hut also aligned with its pragmatic criteria, 
being cheap and available. The hut is constructed inside the Community Supported 
Shelters workshop in Eugene and can be assembled by a team of volunteers in about two 
hours. The materials are all cheap and locally available, with the focus being on creative 
design, as a member of CSS explains 
it's made out of lots of different materials, we use them in an 
unconventional way. The conventional materials not used in ways that 
they weren't really intended to be used, but they work. The cattle fencing, 
the cattle fencing is what gives the strength to the roof structure. That goes 
on and it gets attached with plumbers tape. Plumbers tape is strips of metal 
with holes in it and it’s used by plumbers for piping material, we use it as 
hardware to hold down the kettle panels. Then we have a few layers of 
insulation in there, its insulation, it can be used in lots of different ways. 
We use these panels that can bend to be able to be shaped in that curve to 
give it a little bit more R-value, the ceiling. It’s not that we're using non-
conventional materials, it's that we're using conventional materials in a 
non-conventional way. (#KEB1) 
The innovative design and relative ease in customization were a major draw for the OVE 
organizers. They approached deBuhr about using Conestoga hut in the village instead of 
the typical tents. The group got engaged in improving upon the initial design in order to 
be a better fit for the model. 
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Following the city council initial approval of OVE on December 10, 2012, the 
Conestoga Hut was the final piece of the puzzle. On December 12, OVE brought out the 
new refined model of the Conestoga Hut 
we built a prototype on a trailer, and we brought it down to the city 
council meeting where they were going to be talking about this, about 
what can the city council do to create more spaces for people to just be. 
The mayor, the city councilors, they saw this hut and they walked through 
it, it was sort of a big deal. (#KEB1) 
The hut was approved on that same night and added to the list of accepted vehicles under 
the overnight sleep ordinance. Thus, Conestoga huts could be used for the car camping 
programs as well as for any other programs operating under that particular city ordinance. 
This was a crucial decision as it also opened the door for the establishment of the Rest-
Stop program the next year. The Conestoga Hut was also pivotal in the establishment of 
Community Supported Shelters, the nonprofit organization which will be running three 
out of four rest stop over the next few years.  
Governance 
 A key hurdle for OVE was getting the local city to approve a long-term 
transitional housing project. On the one hand, prior experience with homeless shelters 
discouraged the city from allowing any form of long term camping. On the other hand, 
allowing people to stay for a longer period of time was essential for the transitionary goal 
of the shelter as envisioned by the social activists. It transpired that one of the key 
contention points was about the rules and procedures need to govern the operation. 
Stakeholder communities debated the best approach to ensure that the pilot program 
delivers on its purpose while minimizing the risks of the operation going awry.  
The proposal for OVE resolved the concerns of stakeholder communities through 
introducing strict rules on admission and eviction, a strong criteria for selection, and a 
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pilot period where the project would run on an experimental basis. OVE has five main 
rules that all resident must abide by 
No theft, no violence, no drugs or alcohol, no persistent disturbances, and 
a 10-hour-a-week service requirement. The service work can include 
cleanup chores or gate duty - the village, on North Garfield Street, is 
behind a locked gate that is manned 24 hours a day. These rules are 
enforced by the residents themselves through a village council that meets 
weekly. (A new kind of neighbor, September 10, 2017) 
Residents are responsible for enforcing the different rules within the site. Residents get 
two warnings for violating these codes prior to evictions. SquareOne Village, the 501c 
(3) nonprofit organization that was established in October 2012, is responsible for 
oversight, however, the model seeks to empower the residents in through allowing for 
self-management. Thus, OVE is 
run by a council of people who live there. The board at SquareOne Village 
does ultimately have the decision-making power but is very reluctant to 
overturn decisions made by the council, who runs the place. (#LC1) 
Potential residents have to fill out an application with a nonprofit organization and go 
through an interviewing process with members of the board and the existing residents of 
the village. The 30-unit site is also designed as a high-barrier shelter, meaning no 
individuals with mental/personality issues, drugs, or alcohol problems would be admitted.  
  Opened in May 2013, Opportunity Village Eugene was the first Tiny House 
village in Eugene. It cost a little less than $125,000. It was rather rudimentary in that, 
although comprising mostly permanent structures and Conestoga Huts, it did not provide 
permanent housing or access to utilities i.e. it only supplied the basic need for shelter. It 
was also largely affected by its status as the first pilot project of its kind. The Register-
Guard describes it  
Residents, who pay $30 a month to cover utilities, live in nine rustic 
"Conestoga" huts and 20 bungalows. Other structures include a gatehouse, 
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kitchen, tarp-covered dining area, and a bathhouse with bathrooms, 
showers and laundry room. A 30-foot-wide yurt equipped with a wood 
pellet stove and Wi-Fi serves as the village's central gathering area and 
venue for council and community meetings (Russo, 2014) 
 
Summary of the Phase-1 Legitimation Process: Subject, Sources, Criteria, and 
Emergence 
 I conceptualize OVE as a proto-institution as it presents the first instance of the 
Tiny House model, a new field settlement that emerged through a moderately contentious 
negotiation process between different stakeholder communities. Four main communities 
interacted over the development and implementation of OVE: the social activists, the 
unhoused, the local city government, to a lesser degree, the neighborhood associations. 
These communities represent the sources of legitimation. The highly mobilized social 
activists, housed and unhoused, were strongly focusing on providing a safe space for the 
unhoused to be for enough time to feel empowered and to build up their lives enough to 
find proper housing. Table 11 summarizes the contestation dynamics and contention 
points for the Tiny House village in this stage.  
Table 11: Summary of the contestation dynamics in Phase-1 for the Tiny House Village 
Siting Funding Physical Space Governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
S: Social advocates, H: homeless, G: local government, N: neighborhood associations, B: the business community. 
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legitimacy, understood as doing what is right for a fellow human being i.e. the right to 
safe night’s sleep for the unhoused.  Additionally, the social activists highlighted the 
experiential legitimacy by focusing on the internal subjective experience of living in 
OVE as evidenced in the use of Conestoga Hut, the longer stay period, and the self-
management aspects of the model. The government was seeking to balance the economic 
and political influences of various stakeholder communities while mitigating the issue. 
Thus, it espoused pragmatic legitimacy in evaluating the proposed model i.e. a settlement 
that serves its calculated interests.  The criteria were evident in how the city clashed with 
the social activists over funding, governance, and siting the village, all contention points 
that could affect the councilors approvals with their tax-paying constituents, but relented 
once adequate measures were included in the proposal.  
 Importantly, the negotiation process, contested as it was, was driven by all parties 
desire to collaborate. The increase in the episodic power of the social activists and the 
unhoused following the mobilizations of Occupy Eugene, decreased the asymmetry of 
power between the different parties in the negotiation process (Rao and Kinney, 2008), 
thus, preventing the local city from exercising its power of domination to dismiss the 
issue (Lawrence, 2008). The new field settlement is a compromise, achieved through 
ironing out the incompatibilities in legitimacy criteria between the different parties. The 
settlement is thus a “patchwork of different flavors” (Rao and Kinney, 2008) with further 
diffusion and institutionalization contingent upon future re-evaluation.  
The Rest-Stop Program 
Similar to the Tiny House village, the development of the rest-stop program also had its 
roots in the recommendations issued by the Opportunity Eugene Taskforce for the city to 
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support the establishment of safe and legal places for the unhoused to sleep. Figure 8 
below provides a brief overview of the various stages of legitimation the rest-stop 
program went through starting with model development and implementation at the height 
of the second phase of the field, S.L.E.E.P.S and Whoville, and upon evaluation for 
future expansion in the post-Whoville phase. The establishment of the Rest-stop was and 
continues to be considerably more contentious than the Tiny House villages because of 
the high involvement of the city and the strong mobilization of all stakeholder 
communities either for or against the expansion process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Stakeholder communities’ interactions around the Rest-Stop Program 
I briefly referred to the emergence of the Rest-Stop program from the events of 
Occupy Eugene and the confrontations of the local city with the S.L.E.E.P.S and 
Whoville campaigns in chapter 4.1. The relentless pressures from these two campaigns in 
late 2013 and early 2014 shifted the conversation towards the need for a more innovative 
approach that allows for the permanency and safety necessary for rehabilitation. At the 
time, Opportunity Village Eugene was underway, however, it did not begin to scratch the 
surface of the problem. Councilman Alan Zelenka is credited with proposing the model 
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for the program where certain city-owned land would be exempted from the anti-camping 
ban thus allowing for overnight sleeping.  The negotiation between the social activists, 
the local city, and the neighborhood associations culminated with the passage of Council 
Ordinance no. 20517 on September 25, 2013, permitting the Overnight Sleeping Pilot 
Program. The first rest-stop location was initiated at the height of the Whoville standoff 
in early 2014. The contract for the site was granted to Community Supported Shelters 
(CSS), a non-profit organization that was formed by the inventors of the Conestoga Hut. 
Erik and Fay deBuhr operated out of a social living community in West Eugene. The 
workshop, which they called the Tinehive, was becoming more popular as the Conestoga 
Hut was adopted by Opportunity Village Eugene and a few of the car camping locations. 
A member of the workshop describes it 
What happened to us is we were just like, "Okay, let’s keep building huts." 
What changed is as we were building the huts the word sort of got out on 
the street, it’s like, "Oh, there's this organization that is building these 
huts, they're placing them around town." A lot of people started to come 
up here every day saying, "How do I get into one of these?" We started 
having the conversation with those people and hearing their stories. 
(#KEB1) 
Frustrated with the dismal conditions the unhoused faced, the group put together a 
proposal to run the first rest-stop location through the newly-minted CSS organization. 
The city leased a property in the industrial zone in West Eugene, on the edge of a 
residential neighborhood. The pressure from homelessness advocates following the 
breakup of Whoville pushed the city to open another location in mid-2014, also operated 
by CSS in the same neighborhood. The city refused the request of Whoville campaigners 
to designate the site in the initial phase of the program. 
Points of Contention  
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The emergence of the Rest-Stop program was fraught with contentions on issues 
including the city codes, the model, siting, and governance. A social activist and a 
member of the city Poverty and Homelessness Board explains the pragmatic approach of 
the city as  
Where you're going to put it, how you're going to pay for it, who's going 
to manage it? Those are the only things you really need to get anything 
going. (#RSL1) 
Besides having different positions on the above three questions, the social activists, the 
unhoused, and the neighborhood association brought a few other concerns to the table. 
This section details these contentions points and how the various sources of legitimacy 
i.e. the stakeholder communities interacting around the issue, negotiated the rest-stop 
program as a field settlement framed by their conflicting criteria.  
City Codes 
As mentioned in chapter 4.1, the social activists and the unhoused who mobilized heavily 
with S.L.E.E.P.S and Whoville were motivated by the constant criminalization of the 
homeless population who were routinely ticketed and jailed for sleeping on public 
property. Thus, while the proximate goal was to establish safe and legal places for the 
unhoused to sleep in, the ultimate goal was forcing the local city government to revoke 
the anti-camping ban, the local ordinance under which the unhoused were most 
criminalized. The local government was against revoking the ban, on the contrary, the 
ban was strongly implemented especially in the Downtown area. The establishment of 
OVE further galvanized the activists for demanding a similar transitional approach. When 
councilor Alan Zelenka proposed the model to the city council, social activists were 
quick to offer various possible locations. As a social activist recalls 
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I was somewhat involved, kind of marginally, but somewhat involved in 
the creation of that. And it was a nobody-quite-satisfied compromise 
between what the city wanted and what the advocates. The city originally 
wanted to have it just be a safe parking program, more like a real highway 
rest stop. Where people could just be there at night, and they had to leave, 
and there would be no toilets or anything like that. And the activists and 
advocates pushed successfully to allow people to have an ongoing place 
there to have a place to sleep that did not involve owning a vehicle. 
(#AM1) 
 
The local city finally relented in September 2013 issuing an ordinance allowing the 
establishment of the rest-stop program on an experimental basis. The ordinance was a 
compromise achieved through a contentious process of negotiation involving all 
stakeholder communities, with each vying to ensure its own interests.  
Siting 
Similar to Tiny House village, one of the first and most persistent hurdles to the proposal 
was the location of these sites as neighborhood associations feared these sites will pop up 
in residential neighborhoods. Unlike with the Tiny House village, neighborhood 
associations were heavily involved in the negotiation process to prevent the establishment 
of any homeless facility in unwanted locations. One concerned citizen wrote to the 
Register-guard 
There are no easy answers here, but shifting the problems that the 
downtown area and the surrounding neighborhoods experience into our 
residential neighborhoods is not the answer and frankly defies common 
sense. If the City Council feels it must provide some type of overnight 
homeless camps, they should be on undeveloped city land a reasonable 
distance from residential neighborhoods, and they must be supervised. 
(Warren, 2013) 
 
As such, in writing the ordinance for the rest-stop program, the city, pragmatic as always, 
leaned strongly towards catering to the needs of neighborhood associations and the 
business community. The pilot program approved had two main provisions: 1) each site 
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can have up 15 persons sleeping in vehicles, recognized as tents, cars, and the recently 
approved Conestoga huts; and 2)  
No site may be used for overnight sleeping pursuant to subsection (1) of 
this section unless one or more entities enters into the agreement with the 
City referenced in Section 4 of this ordinance and one or more entities 
other than the City provides, at no cost to the City, adequate garbage, 
toilets and supervision. The entity providing supervision shall work with 
surrounding and nearby neighbors (businesses or residences) to address 
any concerns. (City Ordinance no. 20517, Section 3, 2) 
Further, the ordinance specifically prohibits the establishment of these exempted sites in 
any residential neighborhoods or close to a school, aligning with an avoidance narrative 
and its focus on experiential legitimacy. Accordingly, the first two locations were 
established in the industrial zone on the border of The Whiteaker neighborhood, a good 
distance from residential homes. Witnessing the negotiation over the locations for these 
rest-stops, a resident of the Whiteaker explains 
I think that's there little traction for it to spread to other neighborhoods. I 
think that the perception of the homeless population is ... A lot of is 
media-driven because they're demonized as being druggies and dirty 
criminals. Some of these are people's grandmas. They don't have a place to 
go. I think that hopefully us setting a different example without being the 
nimby neighborhood will catch on. I really hope. I mean, that's all we can 
do because we cannot turn a blind eye to this. Nobody can turn a blind eye 
to this. (#SG1) 
 
Funding and Operations 
Similar to the Tiny House villages, the city, while seeking to mitigate the homelessness 
crisis, refused to contribute any tax-payers money to the establishment and operations of 
the rest-stop programs, a point bluntly made by city councilors in the ordinance and in 
media accounts such as this excerpt from Register-Guard 
In agreeing to pursue the "rest stop" proposal, councilors said they expect 
the people who have been urging them to do more on behalf of the 
homeless would supervise the site. The advocates should not expect the 
city to do it, they said. "The community should step up," Zelenka said 
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"Our role should be to pick a site." Garbage service and toilets should be 
provided on the site at no cost to the city, he said.  (Russo, 2013) 
 
The city, thus, favored an efficient model of funding and operations similar to OVE, 
where a nonprofit operator takes charge fundraising and the day-to-day operations of a 
rest-stop. Operators seeking to run any of these sites have to submit a proposal for 
approval to the city council, detailing the funding, supervision, admission criteria, rules, 
structures to be included. A local city official described the setup of the rest-stop, in 
relation to OVE, and the relationship between the city and the operators  
They have a little bit different structure because they're bigger and the city 
will enter into an agreement with an operator who basically operates the 
entire thing. They do the set up, they take applications for who gets to stay 
there, they make sure that people follow the rules, they take applications 
and things like that. They pay for these, the city doesn't fund that program. 
The operator pays for the ... They're required to have a Port-a-Potty or a 
restroom access on site and trash service, weekly trash service so the non-
profit will pay for that. (#NW1) 
 
Two organizations emerged that were willing to take on the responsibility of running this 
innovative model. Community Supported Shelters (CSS) was the first nonprofit to submit 
a proposal, buoyed by the success of the Conestoga Hut. Erik deBuhr, the founder of 
CSS, describes the funding strategy of those early days  
me and my wife, we know how to throw a party. And so we would have 
fundraising events. And at the time, some of our revenue was coming in 
from just garage sales. And people would donate stuff to us, and we would 
sell the stuff, and we would have that money. And so, those kinds of 
benefits. And those are just a ton of work, and it's really annoying. But we 
didn't have anybody, we didn't have the donors that were like, "Wow, I 
really like what you're doing." (#EB1) 
 
More funding came from the increasing sales of Conestoga Hut to churches and other 
nonprofit organizations who were interested in hosting an unhoused personnel in their 
backyard or parking lots, under the car-camping program. 
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 The second organization emerged out of the Whoville camp where the standoff 
between the mobilized unhoused, social activists, and the local city continued to heat up 
in 2013. A group of unhoused activists from the Whoville camp incorporated Nightingale 
Hosted Shelters (NHS) incorporated a nonprofit organization with the hope to have the 
camp designated as a self-managed rest-stop. A member of the group recalls the 
negotiation with the government.  
I took it over from a guy that was using meth, Tinman, and I took it over 
in the camp when I was chosen as a leader. And so I started going to all 
these meetings and figuring out how to do, and get different activist in the 
house community to help, and they helped me a lot. Doing proposals to 
the city on Rest Stops and different dimensions on Rest Stops and what 
they look like, and what kind of people they'll be helping and what they 
would be like, huts or tents on platforms (#NS1) 
Both organizations offered a similar approach to managing a rest-stop, however, NHS 
strongly believed in self-managed camp as the ultimate expression for the humanity and 
empowerment of the unhoused population. CSS promoted a more supervised operational 
model that empowered the unhoused to run the day-to-day operations, albeit with more 
supervision at the highest level from members of CSS, a similar structure to SquareOne 
and OVE. There continues to be a disagreement between the ranks of the local activists’ 
community on what the best approach would be, summed up in an activist’s statement 
The managed camps are the way to go. But the self-managed camps by 
unhoused themselves are the key to success in my opinion. Success over 
the issue itself because the issue itself is people that are so down that they 
can't even see the light, half of them. (#AT1) 
The proposal from CSS was approved in the initial phase of the program and assigned 
two locations to run rest-stop on an experimental basis.  
Governance 
In negotiating the program, the city emphasized the transitional nature of the rest-stop 
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program, as explained by a local city official  
It's really important that this is not seen as an endgame. This isn't ... We 
don't want people living in tents and huts. It's sort of a step. So the camps 
provide, or the Rest Stops, they provide a place where people can leave 
their things, just sort of stabilize and not have to worry about where 
they're gonna get a meal and where they're gonna sleep and be able to 
focus on connecting with services and housing programs and things to get 
into permanent housing  (#NW1) 
Pragmatic legitimacy motivated this emphasis; homeless camps are viewed negatively by 
many of the taxpayers, as sanctions for a stigmatized group. The government risks losing 
political support from their constituents if they were viewed to be supporting the choices 
of unproductive members of society through providing them with a government-
sanctioned, long-term homeless camp. A city councilor highlighted this reasoning saying 
I think, as I probably alluded to so far, a lot of it has to do with what kind 
of support you provide. I think warehousing people and doing no more is 
just putting a bandaid on the problem … So, I think you can't just house 
people, you have to give them an opportunity to be assessed and 
understand what their impediments to be mainstream, for wan of a better 
word, are. And then hopefully give them the opportunity to develop that, 
whatever it is, to get back into being productive members of society, 
assuming society has a role for them. That's just where we started. And I 
think that's getting harder and harder. (#SP1) 
This position led to the introduction of two of the main rules for the rest-stop program. A 
contentious provision in the ordinance stipulates that residents are allowed to stay on site 
between 9:00 pm and 7:00 am on weekdays. The requirements are meant to motivate the 
residents to get their affairs in order to be able to graduate to permanent housing. It was 
also made as a concession to those on the council who opposed the program on the basis 
of it being a long-term homeless shelter, an arrangement the city objected to as a result of 
previous failed experiences and public disapproval. As an unhoused resident of a rest-
stop puts it 
Monday through Friday from 10:00am to 4:00pm, every other camper 
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besides staff has to leave. The city doesn't want a bunch of homeless 
people staying on this property 24 hours a day (#AJ1) 
The rule is not particularly popular with CSS or NHS as it impinges on the subjective 
experience of the residents by forcing them out of their sanctuary. However, it has been 
applied with some flexibility, especially for residents with health problems. The second 
rule stipulates the allowed transitionary period an unhoused person can stay at a rest-stop. 
Both CSS and NHS has a 10-month limit, however, in reality, the sites are managed on a 
case-by-case basis with residents allowed to stay up to 18 months some cases. The 
process is heavily monitored with multiple checkpoints on how the resident is 
progressing towards their goals.  
 Another important aspect of the living experience that separates the rest-stop from 
typical overnight shelters is the focus on communal living. CSS explain their orientation 
to the living experience as 
We want to make meaningful activity a part of the lives of all the 
residents. The tent campers, who will be screened by Community 
Supported Shelters, are required to participate in a certain number of hours 
of volunteer activity each week to be allowed to stay at the camp. (#KB1) 
 
As with OVE, residents of a rest-stop are expected to contribute to the day-to-day 
operations and maintain the peaceful and collaborative culture of the camps. The city and 
neighborhoods, skeptical of homeless camps, kept a close watch on the culture within the 
camps, with the possibility of ending the experiment looming in case of trouble. This 
resulted in one of the main disagreements around the model: who is allowed in the 
camps. A social activist who was directly involved with the program explains 
But both Community Supported Shelters and Nightingale have high 
barrier marks where they request that the people stay sober, which really 
cuts out a lot of people who can go in. You also have to have people who 
can live in community, who are not too challenged that they can't 
participate in daily activities. Like a lot of sites have gate duty where you 
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have to make sure that that's safe. And that's also part of the culture and 
the community, is people stepping up and doing their volunteer roles. And 
when people can't do that they have to be asked to leave the site. They 
really do try to make sure that the people are somewhat highly functional. 
(#RSL1) 
The high barrier marks and enforcement of community-level were crucial for establishing 
the success of the program, however, these rules had a similar effect as that in OVE: a 
high bar for admission that the majority of the unhoused community cannot pass.   
Summary of Phase-1 Legitimation Dynamics: Subject, Sources, Criteria, and 
Emergence 
The Rest-stop program, the subject of legitimacy, is a proto-institution that emerged as 
field settlement during a tumultuous period of field changes. The highly contentious 
process of negotiation and legitimating the model involved a few mobilized stakeholder 
communities in Eugene, as can be seen in table 12. For the unhoused and the social 
activists’ communities, the moral indignation at the criminalization of houselessness 
materialized in continual acts of civil disobedience and protest, S.L.E.E.P.S and 
Whoville.  
Table 12: Summary of the contestation dynamics between source-criteria 
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guard their own interests in the negotiation process. These four communities represent 
the sources of legitimacy in the legitimation process around the Rest-Stop program. 
 While all stakeholder communities employed a collaborative framing, the criteria 
of legitimacy i.e. how to judge the fit between proposed settlement and the problem, 
varied depending on how every stakeholder viewed the issue. Social activists campaigned 
for humane treatment of the unhoused, directing their ire towards the anti-camping ban as 
a violation of human rights. The rest-stop program was championed as a morally 
legitimate solution providing the basic dignity of safety to sleep. Additionally, they also 
joined the unhoused community in advocating for a better subjective experience i.e. 
experiential legitimacy, which goes beyond the typical overnight shelter. They demanded 
empowerment through self-management, proximity to support services and facilities, and 
enough stability to allow the unhoused to rebuild their lives. These demands, however, 
clashed with those of other stakeholder communities. Neighborhood associations also 
employed a focus on experiential legitimacy, one that emphasized the intersubjective 
experience of living in proximity to a homeless camp and the possible problems such 
location could bring to the residents such increases in criminal activities and unpleasant 
sights. These concerns fed the local city’s focus on pragmatic legitimacy, focusing on 
how the proto-institution could affect its resources, money and time, and its political 
power, rooted in the support of taxpayers and neighborhood associations. As a local 
activist involved with the program remembers 
Really at first the city wanted us to run another one. And it was political. It 
was all political. Well they wanted to shut down Whoville, and they didn't 
wanna look like the bad guys. And so I saw that leverage that we had at 
that point and they just wanted to get another camp up. They didn't even 
care if it failed. Actually, I think that deep down inside there was a lot of 
people in the city who just thought, let's just do this and we'll wait for 
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them to fail. And then we'll say, look we tried to help them but they failed. 
(#KEB1) 
 
The settlement that emerged reflects a compromise between highly incompatible 
proposals from powerful stakeholder communities. The unhoused and social activists 
vested with episodic power from high mobilization, the city endowed with power from its 
position, and the neighborhood and business community from their pull on the local city 
as electors and taxpayers.  The Rest-Stop program reflected the field positions of these 
stakeholder communities, providing a brittle settlement with low chances of evolving and 
codification (Rao and Kinney, 2008). The social activists and the unhoused got their 
transitionary shelter with Conestoga Hut, but the city and neighborhood association 
implemented an experimental approach to the program,  contributed very little money to 
the project, relegated the first two locations to sites away from social services and 
neighborhoods, and required all residents to leave the location during the day. Self-
management, a prime demand from Whoville and S.L.E.E.P.S, was mediated with the 
supervisory role of CSS and strict admission criteria.  
Occupy Medical  
Similar to the two proto-institutions discussed earlier in this chapter, Occupy Medical 
emerged directly out of the Occupy Eugene events and the Opportunity Eugene 
Taskforce. Figure 9 below summarizes the interactions between the stakeholder 
communities in the field Occupy Medical developed and expanded. I will follow a similar 
scheme in describing the legitimation process as it unfolded over two periods of 
evaluation: emergence and expansion.  
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Figure 9: Stakeholder communities’ interactions around Occupy Medical 
One of the earliest organizations to develop out of the Occupy Eugene camp, 
Occupy Medical is also the least controversial proto-institution in this study. The free-
healthcare-for-all clinic started out as a medical tent during the first Occupy Eugene 
march, providing first aid for the protesters. During the WJP phase, the tent expanded in 
size as more volunteers from the health sector joined. Doctors, nurses, and herbalists 
formed the core of the group that provided free healthcare to anyone with no conditions. 
As the clientele increased, the range of diseases and conditions requiring attention also 
expanded from simple first-aid to include patients with HIV, diabetes, measles, hepatitis 
and many more. Occupy Medical began to diverge from the Occupy Eugene movement 
over issues of management. The medical tent committee was wary of applying the 
consensus-based decision-making model to these health conditions. As one of the 
pioneers of the model explains 
We already have insurance companies that make decisions for our 
patients. These people that don't know our people, they're the last people 
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show up at the meetings and say this is what the medical tent is doing., 
and these are the supplies that we need so if anybody knows, we only 
asked permission to get ... we didn't ask permission. We just asked for 
donations. That was it, and then said we've really been enjoying having 
support from you guys. (#SS1) 
The organizers of the medical tent sought to empower the patients to take full control of 
their health conditions which meant separating from the hierarchy of the general 
assemblies and the consensus-decision making model. Patients were also empowered to 
explore other options beyond western, medication-based medicine. Herbalists, 
nutritionists, and reiki professionals were consulted in designing the treatment plans for 
patients. This holistic approach, along with the mission of providing no-judgment and 
free healthcare for all, formed the core of what became Occupy Medical.  
 Following the shutdown of Occupy Eugene, the medical tent moved to downtown 
Eugene where it was set up every Sunday. On September 28, 2012, Occupy started 
operating outside of a re-purposed blood donation bus that they bought through a grant 
from the Oregon Community Foundation. A volunteer with the clinic explains 
We wanted to offer something else, and so we did. We had little tents, and 
that was everything that I could stuff in my car, and that was what we 
were. We wrote the grant for our community foundation and got the grant, 
and that paid for the bus. That was a 32 foot Bluebird bus that used to be a 
blood mobile, and we changed it up a bit to be a mobile clinic. Then it 
very quickly expanded. We got more and more volunteers, and more and 
more patients, and then we had to have another tent. Eventually, it was the 
bus and three garage tents that we set up every single Sunday no matter 
what the weather was like (#SS1) 
 
The process of setting up the clinic every Sunday, however, was hectic. Volunteers set up 
the bus and the tents, forming different stations for patient take-in, a waiting area, and 
consultations. The clinic also provided haircuts, massage therapy, and warm meals to the 
unhouse and low-income patients. All services were provided free of charge with no 
questions asked. Even real names were not required. 
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In the period of 2013 – 2017, Occupy Medical continued to provide its services 
out of the bus every Sunday, relocating to the WJP to be closer to the patients. The wide 
range of services offered to an increasing clientele, however, was getting more difficult to 
maintain, especially with an all-volunteer team and one clinic manager 
It took two hours to set it all up, and then we had a four-hour clinic, and 
then an hour to break it down. And then if it rained you had to take it all 
over to a place where we would hang it up, which was another hour, come 
back, fold it up, and then put it back in the bus. So that's another couple of 
hours right there. (#SS1) 
Points of Contention  
From its beginnings in Occupy Eugene, Occupy Medical championed an independent 
existence, relying on the relentless work of its volunteers for operations and fundraising 
with minimal interactions or need for other stakeholder communities. The points of 
contention around Occupy Medical were mostly rooted in its operations. The primary 
interactions between the stakeholder communities were those between the social activists 
and, to a lesser degree, the neighborhood associations.  
Siting 
As with the homeless initiatives in this study, siting is always a contentious issue. The 
clinic opened on Sunday in Downtown Eugene when all business and government 
employees were off, thus avoiding most confrontation with disgruntled passersby. 
Downtown Eugene is where many of the unhoused stayed during the day to be closer to 
local social services such as the Eugene Library, White Bird Clinic, the Eugene 
Courthouse. A longtime volunteer recalls these early days of the clinic saying 
There was nothing but offices and stores that normally weren't open on 
Sundays surrounding us. We didn't really get any feedback reaction from 
neighbors there. Except sometimes, people would be walking by and they'd 
kind of look at you know like what is this? On the other hand, a lot of 
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people, probably more people stopped and asked what it was and then came 
back the next week with donations. (#NN1) 
 
However, when the clinic located to Park Blocks, the operators had to deal with pushback 
from the residents of the neighborhood, rooted in experiential legitimacy and a desire to 
avoid the “ugliness” of houselessness. One of the lead operators described the conflicts  
The community was not super excited about us for a long time. We got a 
lot of flack. I'm not sure why offering free medical care was an issue for 
them. You're Occupy, therefore you're stupid. They would recommend 
that we would get a job or something. I already have. 60 hours a week I'm 
working, but thanks for the advice. They were really rude to us.  The cops 
would come and there would be three groups of two cops that would circle 
like sharks at our little spot. (#SS1) 
 
Eventually, the clinic moved to the Washington-Jefferson Park in the Whiteaker where 
they faced less conflict from the neighborhood.  
Funding and Operations 
The main contention point emerging with Occupy Medical was rooted in the complete 
reliance on volunteer healthcare professionals. Occupy Medical is registered as a 501(c) 
(3) nonprofit organizations. All operation costs and medical supplies including 
medications are provided through donations and grants. Driven by a moral imperative to 
the humanity of all patients, the clinic is a low-barrier organization; no patients are 
excluded from accessing the services provided by the clinic. Patients entering the clinic 
pass through a triage desk where they check-in and have their vitals recorded before 
being assigned to the suitable healthcare professionals. Many medications are provided 
directly to patients at the clinic, however, for more advanced treatment, the clinic 
provides vouchers for discounted generic products.  
As the number of unhoused and low-income patients seeking healthcare service 
increased, the fluctuation in the number of available healthcare professionals began to 
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take a toll on the clinic, with a few people putting in more hours or having to quit due to 
burnout. A volunteer with Occupy Medical recalls a particularly bad winter in the first 
location near the Federal building in Downtown Eugene 
the doctors and the nurses and the herbalists were freezing their butts off 
for four hours and they couldn't deal with it. Especially aging people. At 
that point in time, I was okay as long as I was just dressed well, but we 
had one woman who we helped to start the place and she finally stopped 
coming to Occupy. The body just can't tolerate the cold. So, she dropped 
out for probably six months (#NN1) 
Unlike the Tiny House villages and the Rest-Stop program, the local government was 
barely involved with Occupy Medical, which was a double-edged sword. On the hand, 
that allowed the clinic to continue to offer its brand of healthcare independently without 
any restrictions or rules on accessibility. Then again, the hands-off approach from the city 
limited the resources and support the clinic initially had. One of the volunteers laments 
the hands-off approach 
The city of Eugene was very reticent to help us. I just came once a month 
and would, during public comment, give a report, as if they were part of 
our problem-solving team. That's okay. I just say, "Well, it's occupy 
medical, and these are the amount of patients that we served, and what we 
have noticed is that we have a lot of respiratory distress right now," … 
After a while, they're like, "What we would like is to have the bathroom 
open, and barring that, I would like to have the City of Eugene offer a 
public bathroom, and then a hand-washing station for our doctors. H1N1 
is coming through, and you need to wash your hands for that. The hand 
sanitizer is just not going to do it. After three asks, so that, and they 
provided that. That's what they offered. Their big thing that they offered 
was that they wouldn't charge us for being there. (#SS1) 
 
Occupy Medical continued to operate out of the bus till mid-2018. 
Summary of Phase-1 Legitimation Dynamics: Subject, Sources, Criteria, and 
Emergence 
Occupy Medical, the subject of legitimation, is a proto-institution that emerged 
out of the contentious events of the Occupy movement. The organization managed to stir 
little conflict with other stakeholder communities during its years of operation, as fig X 
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above shows. Thus, the social activists, those involved with the clinic, were the only 
mobilized community, however, their efforts focused on building their volunteer basis 
and fundraising for supplies. To avoid the contested negotiations that occurred with other 
proto-institutions targeting the unhoused population, Occupy Medical relied on a self-
sufficient independent model, which appealed to the city and its focus on resource 
efficiency. The neighborhood associations, however, expressed the typical objection to 
having a homeless service close to the downtown area. However, Occupy Medical 
remains a low contentious proto-institution, as shown in table 13. 
Table 13: Summary of the contestation dynamics between source-criteria 
Siting Funding and Operations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S: Social advocates, H: homeless, G: local government, N: neighborhood associations, B: the business community. 
X: Experiential legitimacy, M: Moral legitimacy, P: Pragmatic Legitimacy. () contention between source-criteria. 
 Moral legitimacy is at the heart of Occupy Medical, enshrined in the belief of the 
organization in the healthcare-for-all model and the right of low-income and the 
unhoused to access to medical care. Experiential legitimacy is also a driver, found in the 
motivation to go beyond merely providing medical assistance to offering patients and 
marginalized group a holistic and respectful treatment. That includes access to meals, 
haircuts, and a massage therapist, all provided free of charge with no discrimination. As 
one of the lead operators puts it 
It's more than just a free clinic. It's the model that we have of judgment-
free, patient-centered care, integrated health, and community involvement, 
and recapturing your own body. (#SS1) 
S-M 
N-S 
H-X S-M 
H-X 
S-X 
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And while the effort went smoothly, a few conflicts emerged with the neighborhood 
associations and their focus on their own experiential legitimacy measures that excluded 
any organized activity that could possibly increase the concertation of the unhoused near 
residential areas, despite the possible benefits of providing healthcare to those who need 
it. The negotiation process was rather contentious, as a lead member of the organization 
recalls  
We ended up talking with the chief of police, talking to everybody. 
Talking to city council, and it was just part of our job, to fend off people 
that were in places of power that had these horrible ideas about the people 
that we served. They thought we were like some Petri dish for the 
unhoused, like we were making people unhoused as opposed to what was 
actually happening, was when you help people so that you alleviate their 
suffering, then they're able to make better choices (#SS1) 
 
The other major source of legitimacy in the field, the local city, adhered to a pragmatic 
approach to Occupy Medical, providing support when called upon for help, but otherwise 
keeping a hands-off approach. This is rooted in the limited impact that Occupy Medical 
had on the economic and political interests of the city as well as the fact that, through 
providing healthcare for low-income and homeless individuals, Occupy Medical saved 
the city some of the expenses associated with caring for these vulnerable communities. 
The city awarded its Community Award to Occupy Medical in 2014, thus acknowledging 
services of the organization.  
 Thus, on its initial development and implementation, Occupy Medical represented 
a new field settlement between two stakeholder communities, the social activists and the 
city, with high power asymmetry and highly compatible proposals. Occupy Medical 
offered a model that cost the city very little in terms in contention and costs, and in 
return, the city was willing to allow the clinic to Occupy public property and provide 
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support when needed. This integrative arrangement would be extremely durable (Rao and 
Kinney, 2008).  
Phase-2 Legitimation: Evaluation for Growth/Termination of a Proto-institution 
The second stage of legitimation is triggered when the proto-institution is evaluated for 
expansion beyond its initial experimental form. Phase-2 Legitimation, as shown in 
Figure 10, follows a similar pattern to Phase-1. The proposed model of expansion 
triggers the stakeholder communities to both interact and develop interpretations of the 
issue prior to the new phase (Fisher, et al., 2016) with one important difference. The 
implemented proto-institution generates performance outcomes which inform the issue 
interpretation process. Thus, the stakeholder communities are attempting to construct a 
narrative that takes into account the changes in the issue field following the 
implementation of the proto-institution. The outcomes and impact of the proto-institution 
shapes the emerging narratives and how the stakeholder communities evaluate the 
proposed model of expansion.  
 The theoretical contention is that emergent practices are institutionalized if they 
are socially recognized as the solution to a collective problem (Meyer, and Hoellerer, 
2010; Berger & Luckmann, 1966). However, the diffusion of controversial practices is 
likely to face strong political contestation and arouse “negative reactions from groups that 
benefit from the status quo” (Jung and Mun, 2017: 1352). The second phase in the 
legitimation process showcases the contrast between these two views. I find that, in this 
situation, the stakeholder communities continue to maintain their narratives of the field 
with one significant change. Both the objective outcomes and subjective interpretations 
of the performance of the proto-institution inform the evaluation process.  
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Figure 10: Phase-2 Legitimation 
 While the community and avoidance narratives continue to hold sway over the 
stakeholder communities, the push to justify any future growth or decisions resort to a 
logic of positive performance. Efficiency narratives, with emphasis on efficient resource 
utilization and demonstrated positive outcomes, become more dominant in the field. 
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Thus, a more pragmatic approach to evaluating the expansion becomes more common 
compared to approaches that favor the moral or the experiential.  
 In this section, I detail the Phase-2 Legitimation followed by an analysis of how 
the process unfolded for each of the proto-institutions.  
Evaluation of the Proto-institutions: Performance Assessment 
Especially for the Rest-stop program and the Tiny House villages, the experimental 
nature of these models was integral to the local city approval. The local government has 
been reluctant to allow any type of homeless camps on the basis that these camps 
complicate the problem rather than solve it. The typical sight of tent cities is associated 
with trash, drug, and criminal activity and other causes of public anger, without 
effectively resolving the issue. As a city councilor explained 
While the idea of creating a homeless community that would provide a 
variety of services is novel and exciting, I do not believe it is the most 
effective way to alleviate homelessness. A homeless encampment might 
provide food, showers and makeshift shelter, but it does little to move 
toward the ultimate goal of permanent housing. Little if any research 
backs the idea that a homeless encampment effectively helps to end 
homelessness. (Stauffer, 2012) 
 
Despite these objections, the Rest-Stop program and OVE were implemented due to the 
intense pressure from local advocates and the introduction of the Conestoga Hut. As a 
compromise between the conflicting demands of local advocates and the neighborhoods 
associations, the local city included sunset dates to the charters of both the Rest-Stop and 
the Tiny House villages, dates where the programs would be evaluated and terminated if 
believed to be a failure. The evaluation process involves engaging in assessing the 
objective and subjective aspects of the implemented proto-institutions.  
 For the Rest-Stop and the Tiny House village, the local government and the social 
advocates designed objective measures to assess the number of unhoused that 
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successfully transitioned to more permanent housing following their stay at any of these 
transitional shelters. Similarly, for Occupy Medical, the impact was measured through the 
number of patients the clinic serves. The second measure related more to the impact of 
the sites on the neighborhoods i.e. the subjective experience of the residents as measured 
through government-supervised research surveys for the Rest-Stops and assessed 
informally through interactions with the neighbors for The Tiny House Villages and 
Occupy Medical. 
Interpreting the Issue and Constructing Narratives  
To reiterate, Issues lack an objective meaning in-of-themselves (Bansal and Penner, 
2002) thus requiring social actors to construct their own meaning through a process of 
reality construction (Cornelissen and Werner, 2014), what I identify as issue 
interpretation (Litrico and David, 2017). Actors construct narratives that define the issue 
and schemata of action for every stakeholder communities (Furnari, 2018). Interpretative 
narratives frame the position of a group on an issue and thus, how it evaluates i.e. 
legitimates, the newly-minted proto-institution. Narratives are constructed of two 
analytically-distinct parts: a diagnostic element that define the root of the issue and 
perceptions of those afflicted, and a prognostic element emphasizing modes of actions 
and responsibility to act. The legitimation criteria used to evaluate the proto-institution is 
rooted in the narrative that each stakeholder group construct, favoring consistency 
between the definition of the problem and the proposed action under evaluation (Furnari, 
2018; Meyer and Hoellerer, 2010; Benford and Snow, 2000; Snow and Benford, 1988) 
In Phase-1 legitimation, I identified five distinct stakeholder communities and 
three field-specific narratives (Hoffman, 1999; Gerhards, 1995). Two points are 
noteworthy: what is contested in Phase-2 Legitimation is the proposed model for 
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expanding a proto-institution, based on the performance assessments from the 
experimental implementation. Second, stakeholder communities vary in how actively 
involved they are in the contestation and development of the proto-institutions. 
Stakeholder communities are more likely to get involved if the model conflicts with their 
narrative for the issue.  
Not surprisingly, the narratives constructed through issue interpretation were 
consistent for almost all of the stakeholder communities between phase-1 and phase-2. 
Litrico and David (2017) found a similar effect in their study of narrative shifts in issue 
interpretation in the field of civil aviation industry around the contentious issue of 
environmental practices. Stakeholder communities with a focus on economic efficiency 
and regulations continued to favor actions that align with these interests. Thus, a narrative 
of efficiency continued to hold sway over the local city government.  Similarly, 
stakeholder communities who prompted the change in the field continued to advocate for 
it, hence, the persistence of a community narrative with the social advocates.  
 Thus, rather than detailing the construction of each narrative, I will highlight the 
changes that occurred in the diagnostic and prognostic elements of each narrative.  
Social Advocates and the Unhoused 
Social advocates and the unhoused communities continued to interpret the issue of 
homelessness through a community narrative that emphasized the humanity of the 
unhoused and their value as local members of the community, who just fell on hard 
times. The success of the proto-institutions implemented in previous phases validated this 
account of success. As an activist who works with the expansion of the rest-stop explains 
this narrative 
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There's a lot of people interested in, how are you making this work? Why 
is this sustainable? And it really comes down to the way that we engage 
people and the way that we relate with people, and building trust with 
people. I mean, something that people tend to neglect is that the homeless 
are the people in society often who could not make it through the gauntlet 
of normal society, normal functioning society. (#KEB1) 
 
Speaking in 2018, another social advocate lamented the continued prevalence of the 
“homelessness is a choice/personal failure narrative” and how it serves to dehumanize the 
most vulnerable members of our society, saying 
The idea then that people, a lot of folks think people choose that lifestyle. 
People don't choose it and then they think, "Well, I would make better 
decisions. I wouldn't end up in that situation." What they're basically 
expecting people to do is never make a mistake. Never make a mistake in 
a capitalist society because if you do, you're going to pay for it, big time. 
(#YB1) 
 
Conceptualizing homelessness as a personal failure or a choice also negatively affects the 
type of actions that are available for the unhoused through casting the unhoused as 
undeserving of support, compared to those who chose to work hard and maintain 
housing. Residents of affluent neighbors have long pushed that narrative to prevent the 
local government from funding programs such as the rest-stop, the tiny house villages, 
and Occupy Medical. Social advocates have tried to refute this rhetoric, as one of them 
railed against the idea of the unhoused as lazy, saying 
it's easier with that narrative to say, "Oh well, all homeless people are 
bums, and they deserve what they got. I work hard for my money." You 
hear that all the time, "I work hard for my money, I don't want to give it to 
people who are homeless." You guys have no idea how hard all those 
people have to work just to survive. But it's hard to really get past that. 
(#RSL1) 
 
Thus, while social advocates maintained a community narrative, a new tactic was added 
to the prognostic element of the narrative; increasing outreach. In 2017, the local city, in 
collaboration with activists communities, issued the Outreach Handbook Eugene’s Rest 
182 
Stop & Car Camping Programs, with detailed information and strategies for 
communicating with neighborhoods on all issues related to the rest-stop program. 
Homeless activists engaged in information sessions and Town Halls to bring the issue of 
homelessness and the potential of the new programs to those concerned with the hope of 
removing some of the stigmas around the issue. Following a particularly contentious 
session with the public over a possible rest-stop, two homeless advocates began a movie 
series around homelessness. As one of them explains, 
we needed a public education-, just how do we get a little more empathy 
for people? They can complain about trash and needles and whatever, but 
of course, we're talking about having an organized situation which would 
be monitored. In which case you're not gonna have the trash and needles 
and so on. So we started this movie series as something to do. (#EM1) 
 
However, not all social activists subscribed believed much have changed following the 
implementation of the few experimental programs. A narrative of injustice also emerged 
in 2018, espoused by a small group of social activists who believed the various 
organizations implemented by the government only worked to pacify the movement with 
little to no real impact on the actual causes of the issue. This group agreed with the 
identification of homelessness as a local issue affecting good members of society, 
however, they disagreed on the prognostic approach, calling for a return to the disruption 
tactics of Occupy and S.L.E.E.P.S. A few of local activists and citizen launched the 
Homelessness Empathy and Action Team (HEAT) and The Coalition for Compassionate 
Community “a group for people interested in one or more of the following areas: direct 
support for people who are unhoused or facing homelessness; seeking or sharing ideas 
and resources related to homelessness; communication with people at governments and 
corporations; and non-violent direct action”. Another interesting group that emerged is 
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Ward 9 – The Homeless Neighbors Associations which is a group of the currently, 
formerly, and marginally unhoused and their supporters. Both these communities work to 
present the cause of the unhoused and to pressure the city to implement better policies 
and/or solutions to the issue.  
The Local Government 
In line with other research, I find that the local government continued to emphasize an 
efficiency narrative, rooted in its desire to mitigate the issue without losing any political 
or monetary resources (Litrico and David, 2017).  A notable change in this phase is the 
city’s promotion of a more nuanced view in understanding those afflicted by the issue. 
One of the main success of Occupy Eugene and S.L.E.E.P.S was to bring the 
conversation around homelessness to the light. In the process, the communities involved 
began to further appreciate that the homeless are not a homogenized group of people but 
rather, as an unhoused activist puts it,  
… a multicultural group. There are a huge number of people who got 
crushed in the financial crisis, and many, many people lost their homes 
through illegal foreclosure. There are a lot of people who have untreated 
or partially treated mental illness. There are a lot of people who being 
senior and reduced to social security income only who have become 
unhoused. We ran into a lot of young people who were escaping homes 
that were dangerous, either through emotional, physical, or sexual abuse. 
(#NS1) 
 
This distinction in the diagnosis of the issue translated into the prognosis as the city 
moved to adopt different policies and programs that are specifically designed to target 
each of these groups. For instance, many of the homeless, a third by some estimates, in 
Eugene are veterans suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder or physical injuries. 
Following the veterans initiatives of Michelle Obama, a third rest-stop dedicated solely 
for veterans was opened in 2015. Emerald Village, the expansion of the Opportunity 
184 
Village, specifically target the subcategory of low-income unhoused, those able to pay 
$250 - $300 in rent a month. Other programs such as the 15th Night, specifically targeting 
homeless students, and FUSE, targeting those with the highest use of hospitals and jails, 
were implemented.   
 A few of these policies were more punitive targeting groups that are deemed more 
troublesome, what is referred to as travelers or vagrants. This subcategory of the 
unhoused tends to be loitering in the downtown area and have been the bane of the 
business community and the city. Punitive efforts of the city continued to clash with the 
social activists who believed the elites, including the city, the neighborhood associations, 
and the business community, use the traveler community as an excuse for penalizing 
homelessness in general.  A frustrated social activist voiced this opinion, saying 
My opinion, for what it’s worth and there are people who can address this 
better for you that I could refer you to but my opinion, is that the traveler 
idea has been way overblown and it's been used to justify repressive 
majors against the homeless, like they're not us, they're not from here. 
(#NP2) 
Local Neighborhoods and the Business Community 
Similar to the local government, the neighborhood associations and the business 
community continued to subscribe to a narrative of avoidance. This supports previous 
research on elites and their investment maintaining the status quo that serves their interest 
(Litrico and David, 2017; Yue, 2015). The existing arrangement of the field aligned with 
the neighborhood prognostic analysis of the issue, prioritizing a tactic of avoiding the 
issue.  All proto-institutions, the Tiny House villages, all the rest-stops, and Occupy 
Medical, were confined to the Whiteaker, the low-income neighborhood, already home to 
most if not all of the other social services that cater to the unhoused.  
 However, the evaluation of the proto-institution posed a challenge to the status 
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quo, specifically around the rest-stop program. The perceived success of the program led 
the local city to champion it as a replicable model with plans for future diffusion. With 
the Whiteaker at full capacity and not willing to accept any more locations, the city 
announced plans to open a rest-stop in every ward. This prompted a change in tactic from 
the local neighborhoods with intense and organized resistance to proposed expansions 
into residential areas.  
 As I explain in the contestation process, this counter-mobilization is crucial to 
understand the dynamics of legitimation and the outcomes of the process in terms of 
diffusion and institutionalization (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2008; Vogus and Davis, 
2005). While on a personal level, many members of residential areas sympathized with 
the unhoused, collectively, they still favored a NIMBY response. A member of one 
association reiterates this paradox  
I haven't met anyone, almost anyone, who just is totally callous about the 
suffering on a full level. But when you start talking about specific 
solutions, there's a whole lot of people who have, what I think are some 
pretty strong misconceptions about homelessness in terms of the impact it 
might have. They're worried about property values and crime associated 
with it, which really isn't something that we have, that the data, as far as I 
know, show to be associated with something that is helping people get out 
of homelessness. (#IP1) 
 
Summary of Issue Interpretation: Emerging Issue Narratives 
 
As a proto-institution is evaluated and possible expansion plans are debated, the different 
stakeholder communities around the city engage in a process of issue interpretation in 
order to make sense of the issue and how it changed with the implementation of the 
proto-institution (Furnari, 2018; David and Litircio, 2017). I identify four narratives that 
emerge around the focal issue (Hoffman, 1999), summarized in table 14. 
 The unhoused and social advocates maintained a community narrative, 
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perceiving the root of the problem as predominately local with those affected as good and 
deserving community members who fell victim to local misfortunes. The perceived 
success of the proto-institutions further validated this narrative and reinforced the 
communities’ commitment to expansion plans. Not all members of the community agreed 
with this stance, however. A few members believed the proto-institutions, while helpful, 
do not adequately address the issue called for a “return to arms”. Activists subscribing to 
this injustice narrative favored tactics rooted in civic obedience and disruption. 
Table 14:  Summary of Issue Interpretation Narratives in Phase-2 Legitimation 
 Avoidance 
Narrative 
Community 
Narrative 
Efficiency 
Narrative 
Injustice 
Narrative 
What is the root 
of the issue?  
Personal failure Local Systemic Local 
Who are the 
afflicted/ future 
beneficiaries of 
any action?  
Others; non-
locals; 
undeserving 
Good, 
deserving 
community 
members 
Locals and 
nonlocals 
Good, 
deserving 
Community 
Members 
Whose 
responsibility it 
is to act?  
Personal The 
community 
Personal and 
the government 
The 
community 
Actions/Tactics Counter-
mobilize and 
Avoid 
Engage and 
resolve 
Mitigate the 
consequences 
Protest and 
Disrupt 
Sources of 
Legitimacy 
Business 
community, 
Neighborhood 
associations 
Social 
Advocates, 
The homeless 
The local 
government 
Social 
advocates 
 
 The neighborhood associations and the business communities continued to 
champion a narrative of avoidance, with an interest in keeping the issue from affecting 
their interests and day-to-day. Any expansion plans of successful proto-institutions 
prompted a tactic of counter-mobilization to neutralize these plan. 
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 Lastly, an efficiency narrative continued to dominate the local government 
interpretation of the issue. The implemented proto-institution were perceived as 
successful, despite the minimal financial and operational contributions of the city, thus 
enforcing the narrative.    
Engendering Legitimation Criteria 
 The establishment of measures for performance provided all stakeholder 
communities with a pragmatic basis for evaluating the proto-institutions. Different 
stakeholder communities employed the objective measures of performance assessment to 
further support their established narratives around the issue.  
 Community and Efficacy Narrative. For the local advocates, the unhoused 
population, and the city government, pragmatic legitimacy was magnified, becoming a 
crucial component in the ongoing negotiation with other stakeholder communities around 
the potential expansion of the proto-institution. SquareOne village, the operator of the 
Tiny House villages, capitalized on the success of OVE, the first transitional shelter 
established in the city in 2013, to push for a more advanced tiny house village, where the 
houses have gas, electricity and more permanent occupancy. A member of the executive 
board touted the success of the OVE 
Our average is probably about 18 months that it takes for someone to 
move out, and we think that's not that [sic]. So, we have served to date, I 
think it was 155 individuals in the 4 1/2 years, almost five years now that 
we've been operating. And so that's about a 100 [sic]. So minus 30, so a 
125, 120 to 125, who have left the program, and of that group, about 60% 
had transitioned out successfully into some housing of some kind, where 
40% are probably back out on the street. They got kicked out because of 
rule violations, or it just isn't what they wanted or needed and moved out 
on their own. So we figure a 60% success ratio is actually pretty good for 
the population that we're working with. (#NB1) 
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The success of the program, as measured in graduation rates, was at the heart of the 
growth strategy of SquareOne Villages. The transitionary nature of OVE demanded 
somewhere for the unhoused to transition to. A member of the organization explains the 
quandary faced by the program  
Few of our folk were able to transition out successfully, but we found just 
a large number of people who were ready to move out, there just nothing 
there for them because of the lack of … single bedroom apartments. So, 
we decided that we needed to build our own. That we needed to create a 
new model of housing to demonstrate how to build affordable housing at a 
much lower cost. (#NB2) 
Emerald Village opened in September 2018 on a previously empty plot of land in the 
Whiteaker neighborhood to provide a practical option for unhoused persons with minimal 
income.  
The advocates for the rest-stop program adhered to a similar pragmatic 
justification for growth, albeit in a more horizontal manner i.e. growth in expanding the 
number and capacity of the rest-stops available. Support for expansion came primarily 
from the local city government who has more involvement with the rest-stop program. 
The government set stringent rules for the program around the siting, management, and 
for expected operations and outcomes (Appendix 4). The effectiveness of the program 
was closely monitored and the results were published in annual reports in the period 2014 
- 2016 with the latest report showing that “for those who departed rest stops in 2016, 75 
or 45% went to permanent housing (up from 31% in 2015); 18 people or 11% went to 
another type of temporary or transitional housing situation; 24 or 14% remained 
homeless; 4 or 2% went to jail; and destinations are unknown for 23% and listed as 
“other” for 5% who departed” (Watjus, 2016). The report also highlighted the productive 
outcomes from volunteering activities of the residents with a total of “636 hours of 
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community service in City parks” (Watjus, 2017) from both OVE and the Rest-Stops 
operated by CSS and NHS.   
The objective, although relative, success of the program, as measured by the local 
city, is further echoed by many members of the other stakeholder communities. Asked to 
evaluate the program, a long-time activist enthused about the performance and the 
operations 
I think it's an excellent program. People have graduated with jobs, with 
housing, come back to the community. It's a safe place, they're all gated, 
they all have somebody at the gate. Visitors can only come for an hour. 
And there are mentors who keep track of you. (#YS1) 
 
However, attempts to expand the program beyond the Whiteaker have stalled despite the 
support of the city and the efforts of local activists. To better understand the dynamics 
here, I will turn my attention to the stakeholder communities adhering the avoidance 
narrative before returning to the growth of the rest-stop program. This particular case 
provides a prime example of the conflict between the different legitimation criteria as 
rooted in issue interpretation narratives.  
 Avoidance Narrative. Stakeholder communities with a narrative of avoidance 
believe the issue and those afflicted by it are at fault for their own struggle. Homelessness 
is a personal failure or a choice made by members of a group of “other”. Any support 
from the local city or social activist will only reward and perpetuate this behavior of 
failure and criminality. Those members, thus, continue to adhere to their NIMBY 
approach. 
 However, as more evidence emerged of the success of the new interventions, it 
becomes harder for the NIMBYs to cling to the failure logic while ignoring concrete 
evidence of the potential of these programs to better the lives of the unhoused. The rest-
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stop program specifically became the subject of a long and contentious public debate. All 
three initial rest-stops opened in the Whiteaker, the neighborhood historically with the 
most compassion for marginalized groups. As evidence mounted of the success of the 
OVE and the rest-stop program in the Whiteaker, local city council and the advocates 
suggested a growth plan that included siting a rest-stop location in each of the city’s eight 
neighborhoods. However, all attempts to site any rest-stop outside of the Whiteaker were 
met with strong resistance from neighborhood residents. Attempts to open locations in 
River Road, Santa Clara, and Bethel were scraped and even the Whiteaker residents 
objected to siting a fourth rest-stop location. The narrative of avoidance with its focus on 
the experiential evaluation of the proto-institution remained dominant even as the 
NIMBY objection relied more on pragmatic reasons, siting the possible effect of a rest-
stop or any similar facility, on the property values. 
 There're a lot of people in the crowd that always look at all of us as that 
one person that they met, you know? And it really sucks, to be judged on 
somebody else. (#NS1) 
Additionally, a  minority of social advocates and the unhoused who subscribed to 
an injustice narrative, motivated by a pragmatic orientation albeit one that viewed the 
proto-institutions as a cop-out by the government that only serve to forestall real 
solutions to the issue. This faction had little effect on the legitimation dynamics under 
analysis here as they never mobilized against the proto-institutions. However, they 
represent an interesting dynamic in the field that is worth noting for future research. I 
further showcase these dynamics by delving into each of the proto-institution and how 
expansion was contested and legitimated to varying degrees depending on the 
mobilizations of stakeholder communities for or against a particular proto-institution. 
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Table 15 below summarizes the different narratives and the engendered criteria of 
legitimation in this phase.  
Table 15: Phase-2 Legitimation – Stakeholder Community Narratives and Criteria 
Stakeholder 
Community 
Narratives Criteria of Legitimation 
Social Advocates Community 
The idea then that people, a lot of folks think 
people choose that lifestyle. People don't 
choose it and then they think, "Well, I would 
make better decisions. I wouldn't end up in 
that situation." What they're basically 
expecting people to do is never make a 
mistake. Never make a mistake in a capitalist 
society because if you do, you're going to pay 
for it, big time. (#YB1) 
 
 
Pragmatic Legitimacy 
Our average is probably about 18 
months that it takes for someone to 
move out, and we think that's not 
that [sic]. So, we have served to 
date I think it was 155 individuals 
in the 4 1/2 years, almost five years 
now that we've been operating. 
And so that's about a 100... So 
minus 30, so a 125, 120 to 125, 
who have left the program, and of 
that group, about 60% had 
transitioned out successfully into 
some housing of some kind, where 
40% are probably back out on the 
street. 
The Unhoused Community 
We had to put in 50 hours of work on our 
houses. We spend 10 hours a month doing 
work around the place. You're either doing 
maintenance, or yard work, or whatever. 10 
hours a month. It's only two and a half hours a 
week. It's not that big a deal. But it makes a 
difference because then we all take ownership 
and because we all have ownership and we're 
taking care of it. And the neighborhood has 
noticed it. They've seen it. They see that we 
keep our places clean, we keep our yards clean 
as best we can. And they've been doing 
construction all over the place. But they're 
seeing that we want to be part of the 
neighborhood, that we want to be included. 
Experiential Legitimacy 
They're small, but you can learn to 
live in small. It does several things, 
one it forces you to quit being 
materialistic because you find that 
there's only so much you can. My 
appliances are all mini so they fit 
in my mini house. But I found that 
there's so much that we accumulate 
that you don't really need. It's just 
stuff, and so a lot of people, they 
go "Well it's so small, it’s so tiny, 
how do you live in it?" Well 
number one, there's a whole lot 
less housework! (#AT1) 
 
Pragmatic Legitimacy 
Probably over the last five years, 
we've probably had 300, maybe 
400 residents, give or take. And 
we've helped, I haven't done my 
numbers yet for 2018, but up to 
2018, I've helped 132 people off 
the streets and into housing. And 
only, that I really know about, only 
two didn't work out. (#NS1) 
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Table 15 (continued).  
Stakeholder 
Community 
Narratives Criteria of Legitimation 
Local 
Government 
Efficiency Narrative 
Having come from the orientation of saying 
everything needs to be pushing toward an 
outcome, I find the homeless conversation 
frustrating because nobody's really talking 
about the outcome, everybody's coming at 
homelessness from their own individual 
output orientation but if you say, well what 
does that output read into? What's the result? 
Nobody can articulate that because everybody 
has a sense of what outcome is, there is no 
universal agreement on what the outcome is 
and many people are pursuing strategies 
without even thinking the outcome is even 
necessary to talk about, as if the outcome will 
be self-evident once you have enough output. 
(#SP1) 
 
Pragmatic Legitimacy 
I think it's an excellent program. 
People have graduated with jobs, 
with housing, come back to the 
community. It's a safe place, 
they're all gated, they all have 
somebody at the gate. Visitors can 
only come for an hour. And there 
are mentors who keep track of you. 
(#YS1) 
Neighborhood 
Associations 
Avoidance Narrative 
I haven't met anyone, almost anyone, who just 
is totally callous about the suffering on a full 
level. But when you start talking about 
specific solutions, there's a whole lot of 
people who have, what I think are some pretty 
strong misconceptions about homelessness in 
terms of the impact it might have. They're 
worried about property values and crime 
associated with it, which really isn't something 
that we have, that the data, as far as I know, 
show to be associated with something that is 
helping people get out of homelessness. 
(#IP1) 
Experiential Legitimacy 
There're a lot of people in the 
crowd that always look at all of us 
as that one person that they met, 
you know? And it really sucks, to 
be judged on somebody else. 
(#NS1) 
 
 
Legitimating Contested Proto-institutions 
The second phase in the legitimation process drives the future growth or termination of 
the proto-institution under evaluation. The engendered legitimation criteria shape the 
position of the stakeholder communities during the negotiation process. The focus of this 
analysis does not extend to the implementation of the settlement achieved through the 
negotiation process or the institutional work that the various stakeholder communities 
engage in, however, I return to these when discussing future expansion for this research 
project.  
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The Tiny House Village: Opportunity Village Eugene 
The growth of the Tiny House model went beyond the mere diffusion of the OVE 
prototype. Rather, the next step in the project was about upgrading to a more house-like 
experience. As mentioned, OVE was comprised of Conestoga Huts and a few permanent 
structures, none of which connected to the grid. Thus, they lacked power, water, or 
heating. The simple design served the need of the government to push out a quick 
resolution to the issue and also emphasized the transitionary nature of the shelter. For the 
social activists, the simplicity of the physical space meant fewer start-up costs, less time 
to launch, and a chance to validate the model. The next steps in the growth of the model, 
proponents imagined it, was to a) make OVE a permanent fixture in Eugene, and b) 
expanding through opening another village that proves the full housing experience in a 
tiny house design. Evaluating OVE as a successful model was crucial to gaining 
legitimacy for the next phase. As I explain at the end of this section, the evaluation of the 
model centered on the interactions of three stakeholder communities: the social activists, 
mostly those involved with SquareOne, the local city, and the business community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Stakeholder communities’ interactions around the Tiny House Village 
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 A few months after starting OVE, the nonprofit organization was planning its next 
project: Emerald Village Eugene. This second iteration is, as described by SquareOne 
manager, 
… a tiny house community with legitimate homes built to code with 
electricity and heat and plumbing. They're just tiny, 160 to 200 square 
feet. So that the individuals who will be living there will be able to pay 
their own way on their very meager incomes. So, they do have to have 
some income. But $250 to $300 a month rather than $600-$700 a month 
that you'd have to pay anywhere else. (#NB1) 
The model was rooted in pragmatic legitimacy, motivated by the success of OVE and the 
increasing rent rates in Eugene that continued to bar many low-income individuals from 
finding housing. The manager above described the rationale behind the model as  
we worked with those folk that were in our village and we realized there 
was no place for them to transition to, as they got jobs and income, there 
was just no housing they could afford. And so then that's when we decided 
we needed to go to the next level, not just create a transitional shelter 
program. They're called tiny houses, but they're really not houses. (#NB2) 
In June 2015, SquareOne Villages purchased an abandoned lot in the Whiteaker 
neighborhood right by the railroad tracks, a tactic the organization used to avoid 
confronting with the hostile neighborhood. Construction on the site began in spurts in 
May 2017, relying mostly on volunteer hours from local contractors and architect firms. 
The first group of residents moved in September 2018 around the same time that the Tiny 
House building code was adopted by the state as the Oregon Reach Code which 
specifically allows the construction tiny houses. The model is crystallized in the 
description of a SquareOne board member as 
Emerald Village, once it is built, is a 100% supported by the residents 
themselves by the rental income. So the idea being that once we get this 
built, then we hand it over to the village cooperative, and they manage 
their own affairs, so we provide some minimal oversight to make sure that 
they're taking care of the facility, but they're paying their own bills, we're 
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not doing any fundraising for them, for instance. The idea is they're paying 
their own way. (#NB2) 
Points of Contention 
Few points of contention emerged between the stakeholder involved in the project, the 
social activist community, including SquareOne and other activists, the unhoused 
population, and the local city. The process of building and legitimating Emerald was, 
however, less contentious than that of OVE, albeit more prolonged because of the scale 
of the new expansion.  
The Physical Space 
One of the main challenges for the social activists was how to translate the innovative 
vision of the village, a tiny full-operating dwelling for $200 – 300 in rent, to a physical 
space, what an executive at SquareOne described 
we need to create true tiny homes that have plumbing, have electricity, are 
recognized underneath... Under the code as being a legitimate dwelling 
place, habitable space under the code, and to try to get it at a price level 
where someone who's living on $750 disability income, or social security 
income, or a part-time job of $1,000 a month, that they can afford to live 
there, that they can pay for their own housing once it's built. (#NB2) 
This was the start of a collaborative effort between SquareOne and many members of the 
business community in Eugene. The organization issued a challenge for architects around 
the region to design and build a tiny home for less than $25,000 and different designs 
were submitted. The firms with winning design agreed to volunteer their effort, along 
with the many volunteers involved in the building process itself. As an executive in 
SquareOne recalls, the building process was challenging 
particularly when you're working with so many different teams of 
volunteers and they work one weekend a month. And just the slowness, at 
times, of the process, and then all the coordinating that you gotta do to 
make it all happen (#NB1) 
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Employing multiple designs was perceived positively by the group of the unhoused 
selected to live in the village. One of the residents, describing the various designs, said  
because of the involvement of these architects, instead of all of them being 
like this whole square, there are some that have a front room and a 
bedroom with a galley kitchen in the bathroom and then the one that I'm 
going to be, when they finally get it done, has it's living room, bedroom 
area kind of thing, and then it's got breakfast bar with the kitchen on the 
other side, so there's a delineation between. So there's some, gives you a 
feel of different rooms, rather than just one giant room (#EG1) 
 
The almost complete reliance on volunteers delayed the process of construction. The 
village opened in November 2018, however, many of the dwellings were still under 
unfinished.  
Another challenging aspect of the physical space is the small size of the houses, 
an issue that many in the unhoused and the local government lamented in the model as a 
whole. The pragmatic success of the Conestoga Hut validated the possibility of living in 
“tiny” spaces, however, as one unhoused person explained her wariness of the living 
experience stating 
I don't think I'd ever want to live in a tiny house because after being 
homeless, I want a house I can walk on the floor and turn up the stereo and 
dance and have room and space and place to put shit (#YJ1) 
For the first people to move into Emerald Village, the experience is rather pleasant, as 
one of them refutes the above concern 
It can be done, it's easy enough to do. You just have to understand that you 
need to downsize. You cannot be a hoarder [inaudible 00:26:48] in about a 
week. But it's being accepting of understanding that small is better. First 
of all, these places are little for use, that heater right there, that little tiny 
heater on the wall keeps this place hot. The walls in this are made with a 
cladding, what they call clad panels. There's six inches of styrofoam 
between two press board boards. That's it. (#EG1) 
Lastly, another contention point involved SquareOne and the city around the building 
codes. The prolonged fundraising activities intertwined with the ongoing negotiations 
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with the city and state to change the building codes to allow the construction and 
admittance of the Tiny House as a legitimate dwelling. The Department of Consumer and 
Business Services (DCBS), a state agency with regulatory and consumer protection 
responsibilities in Oregon, lacked the building standards and codes to support the 
construction of dwellings less than 400 square feet, thus, making the construction of Tiny 
House infeasible. SquareOne advocated on the state level, pushing for HB2737, an 
amendment that would force the DCBS to adopt the micro-house standard approved by 
the International Code Council (ICC). The measure modifies “clearance and access 
requirements for sleeping lofts in tiny houses” while conforming to all other building and 
safety standards. The negotiation process with the local city was rather collaborative and 
workshopped the proposed amendment with the organization, as a SquareOne member 
recalls 
Both the planning department and the code... The building codes division, 
have been very supportive and helpful and help us troubleshoot. Haven't 
thrown up a lot of roadblocks. They'll come in and say, "Well, the code 
requires X, Y, Z, and here's some ways that you can meet that code," and 
have worked with us. I've heard a lot of horror stories of places, and even 
in our own community, at times, horror stories of, sometimes, the 
roadblocks that the city can put up to developing a project, that's not been 
our experience (#NB2) 
 
The amendment was passed in September 2018 and enshrined in Oregon Reach Code, 
OR455.500 (Available in study database). 
Funding 
SquareOne faced a similar challenge when it comes to funding Emerald Village as it 
faced with OVE: the lack of public fund.  The previous success with OVE emboldened 
the SquareOne to follow a similar approach. The organization relied heavily on 
fundraising, focusing on business firms to offset the high cost of the project. The city of 
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Eugene waived the development costs, $120,000, as a contribution to the project. 
Funding for the project came mostly from fundraising and a few grants. Importantly, the 
funding came from local citizens starting with $100,000 dollar gift that, with money from 
other donors, allowed SquareOne to purchase the property in 2015 for $280,000. Several 
local businesses and members of the community gave gifts of $25,000 dollars, what the 
organization marked as the cost of building one tiny home. The extensive fundraising 
process was arduous leading to many delays in the construction of the village. A member 
of SquareOne village relates 
If I had known this was a $1.7 million project when we started [laughter], 
I don't know if I would have embarked on it, we thought it was gonna be, 
maybe, three-quarters of a million. So it's ended up being about a million 
more than what we first estimated [chuckle] because we just didn't have 
the experience, I mean, we really didn't... We had no clue what it took to 
develop a piece of property and the expense of... You've got... Putting in 
all that infrastructure just turned out to be way more expensive than we 
ever imagined (#NB1) 
 
Governance 
One of the main concerns about Emerald Village was the fact that it was a permanent 
village for previously unhoused individuals and families, sited in a residential 
neighborhood. Thus, the aesthetic of the location was a point of contention between 
SquareOne and the immediate neighbors, as related by SquareOne executive 
the only downside I've heard people talk about is that they think it's 
substandard housing, or they're fearful that it won't be kept up and they'll 
just become like a lot of the trailer parks that were built in the '50s and 
'60s, and now are very dilapidated. Nobody wants a dilapidated housing 
project. (#NB1) 
 
SquareOne managed this concern through its governance and rules structure.  First, 
Emerald Village pushed the self-management and empowerment approach further as a 
mean to ensure successful operation of the village. The permanency of the house inspired 
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one of the more important innovations in the model was: the establishment of the village 
as a co-op. The co-op leases the facility from the nonprofit including the 22 households. 
Every household represents one membership in the co-op worth $1500. Every month, $50 
of the rent paid by the residents is put towards this ownership stake. In case a resident 
decides to leave the village, they can get the amount of money saved in this account to 
help them with the move. This measure, as one resident explains, “makes a difference 
because then we all take ownership and because we all have ownership and we're taking 
care of it”. The ownership aspect extends further to the management of the location. 
Residents are responsible for the upkeep and maintenance of the site and every resident is 
expected to contribute a number of hours every month to the community. A director of 
SquareOne summed up the idea behind the model of EVE as 
Once it is built, is a 100% supported by the residents themselves by the 
rental income. So the idea being that once we get this built, then we hand 
it over to the village cooperative, and they manage their own affairs, so we 
provide some minimal oversight to make sure that they're taking care of 
the facility, but they're paying their own bills, we're not doing any 
fundraising for them, for instance. The idea is they're paying their own 
way. (#NB1) 
The highly communal approach to living and managing the village was one of the 
concerns of local social activists outside of SquareOne as well as the residents of the 
village, as one of them states 
its not like when you sign a rental agreement for an apartment or 
something. You know the rules, you just kind of go about your business as 
long as you can pay and don't mess up, that's how it goes. It feels more 
than that to me here. On the one hand its really good because I've found all 
these people with similar stories, similar pain, similar traumas that care 
about each other and that wanna help each other, but there's also this fear 
of we gotta do this together, I don't want us all to sink. I want us to make 
this work and I want everybody to be safe and happy and healthy, 
including myself. But it gets scary (#AK1) 
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The problem is acknowledged by SquareOne member, however. Sharing her experience 
managing OVE and Emerald, a member of the board overseeing explains 
people in our society don't necessarily have the skills or the experience to 
cooperate well with each other. And so when you get a group of people 
who don't know each other well, whose only commonality is that they 
were formerly homeless when they came, they don't necessarily get along 
that well. They don't necessarily participate in governance that well. And 
with Opportunity Village, it kind of get ahead of us. And there's been a lot 
of interpersonal strife, people joining the council and then quitting, people 
being unkind to each other in various ways. All the things you can imagine 
about people trying to get along together. And Emerald Village is better. 
They started with kind of a more intentional community model where 
people were interviewed more extensively before they came in. And there 
was a process for them to learn about becoming part of the village and 
learn meeting process and stuff like that (#AM1) 
In order to support these strict requirements for community living, SquareOne applies 
highly selective admission criteria. Both locations are open to the unhoused or those at 
high risk of becoming unhoused including single individual, families, and those with 
disabilities, but only those who can afford the monthly rent for the unit, $250 - $300.  
Potential residents have to fill out an application with a nonprofit organization and go 
through an interviewing process with members of the board and the existing residents of 
the village they are applying to. Emerald village residents all had to contribute hours of 
work for the construction of their tiny houses. 
Summary of the Phase-2 Legitimation Process: Subject, Sources, Criteria, and 
Diffusion 
The field around the homelessness movement has changed dramatically over the years 
since Occupy and Opportunity Taskforce. OVE was developed and implemented at the 
height of Occupy movement at a time when the episodic power of the social activists’ 
and the unhoused communities at an all-time high, driven by the accumulation of the 
public attention to the issue and Occupy in general. As the interaction map in Figure X 
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shows, the evaluation of OVE and the development of Tiny House movement began in 
2015, a period of relative calm and settlement in the field following the events of 
Whoville. The social activists decreased their levels of mobilization, mostly focusing on 
working through the local city to achieve their goals. As I detailed in chapter 4.1., many 
unhoused activists were either disillusioned or too scattered to re-organize. The city, not 
feeling the pressure from direct street action, focused on further developing the newly-
implemented solutions. The overall effect was that of a more settled field where the 
legitimation of Emerald village, the subject of legitimacy, took place.  
Table 16: Summary of the contestation dynamics in Phase-2 for the Tiny House Village 
The Physical Space/Codes Funding Governance 
 
 
  
S: Social advocates, H: homeless, G: local government, N: neighborhood associations, B: the business community. 
X: Experiential legitimacy, M: Moral legitimacy, P: Pragmatic Legitimacy. () contention between source-criteria. 
 The main sources stakeholder interactions around OVE and Emerald village were 
the social activists, including SquareOne and other local activists not affiliated with the 
organization, the local city, a select group of the unhoused, and local city government. Of 
these, only SquareOne was actively mobilized to prove the success of OVE, and use it as 
a Launchpad for Emerald village.  
 One source of legitimacy, SquareOne strongly played the moral legitimacy of 
OVE during the development and implementation of the model. However, the group 
highlighted pragmatic legitimacy in their efforts to legitimate OVE for permanency and 
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to justify the need for Emerald Village. A research study in 2015 highlighted the success 
of OVE, with residents indicating that the village helps them feel secure and safe, 
supports community-building, and provide a path to transition to permanent housing. The 
Register-Guard continually touted the success of OVE, writing in June 2014 
Because Opportunity Village exists, 33 people have a place to live other 
than on the streets, in the parks and under bridges. By most people's 
standards, it's not much - a 60- to 80-square-foot bungalow or hut, 
without heat or plumbing. But it's a big step up from nothing. Residents 
of Opportunity Village gain a place where they can leave their belongings 
during the day, a place with access to communal showers, a place they 
can sleep without fearing for their safety or being rousted by the police. 
(It takes a village, June 17, 2014) 
 
For these reasons, the city councilor unanimously voted to remove the sunset date of 
OVE in June 2015. SquareOne further pushed the pragmatic legitimacy in highlighting 
the lack of places to transition to from OVE, thus, the need for Emerald Village as a low-
income housing option. Another source of legitimacy, the city, also maintained its 
pragmatic focus; as long as the tax-payers would not shoulder any burden and the 
neighborhood concerns are appeased, the city was willing to collaborate with SquareOne 
to establish the new village.  
 Social activists outside of SquareOne, however, had mixed feelings about 
Emerald village. While OVE was perceived to be an effective organization, many 
activists were skeptical about Emerald village. The skepticism is also rooted in pragmatic 
legitimacy: the village was highly selective and provided dwellings for only 16 persons 
who have a steady income. One activist explained their position  
Little cutouts of houses, 16 here, 20 there, that's not gonna be a sustainable 
solution. And I think also as long as we treat it as sort of a ... one, this is a 
houseless problem where this is a problem of ... and it's a mixed problem. 
It's a mix problem of not enough affordable housing. It's a problem of 
mental illness and lack of support. It's a problem of addiction. It's a 
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problem of overcriminalization. We have to kind of take a multi sort of 
look at it and kind of approach it from all these different levels. (#AAK1) 
 
For many social activists, the combination of high barrier and limited opportunity 
derailed from the value of Emerald village. Some responded by reverting back to the calls 
for public protest to restart stronger deliberations with the city and develop more 
inclusive solutions. A long-time local activist and an unhoused person laments 
The number of Rest Stop beds has lowered since civil disobedience 
stopped! I have not heard of increased Affordable Housing but celebrate 
the private Emerald Village tiny affordable (but horridly expensive for 
what it is) housing and boy's and girl's homes by the private entity St. 
Vinnie’s. Things will not get better for the vast majority of the unhoused 
citizens without both civil disobedience and essential lobbying. (#ENS1) 
 
The third source of legitimacy, the unhoused population, continued to heavily emphasize 
experiential legitimacy in evaluating Emerald Village, both proponents and opponents 
alike, with opinions centering around two aspects of the living experience. The 
community aspect was both lauded and criticized by the residents. One resident summed 
up his feelings, saying  
I love the village. Of course, you know, you're going to have some conflict 
with the residents because it's a tiny house village and people are different. 
Other than that I love it. I love living here. I love my community and I 
helped build my house. So, I'm going to live here forever (#UB1) 
The intersubjective experience was also highlighted in concerns around the location of 
the village. The village was constructed on an idle piece of land right next to the railroad 
tracks on the outskirts of the neighborhood, thus leaving the residents more susceptible to 
theft, as a villager explains 
We used to get a lot of drifters in here. Now, not so much because there is 
growing. Like the community building. I think drifters see that becoming a 
community. So, I think they're kind of shying away. (#UB1) 
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Importantly, I characterize the negotiation process between the stakeholder communities 
over Emerald village as low contention as it involved two main stakeholder communities, 
SquareOne and the local city, both of which employed a collaborative approach over an 
expansion proposal that appealed to all parties. The city was excited to support the 
innovative model of Emerald village, knowing that it would not affect its economic and 
political interests. The other two communities interacting with the issue, to a lesser 
extent, were the non-SquareOne social activists and the unhoused, both were not involved 
in the negotiation process. Social activists who did not believe in the sustainability of the 
model moved towards returning to civil disobedience, while the unhoused population 
excluded from the village lacked any power to participate in the ongoing debate. Emerald 
Village thus represented a possibly durable new field settlement, rooted in the power of 
the state as legalized in the new building codes (Rao and Kinney, 2008).  
 Table 17 summarizes the overall legitimation process of the Tiny House village. 
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Table 17: Summary of the Legitimation process for The Tiny House Villages 
Proto-
institution 
Development 
Proposed model 
Transitional shelter 
Opportunity Village 
Eugene 
Proposed Expansion 
Permanent Micro-housing 
Emerald Village 
Eugene 
Legitimation 
Phase 
Phase-1 Legitimation Implemented Phase-2 Legitimation Implemented 
Process Stakeholder 
Interactions 
Contestations  
(Source-Criteria) 
Negotiation Outcomes 
Stakeholder 
Interactions 
Contestations Negotiation Outcomes 
  
 
Siting  
- Located in the 
Whiteaker, away from 
business and residential 
areas. 
 Physical Space/Codes 
 
 
- Multiple designs for 
the village, donated by 
architecture firms and 
contractors.  
Funding  
- funded primarily 
through donations and 
grants. Residents 
contribute minimum 
rents 
Funding 
 
 
 
- Funded through 
donations, grants, and 
rent from residents. 
Physical Space  
 
- Built around 
Conestoga Huts instead 
of tents, with a few 
permanent structures.  
 
Governance 
 
 
- Self-managed by the 
residents, with strict 
community rules for 
maintaining sound 
operations 
Governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- High-barrier shelters, 
with strict rules on 
admission, service, and 
eviction.  
  
G-P 
N-X 
S-M 
S-X 
H-X 
G-P 
N-X 
S-M 
S-P 
G-P 
H-X 
G-P 
S-P 
H-X 
S-X H-X 
G-P 
N-X 
S-X 
H-X 
G 
S 
N B 
H 
G 
S 
N B H 
S: Social advocates, H: homeless, G: local government, N: neighborhood associations, B: the business community. 
X: Experiential legitimacy, M: Moral legitimacy, P: Pragmatic Legitimacy. (  ) contention between source-criteria. 
 
G-P 
S-X 
H-X 
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The Rest-Stop Program 
The Rest-Stop program, as mentioned, was implemented on an experimental basis. The 
initial success of the two rest-stops operated by CSS emboldened advocates and the city 
to open more sites. However, any attempts to expand were throttled by neighborhood 
oppositions to siting the rest-stops close to any residential areas. The border area between 
the Whiteaker and West Eugene neighborhood continued to host all the rest-stop in 
addition to the Eugene Mission and other homeless services. The expansion continued in 
2015 – 2016 with CSS opening two more locations for a total of four rest-stops. Each 
location was dedicated to a specific subgroup of the unhoused population such as the 
elderly, the veterans, and youth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Stakeholder communities’ interactions around the Rest-Stop Program 
The other push for growth came from ill-fated Whoville camp in downtown 
Eugene. In late 2013, NHS, the self-governing body of Whoville, negotiated with the 
local city to be designated as a self-managed rest-stop. The negotiations failed resulting 
in the shutdown of the camp, however, the camp leaders continued to advocate for the 
same cause. The County allowed the group to set up two temporary camps in December 
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2014 at a parking lot near Autzen Stadium on the offseason. The camps had to move in 
Fall 2015 in order to open the parking lot, relocating to a rented property in West Eugene 
before returning to the parking lot in December 2015 – August 2016. The 20 residents 
then had to move again to property owned by the Eugene Mission in the Whiteaker, 
however, “some Whiteaker neighbors felt overburdened by having so many of the 
organizations involved in support for unhoused people in their neighborhood” (NHS, 
2019). Thus, the city asked NHS to find another location by April 2017.  
During that time, the sunset date on the Overnight Sleeping Pilot Program was 
removed, installing the Rest-Stop model as a permanent model in Eugene. Moreover, the 
city expressed its intent to open a rest-stop in each of the eight wards. That was easier 
said than done. As one councilor recalls 
The council said, "We would like to have a rest stop in every ward." We 
certainly don't want to push it on Whitaker with seven, but we've got one 
in Ward two. I've been trying to get one in Ward one, but nobody wants it, 
and there's a lot of rules from the city. It can't be in a park, can't be near 
this, you've got to get the neighborhood to say okay. So one of our 
sessions coming up is rest stop parameters. What can we do to make this 
more possible? (#YS1) 
 
The city and local advocates ramped up the outreach efforts, trying to persuade the 
different neighborhoods to accept a rest-stop in more residential areas. An Outreach 
Handbook for the Rest Stop and Car Camping Programs was published in 2017 by the 
city manager’s office, detailing different tactics for building community support for these 
two programs (Available in study database). One of the first success, and a milestone for 
the rest-stop program came when Southeast Eugene, a progressive and affluent 
neighborhood, agreed to host NHS in a city-owned parking lot on April 2016. The new 
location started out as car camp with only six Conestoga huts with further expansion 
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contingent on the feedback from the community around the rest-stop. In October 2017, 
the site was approved as Rest-Stop with 12 Conestoga Huts, and by the end of 2018, it is 
now approved for 20 huts. In 2018, CSS had to close down one of its four sites after 
incidences of a toxic culture and bad practices involving drug dealing and manufacturing, 
leaving Eugene with four operating rest-stop programs by the end of the year.  
Points of Contention  
The rest-stop program was implemented at the end of 2013 as a response to increasing 
social mobilization by activists and the unhoused. The program marked the end of 
Whoville, with the city refusing to include the site is rest-stop leading to a contentious 
dismantling episode. For the rest-stop program, the period of 2014 – 2018 saw a change 
in the mobilization levels and stakeholder interactions around the program. The overall 
decrease in mobilization of social activists and the unhoused in general corresponded 
with an increasing mobilization of neighborhood associations against any potential 
expansion of the rest-stop program to more affluent residential areas. The business 
community on the other hand was less involved with the issue, secure in knowing that the 
city would not allow any homeless camp in the downtown neighborhood. These changes 
in field mobilization levels lead to different dynamics of legitimation when evaluating the 
program for expansion.  
 Pragmatically, the Rest-Stop program was found to be successful in serving its 
purposes. A memorandum to the city in June 2016 (Watjus, 2016) detailed the 
performance of the rest-stops in 2015 with CSS running four locations and NHS in a 
temporary location on county land near Autzen stadium. The locations provided a safe 
and legal space to sleep for 214 unhoused persons, with 80% turnover rate. The strict 
rules demanded by the city were applied, with 42 individuals evicted due to violations. 
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Importantly, 42 individuals were able to transition to permanent housing while 44 
individuals had to go back to the streets following the end of their allowed time. A 
similar memorandum (Watjus, 2017) in 2017 showed better results with 75 individuals 
moving to permanent housing out of 167 served four locations in 2016. The report 
emphasized the success of the program, concluding with  
The rest stops and Opportunity Village continue to demonstrate success in 
the numbers served, stabilized, and housed through these programs. 
Anecdotal information also indicates the significant value of these 
programs to people who need them and can abide by their rules and 
structure. While there are a number of applicants who struggle and may 
not be able to conform to the requirements of the programs, and while 
some remain homeless upon departure, there are many who have greatly 
benefited from the stability, support, connections, and self-growth these 
communities offer, and who attribute their success in achieving permanent 
housing and significant life improvement to the programs.  
However, in attempting to expand the program, a few contention points emerged between 
the stakeholder communities.  
Siting 
Neighborhood associations intensified their efforts to stymie any attempts to expand the 
program into residential areas, despite reports of the success of the program and the 
efforts by the social activists to sell the concept as a safe and effective way to alleviate 
the problems associated with homelessness. A local activist summarized the contrast 
between the pragmatic perception of the program as effective and the kneejerk reaction 
against the homeless as  
The perception of the Rest Stop program, to the extent that the public is 
aware of it, I think is pretty good. There's a whole lot of people that just 
see the word homeless, or see a homeless person, and they have an 
immediate gut-level, negative reaction. Some of those folks can be 
reached with communication, with education, with personal experience. 
They can develop some compassion, some sense of there but for the grace 
of whoever go I, but some of them are not interested in that. They are 
invested in having a hateful opinion, and if those people had a chance to 
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shape the dialogue, then they can spoil the opinions of those who might go 
one way or the other, depending on who reaches them first and most 
effectively (#AM1) 
 
The local government championed the rest-stop program, buttressed by the reports of 
successful implementation. However, any attempts to expand the program to unused 
lands in residential neighborhoods were thwarted by a highly mobilized anti-homeless 
showing. A local city official recalls one of those attempts in Santa Clara, a neighborhood 
in Northern Eugene  
it was an undeveloped park up there and we had identified that as a place 
to put a Rest Stop and had talked to the council about it, but I was sort of 
just ... I wasn't in my position yet, but I knew I was going to be coming 
into the position so I was sort of starting to help and so we went and did 
some outreach and the neighborhood was just not happy. (#NW1) 
A social activist recalls one of these meetings as more contentious 
whoa, were people mad. They came out in a mob, like angry villagers with 
pitchforks. We had people who are un-housed there on a panel talking 
about their experience and all this, but it didn't matter. People just were 
mean. (#RSL1) 
The struggle to expand a pragmatically successful program in the face of unwelcoming 
neighborhoods is exemplified by the NHS camp, the one successful instance of diffusion 
outside the Whiteaker area. The nonprofit was designated a self-managed rest-stop in 
2015, however, no permanent location was assigned. The camp moved three times, at 
times settling in a property owned by the Eugene Mission in the Whiteaker, close to other 
homelessness services. However, the neighborhood association of the Whiteaker 
complained about being signaled out to host all the rest-stops. An unhoused activist 
recalls the situation as  
There were 30 people, who again were out in the railroad district where all 
of the homeless projects including the Mission and they were extremely 
successful, but they kept on moving them around which made it a little bit 
difficult. And even though they had total support, I mean, and I do mean 
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total of the police, of everybody. The people they didn't, I want to say 
everybody, but everybody they didn't have support from was all the 
neighborhoods. So they started trying to move Nightingale away from the 
train district. They went to the mental health center property for a while, 
but then it came up time where that property was promised to the Boy 
Scouts out to sell refreshments to tailgaters or something so they kicked 
them out of there (#ENS1) 
It was in the neighborhood of Southeast Eugene that the push for growth managed to 
capitalize on the initial success of the rest-stop program. Local advocates, working with 
the city, had to resort to a new approach to circumscribe the opposition in the 
neighborhood. A resident of the neighborhood who was particularly involved with the 
process explains how they  
did it sneaky, where they started it as a car camp, and then we got the 
approval to go to a rest stop. Which I think was a great way to go, start 
small and go a little bigger. (#RSL1) 
 
The site was started not as a rest-stop but as a small shelter for 2-3 families in the parking 
lot of an assisted living facility. The advocates on the neighborhood board approached 
The Good Samaritan, a Lutheran-based nursing facility for the elderly, with the goal of 
getting the approval of the immediate neighbor of where the rest-stop would be located.  
when you have that good neighbor who's willing to say, "I'm a neighbor 
and it doesn't bother me", it shuts up all those people who live two blocks 
away, or five ... You know, because what are they going to say? ... I'd been 
keeping track of where are all the people who came to all my meetings, 
where they lived, and then I was able to, "Okay, you live down the street 
from here, we're talking about putting a rest stop, are you willing to 
support it and come to the meetings?" So that when there were naysayers 
you had an equal number of people who were like "I've been supporting 
this rest stop for a long time, and I know these people" (#RSL) 
NHS, the fourth rest-stop in the city and the first outside of the Whiteaker, thus started 
under with a low profile to avoid aggravating the neighborhood. In late 2018, the 
operators of NHS applied for full-fledged rest-stop designation which will allow them to 
host up to 20 Conestoga Huts on location. The designation was granted by early 2019. 
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Operations 
As mentioned, all rest-stops are operated by nonprofit organizations which are 
responsible for securing the dwelling spaces, be it tents or Conestoga huts, the review and 
selection of residents, the enforcement of rules on the premise, and, to some degree, 
connecting residents with social services. The City and county provide the public 
property and support the nonprofit organization in outreach services.  
Another contention point emerged around the pragmatic possibility of expanding 
the program centered on the capabilities of the nonprofits operating the sites. Besides 
locations requirements, all sites need to be fenced with a gated and manned entry point. 
Every location is required to have a public meeting area and portable toilets to 
accommodate the number of residents. Residents are responsible for the day-to-day 
operations of the site. Funding for the sites comes mostly through fundraising by the 
nonprofits operating the sites, CSS and NHS, however, in 2017, the city approved 
$25000 in the budget to support the rest-stop program.  
 CSS and NHS both faced resource and administrative limitation that hindered 
their ability to expand. As mentioned, the operations of the sites vary between CSS and 
NHS due to the different approaches adopted by each organization. CSS runs its 
operations from its headquarters in West Eugene, appointing a network of site managers 
in all their relocations to handle the day-to-day operations and communications 
At each camp the way that we do it now, there's five volunteer staff roles. 
There's a communications liaison. Or communications coordinator. 
There's a transportation person… There's the groundskeeper, grounds 
maintenance. There's the kitchen coordinator at the camp. And then there's 
also a general staff position that used to be the peacekeeper, but that was a 
really hard role to fill. So now we're changing that to this support staff, 
which is kind of like a flexible role to meet whatever needs there are in the 
camp. 'Cause it's nice to have five staff members. And so they're like the 
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volunteer employees that live there. And we send them to trainings, like 
peer support training, trauma-informed care training, de-escalation 
training. So they're on the groundwork is more effective. (#KEB1) 
The hierarchical structure mandated a strong supervisory presence from CSS limited the 
organization's ability to expand beyond a maximum of four locations in 2016, all in the 
same vicinity of The Whiteaker. The organization, however, was overstretched 
administratively so they opted to close one location. The question of how to handle the 
future diffusion of the model remains a challenge for CSS, as an executive in the 
organization explained 
It all comes down to we have our limitations and how do we overcome 
those limitations is a mystery to us. 'Cause one thing that I don't wanna 
have to happen is we grow so big that we lose the ability to have those 
personal connections with people that are really the heart of what we do. 
And sort of part of the reason it works so well. And it's still a question in 
my mind, like are we a ma and pa organization? Or does this model have 
the ability to keep growing? Or, is the model more like do we wanna go 
more of like an education/consulting route? (#KEB1) 
NHS had to contend with similar limitations in capacity. The organization runs all its 
operations onsite in Southeast Eugene. The camp is run through a council of its members, 
spearheaded by Nathan Showers and Tracy Joscelyn, unhoused Whoville activists, who 
currently live in on the Conestoga Hut on location. The small size of the organization 
allows for a more hands-on approach. The operations are perceived to be successful. A 
member at NHS proclaimed the site as 
Very successful. Because I'm here now. Probably over the last five years, 
we've probably had 300, maybe 400 residents, give or take. And we've 
helped, I haven't done my numbers yet for 2018, but up to 2018, I've 
helped 132 people off the streets and into housing. And only, that I really 
know about, only two didn't work out. (#NS1) 
 
Any growth, however, was even more practically limited the self-management model. 
The hands-on approach of Nathan Showers and Joscelyn is credited with the success of 
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the camp, however, it makes any expansion rather challenging as it would require 
individuals with similar profile and capabilities who are willing to run the camp. As 
Nathan explains the limitation 
I would love to run many camps in this town, but it's finding the right 
people to run it, as homeless people. Because, it's so much nicer to, and I 
know, Tracey doesn't like it when I say this but it's the only word I can I 
think of, is to empower other homeless to see the strengths that they have 
and let them use it, to ran a camp would be awesome. But it seems like 
every time we try to find one, drugs usually come along, we find out 
they're closet users. It just really sucks. (#NS1) 
The limitations on the diffusion of the model, both for CSS and NHS, is echoed in the 
contention over impact. For some social activists and a few members of the city, 
pragmatic evaluation of the Rest-Stop program had to focus on how it impacts the issue 
of homelessness as a whole, not just how the program serves those who enter it. A city 
councilor highlights the broader picture lamenting 
We haven't been housing more people every year. This last year, we lost a 
rest stop. We gained six people. It's not really working out. So when I hear 
well we have all these things we didn't have six years ago or ten years ago, 
that's great, but we've housed 300 people. That's not great. (#YS1) 
 
A local activist who was heavily involved in the establishment of the program in 2013 – 
2014 expressed similar disappointment with the overall practical impact of the Rest-Stop 
program 
I'm concerned that rest stops are the only effort on the table when the 
needs are far greater and more urgent (DeSpain, 2017) 
 
The Living Experience 
Another contention point around the rest-stop program stems in the cultures that emerged 
on sites, specifically the differences between the NHS and CSS models. All rest-stops are 
designed to be high-barrier shelters to a degree. All residents are required to be clean and 
sober. No alcohol or drug consumption is allowed on the premise. However, both 
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organizations operate on a case-by-case basis in their selection process. Operators have to 
walk the thin line between adhering to the requirements of admission as agreed up with 
the city and the moral obligation to help those most in need without outright 
discriminating against an already marginalized community. An executive at CSS explains 
how the selection process plays out in reality as 
We really were interested in not trying to ... not trying to make any kind of 
barriers for people. I think from the beginning we understood that we can't 
keep people out. People need a place to get stable. And so, we were just 
like, you know, I think maybe some of it was naivety, but we didn't want 
to discriminate against people with criminal histories. One of our first 
residents was a sex offender. And people hear that and they're like, "Oh 
my gosh." But a sex offender, you know ... Sometimes that can be such a 
blessing to somebody, which they'll give 120% to making it work. 
(#KEB1) 
The approach, while aligning with the moral and humane purposes of the program, can 
lead to some unfavorable consequences within the camp, especially when combined with 
limited administrative resources. CSS had to reckon with the interplay between 
increasing capacity and managing the lived experience of residents when it expanded to 
four locations in 2016. An executive recalls, 
we had three camps. And then we went to open up a fourth camp. And 
then we had four camps for a while, but I think it was stretching ourselves 
and so one camp the culture ran astray, and we learned some valuable 
lessons, but we had to shut it down. There was sort of some rotten culture 
in there, some related to drugs and keeping things hush hush. And it was a 
hard thing to sort of weed out and understand. So we just said we gotta 
close the camp guys (#KEB1) 
For the operator of NHS, The small size of the camps and deep involvement of Nathan 
and Jocelyn with the residents allow for a more sober community anda better experience 
for the residents and the neighborhood. The differences represent the ongoing contention 
between a model of supervision and that of self-management I described earlier, with 
strong proponents of both. A resident of NHS explains  
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I don't allow to talk smack about the other camp but they have a lot of 
faults. Like, Erik doesn't live and like know a lot of his residents, like a lot 
of stuff happens in his camps, like meth and drugs and he's had to close 
camps down. I've never had to close a camp down. One reason is because 
he barely knows his residents, you know, like heart to heart like lives with 
them. We live with our residents and a lot of stuff doesn't happen because 
we live here with them. And I get to know everybody (#NS1) 
 
The stricter culture of NHS is more necessary given the location of the camp in the 
residential neighborhood of Southeast Eugene. 
Summary of the Phase-2 Legitimation Process: Subject, Sources, Criteria, and 
Emergence 
The Rest-Stop program emerged as a brittle compromise among different stakeholder 
communities, each with relatively high power. While the model was proven successful 
over the next two years of implementation, true expansion only happened with the 
opening of the first location outside of the Whiteaker, the NHS rest-stop in Southeast 
Eugene in 2017 - 2018. Proposed expansion plans faced a highly contentious negotiation 
process informed by the different mobilizations and interactions between the stakeholder 
communities, i.e. the sources of legitimacy evaluating the proto-institution, as shown in 
table 18. 
Table 18: Summary of the contestation dynamics in Phase-2 for the Tiny House Village 
Siting Operations Governance 
 
 
  
S: Social advocates, H: homeless, G: local government, N: neighborhood associations, B: the business community. 
X: Experiential legitimacy, M: Moral legitimacy, P: Pragmatic Legitimacy. () contention between source-criteria. 
S-X H-X G-P S-P 
S-P 
N-X G-P 
S-M 
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The period following the dismantling of Whoville was generally more settled as 
social activists moved from civil disobedience and protests to a focus on managing the 
few organizations as a result of high mobilization in 2012 – 2014. Unhoused activism 
also declined, save for the group championing a self-managed Rest-Stop location, NHS. 
The city continued to push for expanding the program, however, they continually catered 
to the demands from neighborhood associations, a community that mobilized heavily 
against expanding the program beyond the Whitaker. Lastly, the business community 
maintained its low profile, represented by the Eugene Chamber of Commerce in the 
negotiation process, and secure that the city would never allow a homeless camp in the 
downtown area. The lines of contention were, thus, drawn between the social activists, 
the neighborhood association, and the brokering role of the city.  
 The focus of the neighborhood associations on experiential legitimacy had the 
most significant impact on the legitimation process. All attempts to expand the rest-stop 
program into any neighborhood were blocked by residents who believed any sort of 
homeless camp would be detrimental to the livability of the neighborhood. The city and 
social activist employed pragmatic legitimacy, citing the success of the program on 
various measures of performance such as the number of people sheltered, the number of 
people of transitioned to permanent housing, and the limited number of behavioral issues. 
However, the pragmatism of these stakeholders failed to overcome the preconceived 
notions and established ideas that residents hold of homeless people. Experiential 
legitimacy was also an important evaluation criterion for the social activists involved with 
the program and the unhoused. Both communities highlighted the communal nature of 
living in the rest-stops and the cultural differences between the CSS model, with its focus 
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on empowerment with hierarchical supervision, and NHS with its vision of a completely 
self-managed model. Future expansion was further limited by the ability of both 
operators to pragmatically extend their operations while maintaining the subjective 
experience of living on the camp. Social activists and the unhoused achieved limited 
success in expanding with a one new spot opening in a residential area.  
 Notably, focusing on pragmatic evaluations also worked against the program in 
some instances. A subgroup of activists and city officials expressed disappointment at the 
effect of the program, even if successful, in having an actual impact given the scale of the 
homelessness issue.  
 The negotiation process around the expansion of this proto-institution was highly 
contentious, with multiple sources of legitimacy and adversarial dynamics. Neighborhood 
associations enjoyed more power in the field in comparison, rooted in its pull over the 
city government and the associations’ ability to mobilize in opposition to any expansion. 
The episodic power once enjoyed by the unhoused and the social activists dissipated with 
the decreased street mobilization. As a result, the program continues to suffer from low 
diffusion, buttressed mostly by the city relative commitment to future expansion. Thus, as 
it stands, the rest-stop program exists as a form of imposition from the city, with a high 
likelihood of falling apart if the city decides to discontinue its support for any reason 
(Rao and Kinney, 2008). Table 19 summarizes the overall legitimation process of the 
Rest-Stop program. 
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Table 19: Summary of the Legitimation process for The Tiny House Villages 
Proto-
institution 
Development 
Proposed model 
Transitional shelter on public land allowing 
for safe and human experience for the 
unhoused 
CSS-Operated Rest Stops in the 
Whiteaker 
Proposed Expansion 
Transitional shelter on public land allowing 
for safe and human experience for the 
unhoused 
NHS-Operated Rest-
Stop in Southeast 
Eugene 
Legitimation 
Phase 
Phase-1 Legitimation Implemented proto-institution Phase-2 Legitimation 
Implemented 
expansion 
Process 
Stakeholder 
Interactions 
Contestations  
(Source-Criteria) 
Negotiation Outcomes 
Stakeholder 
Interactions 
Contestations Negotiation Outcomes 
  City Codes 
 
 
- A special ordinance allowing for 
public camping in city-designated 
locations, supervised by a 
nonprofit organization. 
- Experimental basis.  
 Siting 
 
- One location 
allowed in Southeast 
Eugene. Other 
neighborhoods 
continually rejected 
the rest-stop. 
Siting  
 - No rest-stops are to be located 
in residential areas. 
- Strict rest-stops to industrial 
zones, outskirts of town, or the 
Whiteaker.  
 
Operations 
 
 
- Administrative 
limitations continue to 
threaten the 
possibility of 
expanding the 
program.  
Funding and Operations - All sites are to be operated by 
nonprofit organizations 
- No funding from the city.  
- the city will contribute the public 
land through an agreement with 
the nonprofit operators. 
Governance - The tension between 
supervised and self-
managed models of 
governance continues 
as NHS and CSS face 
limitations in 
expanding operations.  
Governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- High barrier transitional shelters.  
- Limited stay allowed.  
- Community service requirements 
for a stay.  
  
G 
S 
N 
B 
H 
B-X 
G-P 
N-X 
S-X 
H-X 
G-P S-P 
 
S-P 
N-X G-P 
S-M 
S: Social advocates, H: homeless, G: local government, N: neighborhood associations, B: the business community. 
X: Experiential legitimacy, M: Moral legitimacy, P: Pragmatic Legitimacy. (  ) contention between source-criteria. 
 
G-P S-M 
G 
S 
N B 
H 
G-P 
S-M 
N-X 
S-X H-X 
G-P 
S-M 
S-X 
H-X 
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Occupy Medical  
Occupy Medical has not experienced as much growth as the Rest-Stop program or The 
Tiny House villages, most likely due to the complex nature of the healthcare model and 
its complete reliance on volunteers and donations. The clinic visited nearby cities such as 
Roseburg and Coos Bay but stayed for the most part in Eugene.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Stakeholder communities’ interactions around Occupy Medical 
In June 2018, however, Occupy Medical moved permanently to an office building 
in the neighboring city of Springfield. The move was driven by the need to provide better 
services to the community. The lead operator explains 
we're seeing people that, they're coming in in the winter and they are 
freezing. And we didn't have a place to really warm them up. Or their feet 
are just, the tissue is starting to expand and turn white and like you could 
put your finger through it. Because they've been in these boots all the time, 
they are forced to stay outside, and they're forced away from places where 
they can't get shelter. So their feet are rotting. And to be able to bring them 
here, warm them up, let them just stay sheltered and dry for a while, so 
they don't have to have amputations. I mean we've watched people go 
through a lot of amputations and it's so stunningly preventable (#SS1) 
The move was rather surprising, given the stability of the arrangement Occupy Medical 
had with the local government in Eugene and the Whiteaker neighborhood.  
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Points of Contention  
As mentioned, Occupy Medical is a low contentious model, supported by the self-
sufficient efforts of the clinic operators and volunteers and admired by the local city and 
the Whiteaker, the low-income neighborhood where the clinic operated every Sunday 
servicing families and unhoused individuals. As described in Eugene Weekly,  
Here in Eugene, Occupy Medical (OM) is the best example of both 
political involvement and providing service to the community. In addition 
to taking a strong stand in support of single-payer healthcare, OM is 
modeling this approach by providing medical services to the community 
on a weekly basis free of charge. It also promotes empowerment by 
teaching self-care through classes on better nutrition, breastfeeding, and 
use of herbal remedies. (It’s all about love, January 2, 2014) 
 
 However, in evaluating the model for expansion, the main contention points emerged 
from the operations of the clinic. 
Operations 
Occupy Medical was proven to be highly popular and the increasing demand for services 
required an expansion of operations to accommodate patients with more health issues. 
The clinic helped an estimate of 9000 patients in the period 2013 – 2018. The once-
weekly, temporary setup was proving to be unwieldy in servicing the increasing need in 
the community. This pragmatic approach was highlighted in the desire to expand the 
clientele to include certain populations that would rather not come to an open space 
location. The lead operator offered the rationale for the expansion 
And there was so many segments of the population that needed to be 
served that we were serving poorly. Like, for instance, the undocumented. 
They are in a dangerous position right now... so for this situation we 
expand our hours and we offer appointments and people can come in and 
then leave quickly and we've got a back entrance et cetera that will make it 
easier for people no matter what their citizenship status is to get the care 
that they need. (#SS1) 
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Additionally, the open space setup became too expensive to maintain. A local unhoused 
activist with strong tied to the program explains this pragmatic need 
And one of the other things I had learned was, like the equipment, they 
were spending too much money on fixing things. Like all the tents 
necessarily, people don't realize all these tents coming up and down, up 
and down, up and down, wear and tear and thousands of thousands of 
dollars where those thousands and thousands of dollars can be going 
towards medicine. (#LW1) 
The move, however, was not popular with everyone as many of the unhoused and 
social activists community would have liked Occupy Medical to stay in Eugene.  
 Another contention point in operations relates to the administrative capacity of the 
clinic with its flat organizational structure. A volunteer described it as weak because 
Because we don't have an administration. We don't have an executive 
director, we don't have, these are administrative positions that nobody 
would necessarily need to know anything about medicine or whatsoever to 
do. And I really think, we've talked about this. We have a retreat every 
year and we've talked about it in terms of what could we get done better if 
x? And I always brought up the administrative staff to help out and take 
things that other people don't have to deal with (#NN1) 
The reliance on volunteers and a dearth of full-time personnel resulted in 
miscommunication issues and delays in processing volunteer applications and other 
aspects of operations.  
Summary of the Phase-2 Legitimation Process: Subject, Sources, Criteria, and 
Expansion 
Figure 20 summarized the contestations around Occupy Medical. The expansion of 
Occupy Medical was mostly an internal affair, taking place with low contention and 
limited stakeholder negotiations. The social activists involved with the organization 
operated effectively to continue to raise funds and volunteers from the community, 
however, they did not engage in any acts of civil disobedience or public protests. The 
expansion moved the clinic outside Eugene altogether to an office building where the 
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organization operated as a typical free clinic. Thus, the main source of legitimacy in this 
legitimation process was the organization itself and how it evaluated the performance of 
the proto-institution to justify the expansion. 
Table 20: Summary of the contestation dynamics in Phase-2 for Occupy Medical 
Operations 
 
S: Social advocates, H: homeless, G: local government, N: neighborhood associations, B: the business community. 
X: Experiential legitimacy, M: Moral legitimacy, P: Pragmatic Legitimacy. () contention between source-criteria. 
 While moral legitimacy continued to be at the heart of the proto-institutions, 
pragmatic legitimacy was the main driver for the expansion. The clinic successfully 
provided healthcare in its mobile iteration but the operators wanted to expand the model 
to a broader clientele and to offer better services that were not feasible out of a bus. Other 
sources of legitimacy were involved albeit minimally. The neighborhood residents where 
the clinic moved occasionally expressed the typical disgruntlement rooted in experiential 
legitimacy about having a homeless service facility in the vicinity. A lead operator in the 
clinic recalls one of these incidents  
their idea was that there would just be, you know, homeless people 
dripping off of the ceilings or something like that. And that we were dirty, 
and et cetera. So they caused a little trouble. Another person said when 
you guys moved in then I noticed there was dog poop around. And I was 
like, well our staff doesn't bring dogs. I can keep track of the amount of 
patients that come and have dogs if you'd like. So far last week we had 
one person who has a dog. Is that information helpful to you, do you want 
me to keep track of it? (#SS1) 
 
S-M 
S-P 
S-X 
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Such confrontations were minimal and did not affect the expansion of the proto-
institution. The expansion of the proto-institution happened with very little contestation, 
thus representing a strong field settlement, with strong potential for institutionalization.  
Table 21 summarizes the overall legitimation process of Occupy Medical. 
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Table 21: Summary of the Legitimation process for Occupy Medical  
Proto-
institution 
Development 
Proposed model 
Free healthcare for all model for the 
unhoused and low-income persons  
Occupy Medical 
Tent 
Proposed Expansion 
A more stable clinic, offering better 
access to all marginalized groups 
Occupy Medical 
Clinic in 
Springfield 
Legitimation 
Phase 
Phase-1 Legitimation Implemented Phase-2 Legitimation Implemented 
Process Stakeholder 
Interactions 
Contestations  
(Source-Criteria) 
Negotiation 
Outcomes 
Stakeholder 
Interactions 
Contestations 
Negotiation 
Outcomes 
  
 
Siting 
 
- A mobile clinic, 
operating downtown, 
only on Sundays to 
avoid conflict. 
- Move to the 
Whiteaker.  
  
Operations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  -  An office clinic in  
Springfield.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Funding and 
Operations 
 
- Rely on volunteers, 
increase recruitment 
to counter burnout.  
G 
S 
N 
B H 
G 
S 
N B H 
S-M 
H-X 
S-X 
S-M 
S-P 
S-X 
S: Social advocates, H: homeless, G: local government, N: neighborhood associations, B: the business community. 
X: Experiential legitimacy, M: Moral legitimacy, P: Pragmatic Legitimacy. (  ) contention between source-criteria. 
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Cross-Case Comparison: Tiny House Village, Rest-Stop Program, and Occupy 
Medical 
Theorizing from multiple case studies require engaging in within and cross-case comparison to 
avoid any possible biases in data analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989). Cross-case comparison is an 
integral part of the interpretive analysis as it allows for the translation of the theoretical sampling 
approach into rich and nuanced accounts of the phenomenon under investigation. In this section, I 
discuss the impact of the cross-case comparison between the three proto-institutions included in 
my analysis: The Tiny House Villages, the Rest-stop Program, and Occupy Medical.  
The goal of the study is to unpack the legitimation process in all its complexity, with a 
focus on multiple sources of legitimacy and the contention process between them. I emphasize 
the dynamic nature of legitimation and the interactions between the stakeholder communities and 
the field over time. Table 22 summarizes the components of legitimacy for each proto-institution 
in Phase-1 of the Legitimation process.  
One of the key insights from cross-case comparison concerns the nature of contention i.e. 
where does contention come from in the field. Stakeholders’ contentions have been traditionally 
analyzed as conflict in rhetoric (Fisher et al., 2017; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2006) leading to 
conflict in the framing of an issue or proto-institution (Greenwood et al., 2001). Social movement 
research emphasized the strong link between the mobilization of stakeholder communities, in the 
form of protest or civic action, and contention in the field (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2017). The 
in-depth analysis of the field highlighted the three phases around the issue, rooted in the 
mobilization levels of the social advocates and the unhoused communities Thus, the events of 
Occupy Eugene represent a period of high mobilization for social advocates, culminating in the 
formation of the Occupy Eugene Taskforce with a mandate to recommend solutions to the local 
homelessness problem. Similarly, the S.L.E.E.P.S and Whoville campaigns stood out as periods 
of high mobilization for the unhoused community.  
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However, a more nuanced conceptualization of contention emerged from comparing 
across the three proto-institutions. In Phase-1 of the legitimation process, where a proposed 
model for the proto-institutions was negotiation, not all stakeholder communities were as 
involved in the contestation process. Contention emerged as a function of three elements: the 
mobilization levels between of the different stakeholder communities, the number of stakeholder 
communities engaged around a specific proto-institution, and how contentious the subject is, 
gauged through the number of contention points that emerged in the negotiation process. I 
assessed mobilization levels and the number of stakeholder communities involved, through 
comparing and contrasting the informants’ accounts of how the stakeholder communities 
acted/reacted to developments in the field. 
Thus, as table 22 shows, while the Rest-Stop program and the first instance of the Tiny 
House Village, Opportunity Village Eugene (OVE), are similar in many aspects, being 
transitional shelters, operated by nonprofits, with 10-12 months stay limit, involving the same 
network of advocates, each proto-institution experienced different levels of contention in the 
field. The Rest-stop program was and continues to be highly contentious, while the Tiny House 
village was the first program to be approved and implemented. The difference in contention level 
can be explained by comparing the three elements of contention. Siting was of the main 
contentions around the Rest-Stop Program. Social advocates and the unhoused were highly 
mobilized at this point, with S.L.E.E.P.S and Whoville in full swing. These communities, driven 
by moral and experiential legitimacy, demanded a more humane and positive experience for the 
unhoused, in the form of a transitional housing project, going as far as demanding a location in 
the downtown area and other residential neighborhoods. This led the neighborhood associations 
and the business community to mobilize, pressuring the government to rebut these demands and 
causing a prolonged conflict that continues till now. The Tiny House village, on the other hand, 
avoided mobilizing more stakeholder communities against the model by locating Opportunity 
Village in the Whiteaker, close to the other homeless services.   
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Table 22: Cross-case Comparison for the three Proto-institutions in Phase-1 Legitimation 
 Tiny House Rest-Stop Program Occupy Medical 
Subject of 
Legitimation 
Opportunity Village (OVE) 
 
- Temporary, transitional 
shelter 
- high-barrier 
- 10 – 12 months 
- Residential neighborhood 
CSS-managed Rest-Stops 
 
- Supervised transitionary - 
shelter 
- Low-Barrier 
- 10-months stay 
- Non-residential neighborhood 
Occupy Medical Tent 
 
- Mobile Unit, makeshift 
clinic 
- moderate-Barrier 
- Sundays and Fridays 
- Residential 
neighborhood 
Sources of 
Legitimation 
(mobilization  
level)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Social activists (High) 
- Unhoused (Low) 
- Local Government 
(moderate) 
- Neighborhoods (Low) 
- Business community 
(Low) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Social activists (High) 
- Unhoused (high) 
- Local Government 
(Moderate) 
- Neighborhoods (Moderate) 
- Business community 
(Moderate) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Social activists (High) 
- Unhoused (Low) 
- Local Government 
(Low) 
- Neighborhoods 
(Moderate) 
- Business community 
(Low) 
Criteria of 
Legitimation 
(sources) 
- Moral (social activists) 
- Pragmatic (local 
government) 
- Experiential (unhoused, 
neighborhood, business 
communities) 
- Moral (social activists) 
- Pragmatic (local government) 
- Experiential (unhoused, 
neighborhood, business 
communities) 
- Moral (social activists) 
- Pragmatic (local 
government) 
- Experiential (unhoused, 
neighborhood, business 
communities) 
Main Source-
Criteria 
Contentions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Contention points - Governance 
- Funding 
- Siting 
- Operations 
- City Codes 
- Funding and Operations 
- Siting 
- Living Experience 
- Siting 
- Operations 
Contention Level 
(function of the 
number of sources 
involved in the 
negotiation process, 
how mobilized a 
source is, and the 
number of 
contention points) 
 
Moderately contentious 
 
 
Highly contentious 
 
Low contention 
Performance, 
sources of 
assessment 
No previous models Negative, past performance of 
homeless shelters 
No previous models 
Settlement  - Integrative, extremely 
durable 
- Brittle, low likelihood of 
institutionalization 
- Integrative, extremely 
durable 
S: Social advocates, H: homeless, G: local government, N: neighborhood associations, B: the business community. 
X: Experiential legitimacy, M: Moral legitimacy, P: Pragmatic Legitimacy
S-M 
S-X 
H-X 
G-P 
N-X 
Proponents vs.  Opponents 
S-M 
S-X 
H-X 
G-P 
N-X 
Proponents vs.  Opponents 
S-M 
S-X 
N-X 
Proponents vs.  Opponents 
G 
S 
N B 
H 
G 
S 
N B 
H High 
Med 
Low 
S 
N 
G B H 
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Understanding contention as a function of multiple elements in the field further explains 
the outcomes of the legitimation process in Phase-2. As Table 23 shows, The Tiny House village 
and Occupy Medical enjoyed a relatively smooth expansion, following positive performance 
assessments. The successful diffusion of these proto-institutions can be attributed to the low 
contention levels around the proposed models of expansion. Occupy Medical minimized 
contention through sidelining most stakeholder communities. They sidestepped any interference 
from the government by relying on donations for funding and volunteering for operations. They 
also avoided any conflict with the Neighborhood associations by relocating to an office building 
in Springfield. Operating out of an enclosed space meant the clinic’s clientele has little to no 
contact with the neighbors, thus, minimizing any opposition based on experiential legitimacy. 
The Tiny House Village followed a similar pattern in its proposed expansion. The new village 
was located in the Whiteaker, thus, avoiding any counter-mobilization from Neighborhood 
Associations. The government continued to support the model as it was perceived as a successful 
collaboration between the city and the social advocates, with minimal financial costs to the city 
coffers.   
On the other hand, the Rest-Stop program was highly contentious as it attempted to 
diffuse outside the Whiteaker. Neighborhood associations mobilized aggressively against 
proposed expansions in the Santa Clara and River Road neighborhoods, alarmed how a 
permanently-located transitionary shelter could affect the experience of the residents. The local 
government’s support for the expansions as a pragmatically-proven successful model failed to 
overcome the resistance from the neighborhood associations. Even in the Whiteaker 
neighborhood, the proponents of the model, social advocates and the unhoused, ran out of 
goodwill from the residents. The program continues to be a fragile settlement, relying 
predominantly on the local government support and the tentative efforts of CSS and NHS in 
operating the locations.  
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Table 23: Cross-case Comparison between the three Proto-institutions in Phase-2 
Legitimation 
 Tiny House Villages Rest-Stop Program Occupy Medical 
Subject of 
Legitimation 
Emerald Village Eugene 
(EVE) 
- Permeant, micro-housing 
- high-barrier 
- contingent on rent 
- Residential neighborhood 
NHS 
 
- Self-managed transitionary  
shelter 
- High-Barrier 
- up to 2 years 
- Residential neighborhood 
Office Clinic in Springfield 
 
- Office Clinic 
- Low-Barrier 
- Sundays-Only 
- Office Building 
Sources of 
Legitimation 
(mobilization 
 level)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Social activists (High) 
- Unhoused (Low) 
- Local Government 
(moderate) 
- Neighborhoods (Low) 
- Business community 
(Low) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Social activists (moderate) 
- Unhoused (moderate) 
- Local Government 
(Moderate) 
- Neighborhood (high) 
- Business community (low) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Social activists 
(moderate) 
- Unhoused (Low) 
- Local Government (Low) 
- Neighborhoods (Low) 
- Business community 
(Low)) 
Criteria of 
Legitimation 
(sources) 
- Moral (social activists) 
- Pragmatic (local 
government) 
- Experiential (unhoused, 
neighborhood, business 
communities) 
- Moral (social activists) 
- Pragmatic (local 
government) 
- Experiential (unhoused, 
neighborhood, business 
communities) 
- Pragmatic (social 
activists) 
- Pragmatic (local 
government) 
- Experiential (unhoused, 
neighborhood, business 
communities) 
Main Source-
Criteria Contentions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Contention points - The Physical Space 
- Funding 
- Governance 
- Siting 
- Operations 
- Governance 
- Operations 
Contention Level 
(a function of the 
number of sources 
involved in the 
negotiation process, 
how mobilized a 
source is, and the 
number of contention 
points) 
 
Low Contention 
 
 
Highly contentious 
 
Low contention 
Performance, sources 
of assessment 
Positive, city reports and 
the media 
Positive, city reports Positive, city reports and 
the media. 
Settlement  - Integrative, extremely 
durable 
- Brittle, low likelihood of 
institutionalization 
- Integrative, extremely 
durable 
S: Social advocates, H: homeless, G: local government, N: neighborhood associations, B: the business community. 
X: Experiential legitimacy, M: Moral legitimacy, P: Pragmatic Legitimacy 
S-M 
S-X 
H-X 
G-P 
N-X 
Proponents  vs.  Opponents 
S-M 
S-X 
H-X 
G-P 
N-X 
Proponents vs.  Opponents 
S-M 
S-X 
N-X 
Proponents vs.  Opponents 
G 
S 
N B H 
G 
S 
N B H 
G 
S 
N 
B 
H 
High 
Med 
Low 
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 These dynamics of contentions, the changes in contentions over time, are crucial 
to understanding the legitimation process. The contentions occur as conflict over the 
various points of contention between a source-criteria combination. Social advocates’ 
championed safe locations for the unhoused to sleep without fear of prosecution, a 
position rooted in moral legitimacy (S-M). This conflicted with the government, who 
viewed the problem as unsolvable, and thus would not allocate public lands for the 
unhoused (G-P). Locating the rest-stops on the edges of the city pacified the 
Neighborhood Associations, whose main criteria for evaluating the program was how it 
affects the subjective experience of neighborhood residents (N-X). However, once the 
government began expanding the program to residential neighborhoods, with the “one 
rest-stop in every ward” suggestion, the N-X translated to opposition and counter-
mobilizations.  
An Emergent Process Model for Legitimation of Proto-institutions  
In this chapter, I built on the historical narrative of the field of homelessness in Eugene to 
inductively construct a process model explaining the legitimation dynamics of proto-
institutions among multiple stakeholder communities (Figure 11). The model underlines 
how the changes in the field drive the legitimation process. My goal is to integrate the 
complexity of field development around a proto-institution, the multiple stakeholder 
communities, and the ongoing evaluation processes they engage with during legitimation. 
The disruption of an issue of field shifts it from an established to a contested (Zietsma et 
al., 2017; Wooten and Hoffman, 2017; Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2017; Haveman, et 
al., 2001). The jolt on the local level increases issue awareness and galvanizes public 
support around said issue, driving more mobilization from the concerned parties (Grodal 
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and O’Mahoney, 2017) until critical mass of mobilized communities forces the all 
stakeholder communities to the negotiation table to figure out a field settlement (Furnari, 
2018, Helms et al., 2012). The proposed models of action emerging from the negotiation 
process between stakeholder communities represent the subject of legitimation. I refer to 
this phase as Pre-legitimation 
I construct a process of legitimation initiating as all stakeholder interact to 
evaluate the fit of the proposed model of action to the issue (Meyer and Hoellerer, 2010), 
Phase-1 Legitimation. Every stakeholder community socially construct a narrative of the 
issue through a process of issue interpretation that defines the roots of the issue, a 
perception of those afflicted by it, and a repertoire of possible action and tactics (Furnari, 
2018; David and Litirco, 2017; Benford and Snow, 2000; Hoffman, 1999; Snow and 
Benford, 1988).  
Three different narratives emerge in this phase through the process of narrative 
construction. A community narrative identifies the issue as local, affecting good 
hardworking members of the community, thus requiring the collaboration of all 
community stakeholders, and favoring tactics of engagement and innovating to resolve 
the issue. An avoidance narrative identifies the roots of the issue as a personal failure or 
choice of an “othered” group, perceived as non-locals or stigmatized, consequently, it is 
primarily the responsibility falls primarily on those who are afflicted to explicate 
themselves through making better choices, and on the authorities to make sure the 
manifestations of the issue does not affect the interests and experience of those 
championing this narrative. Adherents to this narrative favor tactics of NIMBY.  
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Lastly, an efficiency narrative identifies the issue as systemic and thus beyond 
anyone’s control, and those afflicted as both locals and nonlocals. The responsibility to 
act is diffused between the personal and the state. Adherents to those narratives employ 
tactics of mitigation with a focus on conserving resources given the inevitability and 
complexity of the issue. 
The narrative engenders the legitimation criteria that frame the negotiation 
process in between the different sources of legitimacy, the stakeholder communities 
involved in evaluating the proposed model. Community narratives emphasize on the 
humanity of those afflicted and the shared responsibility of all community members, thus 
engendering moral legitimacy, mandating action as the right thing to do, and experiential 
legitimacy, evaluating how the proposed model allows for a positive subjective 
experience for the community. Avoidance narratives also engender experiential 
legitimacy, evaluating the proposed model as to how it would affect the subjective 
experience of those adhering to the narrative. An efficiency engenders pragmatic 
legitimacy, evaluating the model as to how it would serve the purposes of the adherents in 
terms of resource conservation. These criteria frames how a source of legitimacy 
negotiates the different points of contention around the proposed model. A proto-
institution is implemented as a result of the contestations between the different 
stakeholder communities over the proposed model. 
Phase-2 Legitimation starts when the proto-institution is evaluated for future 
expansion and proposed model becomes the subject of negotiation in the field. 
Stakeholder communities engage in issue interpretation to reassess the changes in the 
field and the impact of the implemented proto-institution on the issue. Performance 
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assessments of the proto-institution, both objective and subjective, inform the issue 
interpretation process. I find, in line with previous research, that the narratives 
constructed around the issue tend to be stable (David Litrico, 2017). The engendered 
legitimation criteria also tend to persist with the addition and emphasis of pragmatic 
legitimacy, driven by the availability of performance measures. The criteria frame the 
negotiation process around future action of diffusion or entrenchment
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V.  DISCUSSION 
Broadly, the goal of my dissertation to unpack the complex process of proto-institution 
legitimation among multiple stakeholder communities. New organizational forms are 
subject to multiple evaluations criteria, depending on the source of legitimacy. 
Researchers have long highlighted the possible conflicts between the stakeholder 
communities over the legitimation process. I set out to provide an in-depth investigation 
of the dynamics of this process at the conflation of subjects, sources, criteria, and context. 
I adopted a multiple case study design, focusing on three proto-institutions that emerged 
following a contentious social mobilization event that unsettled the field of homelessness 
in Eugene, forcing the different stakeholder communities to reckon with each other and 
the problem. I emphasized field-generated data to develop an inclusive understanding of 
the field focusing on a) the field changes following an institutional jolt and b) the 
legitimation process as it occurred over time.  
My analysis makes contributions primarily to the research in legitimation and 
issue fields. I also contribute to the research on social movements to the emerging body 
of scholarship on grand challenges. In this section, I detail these contributions along with 
other contributions to practice and provide a brief discussion of the boundary condition of 
this study. 
5.1   Contributions to Research 
Legitimation/Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is a fundamental concept in institutional theory. However, the complexity of 
the legitimation process remains severely understudied (Suddaby et al., 2017; Deephouse 
et al., 2017; Fisher et al., 2017; Fisher et al., 2016; Suchman and Deephouse, 2008). This 
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study is unique in that it addresses the complex process of legitimation holistically, 
analyzing the interactions between sources, subjects, criteria, and context of legitimacy in 
an evolving institutional field. My findings make three unique contributions to 
legitimation research: I construct a two-phase model of legitimation; I deconstruct the 
simultaneous development of legitimation criteria by multiple stakeholder communities, 
and I contribute to our understanding of dynamics of legitimation. I discuss each of these 
contributions and how they advance and challenge our knowledge on legitimacy.  
Two-phase model of legitimation of proto-institutions. In this analysis, I examine 
the process of legitimation as socially constructed through interactions and contestations 
between multiple stakeholder communities. One of the major gaps in legitimacy research 
is the dearth of studies on how a newly-created social entity is evaluated for fit 
simultaneously by the multiple stakeholder communities. This contentious process 
represents legitimacy at its most complex with multiple sources, criteria, subjects, 
embedded in a relational context. This complexity rendered it vastly understudied, as 
lamented by Deephouse et al. in their 2017 review of the field 
More than two decades after Suchman’s 1995 review of legitimacy, we 
still find, as he concluded then, that “most treatments cover only a limited 
aspect” (1995: 571) of this complex but crucial subject. There are specific 
combinations of sources and criteria that apply to specific types of 
organizations under specific circumstances. Most empirical research, be it 
qualitative or quantitative, examines only one or at most two 
combinations. 
This analysis provides a holistic approach to legitimation dynamics that goes beyond the 
organizational level (Tracey, et al., 2018; Pahnke et al., 2016; Drori and Honing, 2014; 
Huy et al., 2014) to examine the much richer context of issue fields (Zietsma et al. 2017). 
I unpack these dynamics through a two-phase model of legitimation that integrates the 
emergence of the subject of legitimation (Helms et al., 2012; Lawrence et al., 2002), its 
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initial evaluations as a proposed new settlement, and its re-evaluation as a proposed 
model for diffusion (Jung and Mun, 2017; Hensel, 2017). This dynamic model accounts 
for the evolving combinations of the subject of legitimacy, from a proposed model to 
experimental implementation, the sources of legitimation (five distinct stakeholder 
communities), and the criteria of legitimation (pragmatic, moral, and experiential). 
 Importantly, my study extends our understanding of legitimation through 
highlighting the temporal and contested dynamics of evaluation. Existing studies of 
legitimation have focused on legitimation as an outcome of institutional work with a 
focal institutional entrepreneur(s) engaging with the various stakeholders to persuade 
them of the value of a new social entity (Greenwood et al., 2002) through rhetorical 
arguments (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2005) and framing (Benford and Snow, 2000). This 
approach to legitimation as theorization provided valuable insights into the repertoire of 
strategic actions available to entrepreneurs to legitimate new industries and practices 
(Suddaby et. al., 2017; David et al., 2013; Sine and Lee, 2009).  
However, by focusing on theorization as the key action in legitimation, we fail to 
account for the contestations that emerge around new organizations and, more crucially, 
how stakeholder communities construct conflicting meaning and evaluation criteria. To 
move a new social entity from contestation to objectification (Scott, 2013; Tolbert and 
Zucker, 2006) requires an understanding of the stakeholders, how they socially construct 
the definition of the social entity and its purposes. My model advances our knowledge 
through shifting the lens from focusing on an actor’s effort to legitimatize a social entity, 
to a distributed, inclusive perspective where “legitimacy is not the outcome of efforts of a 
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single actor, but rather a socially constructed outcome that emerges as part of the 
contestation and co-creation of the general social order” (Suddaby et al., 2017).  
Similarly, theorization conceptualizes legitimation as an outcome of logic shifts 
through rhetorical strategies (Fisher et al., 2017; Pahnke et al., 2015; Suddaby and 
Greenwood, 2006). These include meta-narratives such as rationality, capitalism, and 
religion. Proponents or opponents of a new organization appeal to other stakeholders 
through framing their arguments with these logics. However, shifting to a more 
distributed approach of legitimation challenges the prevalence of this approach. Rather, I 
analyze legitimation as a bottom-up contested process where multiple stakeholder 
communities are crucial to an organization’s survival and resource acquisition. This 
approach emphasizes two crucial points in legitimation.  
First, as more stakeholder communities emerge around a social entity, the 
meaning and criteria for evaluation will vary, however, it will be constructed from 
components from the local cultural repertoire (Meyer and Hollerer, 2010; Swidler, 1986). 
Stakeholder communities will continue to appeal for broader logics, for example, faith 
organizations rooting their engagement with homelessness in the deserving poor concept. 
Yet, these broader logics will be filtered through the lens of local relations, history, 
resource limitations, and other factors on the local level.  Thus, I uncover a local 
validation process (Johnson et al., 2006) that emphasizes the embeddedness of 
evaluations in the local level; in relations, recent events, history, and social interactions 
(Hallet and Ventresca, 2006). Tracey et al (2017) analysis of local translation of new 
ventures pointed towards the struggle for local validation with one stakeholder 
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community, assuming an institutional work lens. My analysis embraces the complexity of 
multiple communities and ongoing contestations.  
Second, the temporal aspect of my model highlights the ongoing contestation of 
new entities. Following emergence, the entity remains at the mercy of various evaluations 
by the multiple stakeholder communities in the field. Logics shift could occur on the long 
run when a new entity reaches a state of cognitive legitimacy i.e. institutionalization. Yet, 
how can the entity navigate the contestation process over time? How does the evaluation 
criteria develop as the social entity moves from a proposed model to a diffused model 
(Fiss et al., 2012)? Existing studies emphasize the role of positive performance as an 
antecedent to increasing legitimacy of the social entity and diffusion. Recent studies have 
suggested the likelihood of legitimation criteria to shift over time as stakeholder 
communities integrate more inputs into their evaluations, most notably, positive 
performance assessments (Huy et al., 2014; Drori and Honing, 2013; Scott, 2013; Briscoe 
and Safford, 2008).  
In contrast, I argue that positive assessment in-of-itself does not impart legitimacy 
on the new entity but are part of the socially-constructed narrative that a stakeholder 
group employs to evaluate it. Researchers have highlighted the inter-subjectivity of 
performance of new ventures as various stakeholder communities rely on achievements, 
reputation, resource providers, and other signals in their evaluation (Fisher et al., 2016; 
Navis and Glynn, 2010). Thus, any empirical evidence of positive or negative 
performance is likely to be highly contested in-of-themselves. Instead, my model roots 
evaluation in issue interpretation and meaning-making process (Furnari, 2018; David and 
Litrico, 2017), thus unpacking the role of assessment in the legitimation process. This is 
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significant as it highlights a paradox in the diffusion of social entities: despite an entity’s 
positive performance, diffusion can be opposed by certain stakeholder communities (Jung 
and Mun, 2017). My findings explain this paradox by highlighting that legitimation is 
rooted in how the core issue is interpreted. Even if a new social entity is pragmatically 
valid; as long as it does not align with how a stakeholder community perceives the issue, 
opposition to diffusion will remain significant (Meyer and Hoellerer, 2010).  
Legitimation among multiple stakeholder communities. A crucial aspect of my 
model is the incorporation of multiple stakeholder communities simultaneously in the 
same legitimation process. Research on the sources of legitimacy, generally referring to 
“an entity that makes either explicit or tacit judgments about a focal organization” 
(Deephouse and Suchman, 2008), has largely focused on one or two sources of 
legitimacy and how they assess the legitimacy of a focal organization, despite the 
increasing attention to institutional pluralism diversity of stakeholders around 
organizations (Deephouse et al., 2017). The few studies analyzing multiple sources of 
legitimacy focus predominately on the mechanisms that a central actor can use to 
legitimize a social entity with a particular source (Fisher et al., 2017, 2016; Drori and 
Honing, 2014), or instances of evaluations within an organization (Huy et al., 2014), 
mostly informed macro-level logics (Pahnke et al., 2015).  
I overcame the limitations of these studies through adopting a field-level analysis 
and focusing on the contentious dynamics of issue field. Issue fields are arenas bringing 
together multiple stakeholder communities, and their political nature renders the 
legitimacy of any emerging settlements in the field highly contested (Zietsma et al., 2017; 
Helms et al., 2012; Fligstien and McAdam, 2012; Meyer and Hoellerer, 2010). My 
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findings advance the analysis of multiple stakeholder communities through the concept of 
issue interpretation (David and Litrico, 2017). Stakeholder communities in contentious 
fields develop specific narratives in order to make sense of an issue. These narratives 
define the causes of an issue and identify a repertoire of actions and tactics that are 
logically consistent with the causes. The legitimation criteria used by every stakeholder is 
derived from how they define the issue and how they believe this newly emerging social 
arrangement aligns with their definition and espoused “proper” modes of action.  
This mechanism is particularly important to understand how the different 
stakeholder communities in the field approach the contestation process. Furnari (2018) 
theorizes that, through different interpretations of the issue, stakeholder communities in a 
contested issue field can arrive at two possible frames: collaborative and adversarial. 
New field settlements, if achieved, are rooted in how these frames shape the negotiation 
process. I advance this model through identifying more nuanced frames, rooted in the 
different narratives emerging around the issue, and providing a more dynamic 
understanding shifts in issue interpretation (Litrico and David, 2017) 
Phase-1 Legitimation introduced three distinct narratives. A community narrative 
emphasizes the locality of the issue and the need for collaboration among community 
members resolve it. For adherents to this narrative, an emerging proto-institution is 
evaluated first and foremost by a moral obligation towards the community and all its 
constituents. On the opposite side, an avoidance narrative emphasizes the stigmatization 
of afflicted stakeholder communities. A third narrative emphasized more pragmatic 
approaches to the issue, aiming to mitigate the consequences while conserving resources. 
As the different stakeholder communities engaged to legitimate a possible field 
243 
settlement, these narratives framed how they evaluated the proposed model. Importantly, 
all stakeholder communities engaged in collaborative as opposed to adversarial 
negotiations, despite the employment of adversarial tactics such as protest and civil 
disobedience (Furnari, 2018). This indicates that depending on the issue interpretation 
and the constructed narratives, the collaborative-adversarial dichotomy can actually be 
hybridized where collaboration can co-exist with contestation (O’Mahony and Bechky, 
2008).  
Relatedly, through analyzing the narratives, we can also arrive at a more fine-
grained understanding of strategic action. For instance, the avoidance narrative persisted 
between Phase-1 and Phase-2 but manifested as different tactics depending on the 
stakeholder group and even within the same group. Neighborhood associations objected 
to locating the budding Rest-Stop program in residential areas in Phase-1 but they 
acquiesced to the model. In Phase-2, the mild opposition turned to aggressive counter-
mobilization against any attempts to open sites outside of the Whiteaker. With different 
stakeholder communities simultaneously pushing for their own narratives and 
legitimation criteria, theorization becomes a contentious process in-of-itself, attempted 
not only by the proponents of the new social entity but by other stakeholder communities 
in the field including opponents (Maguire and Hardy, 2009).  
Lastly, rooting legitimation criteria in narrative construction and issue 
interpretation provides a practical approach for researchers to take into account the 
diversity of stakeholder communities and the richness and complexity of the context 
around a proto-institution. As mentioned, legitimation criteria are constituted through a 
highly interpretive meaning-making process. This process is in-of-itself the product of 
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local social interactions, relations, and local history (Hallet and Ventresca, 2006) as 
opposed to derivation from up inert macro-level logics (Litrico and David, 2017).   
Shifting of Legitimation criteria over time. Additionally, my findings contribute 
to the systematic study of shifting legitimacy judgments. Importantly, I identify two 
phenomena in Phase-2 Legitimation. Pragmatic magnification occurs as sources of 
legitimation shift to an emphasis on the measures of performance of the subject of 
legitimacy as a justification for future action. Both the proponents and the opponents for 
the proto-institution framed the discussion of future action in an argument of purposes 
and cost-benefit. For instance, proponents of the model, starting with moral legitimacy as 
the main criteria for evaluation in Phase-1, highlighted pragmatic calculations when 
negotiating the diffusion of the proto-institution, such as the impact on the issue. 
Pragmatic calculations were also key in arguing against diffusion, with conversations on 
administrative limits and low impact on the issue as a whole. Similarly, opponents of the 
model highlighted the cost-benefit analysis justification for entrenchment or the status 
quo. Researchers have found a similar effect on the organizational level (Huy et al., 2014; 
Drori and Honing, 2013; Greenwood et al., 2002)   
    Second, my findings contribute to the increasing call to study the material aspect 
of institutions and institutional processes, as opposed to only the cognitive (Suchman and 
Deephouse, 2008; Hallet and Ventresca, 2006). I analyzed the emerging concept of 
experiential legitimacy, operationalized as evaluations of the fit of an organization based 
on intersubjective experience (Nilsson, 2015). This criteria of legitimacy played a major 
role in my findings as it emphasized the material aspects of proto-institution such as the 
location, the arrangement of objects in the physical space, and the experiencing the proto-
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institution as embodied agents (Carlile, Nicolini, Langley, and Tsoukas, 2013). My 
findings highlight the strong role the experiential legitimacy plays in evaluating new 
social entities. For instance, one of the main contentious points in the negotiation process 
was the physical location of services, strongly highlighted by a few of the stakeholder 
communities. Further, stakeholder communities emphasize the role of experiencing the 
proto-institutions, for example, living in a Conestoga Hut, or having to walk through a 
downtown homeless camp. My analysis expands the role of the material in institutional 
theory through incorporating into how we understand legitimacy (Jones, Boxenbaum, and 
Anthony, 2013; Friedland, 2013).  
Besides investigating experiential legitimacy, my findings also emphasize what I 
define as Experiential Stickiness, the privileging of evaluations rooted in the subjective 
experience of the source of legitimacy, despite objective evidence that might contradict 
with these evaluations. Both opponents and proponents of a proto-institutions continued 
to privilege evaluations based on subjective experiences such as interacting with physical 
entities, or emotional responses. The effect of this phenomenon is none more evident than 
in the persistence of NIMBY reactions to services targeting marginalized or stigmatized 
groups (Lawrence, 2017; Lawrence and Dover, 2015), even if proven effective and 
beneficial to the community as a whole. I would argue that this stickiness is rooted in 
some instances by the stigmatization of a group, rendering them unworthy and unclean 
(Link and Phelan, 2001). The stigma stems from how the stigmatized group is perceived 
as individual and the type of activities they engage with or promote and thus extends to 
any organizations affiliated with the group (Hudson and Okhuysen, 2009; Hudson, 2008).  
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Experiential stickiness offers a novel lens for understanding failed diffusion or 
abandonment, a severely understudied process in institutionalization (Younkin, 2016; 
Maguire and Hardy, 2009). From my analysis, pragmatic and moral arguments for the 
diffusion of a proto-institution all faltered in the face of strong objections rooted in 
experiential legitimacy, continuing to prevail even after positive assessment from 
powerful and knowledgeable stakeholders. Thus, experiential stickiness showcases a 
limitation on theorization and persuasion as strategic actions for diffusing new social 
entities. The crucial question is how can contested practices survive attacks rooted in 
experiential legitimacy? Abandonment can occur through attacking the moral and 
pragmatic aspects of existing practice (Maguire and Hardy, 2009). Examining 
experiential legitimacy, and its roots in issue interpretation, allows for a more in-depth 
understanding of potentially important antecedent to the dynamics of abandonment and 
deinstitutionalization, beyond failed performance (Younkin, 2016). The stickiness of 
evaluations rooted in stigmatization becomes more important as organization research 
embraces institutional complexity (Battilana and Lee, 2014; Pache and Santos, 2013) 
around major global issues such as poverty (Zhao and Wry, 2016), climate change 
(Howard-Grenville et al., 2014), gender inequality (Joshi, Neely, Emrich, Griffiths & 
George, 2015). Many of these issues unfold in highly political fields, rife with plurality 
and contestations (Zietsma et al., 2017) involving various marginalized groups (Lawrence 
and Dover, 2015; Pache and Santos, 2013; Haack and Siewke, 2017).   
Grand Challenges 
Lastly, another layer in this dissertation is the focus on the context of Grand Challenges. 
These are “ambitious problems that lack a clear single solution, and encompass 
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incomplete, contradictory, or changing requirements that often unfold in complex 
systems” (Grodal and O’Mahoney, 2017). Organizational researchers have responded to 
the recent call to investigate and tackle these problems in our research (George, 2014; 
Ferraro, et al., 2015; George, et al., 2016), producing a growing stream of studies that 
investigates issues such as poverty alleviation (Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012) and 
healthcare (Lawrence, 2017), among others. One of the main challenges in tackling grand 
challenges is that these initiatives unfold with highly interactive and nonlinear dynamics 
with multiple actors and communities jostling with many possible solutions (Ferraro et 
al., 2015). The different entities involved in tackling the issue are usually unable to grasp 
the entire system where the issues unfold and thus are likely to develop various possible 
solutions and approaches to the grand challenge, what can be referred to as distributed 
experimentation (Ferraro,  2015). Diverse communities mobilize and engage in 
negotiations to push forward their goals for the grand challenge (Maguire, et al., 2004; 
Evans and Kay, 2008), leading to the development of multiple proto-institutions (Zietsma 
and McKnight, 2013). 
 Importantly, I contribute to the study of grand challenges through providing an 
empirical account of the Robust Action Strategies model (Ferraro et al., 2015) and its 
focus on engaging all stakeholder communities, local action, and the experimental 
implementation of solutions. My findings demonstrate an initial attempt in analyzing the 
model as it applies to the issue of homelessness. Unlike climate change, homelessness is 
a complex national problem with mostly local manifestations that involves a clearly 
defined and mostly stigmatized core group.  
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First, Ferraro et al., (2015) emphasize a three-step model starting with the 
construction of participatory architecture, the structures, and rules of engagement 
whereby the various stakeholder communities around the issue can interact for prolonged 
periods of time. In my findings, I demonstrate the platforms that emerged to facilitate 
engagement between the different stakeholder communities. Government-sanctioned 
platforms such as the opportunity Eugene Taskforce were temporarily in nature, but had a 
huge impact in the development of the field, paving the way for the emergence of all 
three of the experimental proto-institutions in my analysis. However, once this 
participatory platform dissolved, less powerful stakeholder communities resorted to the 
common tactics of public protest and civil disobedience, as evidenced in Whoville and 
the S.L.E.E.P.S campaign. This points to the importance of power dynamics in managing 
grand challenges. Participation through mobilization is contested and transient in nature, 
however, it is one of the main tactics available to marginalized communities to get a seat 
at the negotiation table and to maintain new field settlements in the face of more 
powerful stakeholder communities and counter-mobilization (Yue, 2015; Rao and 
Kinney, 2008; Vogus and Davis, 2005).  
Second, my findings examine of the notion of distributed experimentation as a 
way to manage complex problems through incremental and iterative actions, evaluated 
through “multiple accounts of worth” (Ferraro et al., 2015) i.e. multiple performance 
indicators. Phase-2 Legitimation process in my model highlights these dynamics. Despite 
the objective success of the rest-stop program and Occupy Medical, opposition to 
expanding the model beyond experimental implementation persisted. As I explained, I 
attribute this effect to the different issue interpretation, and more importantly, to the 
249 
imbalance of power rooted in different social positions of stakeholders (Fligstien and 
McAdam, 2012) which allows more powerful players to override pragmatic evaluations 
of solutions in favor of other evaluations rooted in subjective experience. Thus, my 
findings suggest that the expansion any experimental solution hinges on the ability of 
proponents to push for expansion in the face of opponents, either through continued 
mobilization or through relying on a strong centralized player such as the local 
government.  
5.2   Contributions to Practice 
My research provides many contributions to the practitioners in the different stakeholder 
communities that are directly involved in the development and the implementation of 
innovative solutions to complex social issues, especially on the local city or county level.  
• Practitioners should seek to involve the beneficiaries in the creation of the 
proto-institutions. Issues such as poverty and homelessness are often more 
complex to tackle because usually, those who are involved in the creation of 
solutions are not the main beneficiaries. Poverty and homelessness are 
stigmatized and, consequently, those who are afflicted or most vulnerable to these 
problems become marginalized and thus, more likely to be excluded from the 
conversations. This usually results in a gap between the different 
conceptualizations of the problem and the solutions offered.  One of the key 
takeaways from my study is that social activists and local city officials should 
actively seek the voice of those who are marginalized and involve them in 
developing proper solutions. Occupy Eugene brought the voice of the homeless to 
the forefront of the discussion around the issue. The rest-stop program and the 
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tiny house village both were developed through direct input from the unhoused of 
Whoville and S.L.E.E.P.S.  
• Practitioners should develop inclusive metrics for evaluating performance. If 
the solutions developed for the local issue is to be implemented on an 
experimental basis, it is crucial that clear and inclusive measures of performance 
be agreed upon by the different stakeholder communities. One of the main hurdles 
for expansion of the rest-stop program were the muddled measures of success and 
failures. The government and CSS touted success as the numbers of those served 
by the rest-stop, while opponents lamented the small size of these programs and 
their effect on the problems. Thus, any claims for success lacked the full buy-in 
from the various stakeholder communities. Importantly, practitioners need to 
enforce strong rejection criteria i.e. who would be refused service by the new 
organization, as it signals a commitment to the other stakeholders. OVE and CSS 
both emphasized how the face that they evicted residents from the sites was 
important to show how strictly the rules are implemented and appease some of the 
concerns of the other stakeholders. 
• Practitioners should connect evaluations metrics to solid future expansion 
plans. Occupy Medical and The rest-stop program both suffered from the absence 
of expansion strategies. Occupy Medical had to expand outside of Eugene, thus 
weakening its model of providing healthcare close to where it’s most needed and 
remains highly vulnerable to administrative issues due to its flat structure. 
Similarly, proponents of the rest-stop program continue to struggle with adding 
new spots, with neighborhoods rejecting attempts to host sites. Mandating the 
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Rest-Stop in Every Ward strategy as part of the solution would have made future 
expansion smoother, contingent on agreed-upon evaluation measures.  
• Practitioners should seek strategic alliances within the neighborhoods to 
overcome NIMBY. Implementing any solutions that potentially bring a 
stigmatized group into a physical site in a neighborhood is bound to encounter 
opposition from the residents, the NIMBY effect. A successful strategy to 
overcome this effect is to seek the buy-in from the direct neighbor(s) of the 
location prior to bringing the issue to the entire neighborhood. Forming cross-
stakeholder alliances within the neighborhood can help silence some of the 
opposition from those who are less affected by the location.  
• Practitioners should engage with all stakeholders through in-depth 
communications to understand the narratives driving positions on a social 
issue. Evaluations of an organization aiming to address a social issue are rooted in 
the narratives the evaluator develops about the issue and those afflicted by it. 
These narratives are rooted in the values and emotions of the evaluating parties, 
thus, they are sticky in nature, even in the face of objective and pragmatic results. 
Practitioners, be it social activists or local government, are likely to be too 
enmeshed in their own narratives and goals. Building proper platforms for in-
depth and inclusive communication is crucial to uncovering the roots of these 
narratives and consequently, to develop better solutions and evaluation criteria.  
5.3   Avenues for Future Research 
The field of homelessness in Eugene offered a rich and unique opportunity for scientific 
investigation. I recommend four future avenues to research both in legitimation and 
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beyond in the following topics: the institutionalization threshold; the relationship between 
legitimation and strategic responses of different stakeholder communities; the role of 
local culture in legitimation; the role of place and materiality in the legitimation process, 
and social movement takeover.  
In Institutional Theory and Legitimation Research 
 My dissertation investigated the dynamics of local validation, however, an 
important question is when and how would a proto-institution cross the 
“institutionalization threshold”. My model shows how the contestations of an entity 
continue to evolve over time as well. Institutionally-contested practices still face strong 
legitimacy challenges even if diffused (Jung and Mun, 2017), thus relying on diffusion 
in-of-itself to explain institutionalization fail to account for the distinct social and 
cognitive elements of institutionalization (Wooten and Hoffman, 2016; Gray, et al., 
2015). Yet, legitimation model continues to move a subject of legitimacy through a 
transition from a proto-institution, contested and weakly entrenched social entity, to an 
institutionalized form (Scott, 2013; Tolbert and Zucker, 2006; Johnson et al., 2006; Zietz, 
Mittal, and McAulay, 1999). This question is more pertinent given how this analysis 
emphasizes experiential stickiness and the role of subjective evaluations of a proto-
institutions in hindering diffusion. It is thus central to understand if and how pragmatic 
evaluations can eventually overcome oppositions based on negative experiential 
evaluations i.e. NIMBY. 
 Relatedly, a promising avenue for research is to investigate the strategic responses 
of local community members to the legitimation process. My model showcased how the 
multiple narratives and their corresponding legitimacy criteria can often fall into conflict. 
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Thus, an important question is how different stakeholder communities respond to 
misalignments in evaluations. For instance, in my field research, the misalignment 
between the proponents of the rest-stop program and those who believe it is just a ploy to 
appease the social activists resulted in fracturing of the movement into mainstream and 
radical factions. This process of factionalization is common with social movements 
(Whittier, 2004) and is a response to the misalignment around a proto-institution. On the 
other hand, other factions are prone to dig in and engage in legitimation work to garner 
more support for the organizations (Rueede and Kruetzer, 2015). The interplay between 
alignment/misalignment at different stages of the legitimation process offers an 
opportunity to study the responses of the different stakeholders in the field.  
 The intersection of local culture and legitimation is another rich venue for future 
research. Understanding legitimation of proto-institutions as a product of issue 
interpretation leaves us with a process that is embedded and heavily influenced by the 
local culture of the various stakeholders and, more importantly, the variations of this 
culture. Two opposing cultures can be found in Eugene exerting contrasting influences on 
the stakeholder communities: The liberal egalitarian culture of the 60s and 70s social 
activists and the meritocratic, self-sufficient, pull-yourself-by-your-bootstraps culture of 
the frontier. These high-level cultures percolate to the field and micro-level and play an 
important role in the meaning-making processes (Aten, Howard-Grenville, and 
Ventresca, 2012) including the legitimation of proto-institutions. In this study, I focused 
on the interactions between the different stakeholder communities as the legitimation 
process unfolded in a highly contextualized field (Liebel, Hallet, and Beckhy, 2017), 
however, there is more depth to be explored focusing solely on these interactions.   
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In Social Movements and Institutional Theory 
 The proto-institutions at the heart of this study can be perceived as outcomes of a 
cycle of protest (Tarrow, 1998). My analysis focused on the dynamics of legitimation of 
these new forms, however, the emergence of these proto-institutions opens up interesting 
opportunity to answer to the pertinent research question at the intersection of 
institutionalism and social movement research.  
First, future research could investigate how local grass-root movements such as 
Occupy Eugene can create the conditions for its own relative success. Traditional theories 
of political opportunity structure strongly suggest that “politics and power are 
institutionally contingent” (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2013; p. 664) with successful 
mobilization and/or diffusion of outcomes happening as a result of an opening in the 
institutional system. However, the homelessness movement in Eugene presents a revised 
scenario where the movement actively created the political context for the development 
of innovative solutions for the issue. Activists championed the cause and the proto-
institutions, pushing for their support in a highly pluralistic and contentious field.  
Second, future research can further investigate how the institutional history of the 
field contributed to the new cycle of protest and its outcomes. New fields and institutions 
emerge from what researchers refer to as institutional detritus or flotsam (Schneiberg, 
2007). However, the question of history and layering in institutional fields remain 
underdeveloped. An interesting dynamic that emerged in my analysis of the early days of 
the Occupy Eugene is how the early mobilizers, young college students, sought to bring 
the older, more veteran social activists into the movement. However, it was these 
veterans that eventually took over the movement and championed the homeless cause to 
the chagrin of the young activists, many of whom left the movement altogether. These 
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veteran activists are flotsam from prior local waves of social activism. Similarly, the 
development of the Conestoga Hut, a key event in the development of the Tiny House 
village and the rest-stop program, owes its roots to the tradition of community living in 
Eugene and the surrounding area. Investigating this local institutional history offers an 
opportunity to understand the layering of institutional history and how these building 
blocks facilitate the emergence of new issue fields.  
5.4   Limitations 
As with any study, my dissertations has its limitations. First, in attempting to construct an 
inclusive account of legitimation, I have sought to rely on the meaning-making and 
interpretive accounts of first-hand informants. This introduced an element of recollection 
bias, specifically for the period covering the Occupy Events in 2012 – 2013. A concern 
would be that those involved with the movement might provide distorted accounts of the 
event and its consequences. I corrected for this bias through triangulating my interview 
data with other data sources including an extensive database of media articles, and 
official documents from the various organizations and the local government.  
 My choice of contest imposed a few limitations as well. One of the main 
stakeholder communities in my field was the unhoused, a marginalized community. Thus, 
I had to reckon with limits on accessibility to informants, many of whom did not want to 
discuss their condition or be part of the study. Thus, I had to rely on first accounts from 
the unhoused individuals who agreed to meet with me and to support my findings through 
the accounts of social advocates, who usually work closely with the unhoused and other 
data sources. The same limitation extended to the business community, who directed all 
inquiries for interviews to the head of the Eugene Chamber of Commerce as the main 
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spokesperson for the community’s position on the issue. A few high-level politicians also 
refused to meet for an interview such as the city manager. These limitations posed a risk 
of incomplete accounts of the stakeholder communities. I managed to get the government 
position in my analysis through interviewing mid-level personnel, and the plethora of 
secondary data. However, more concerns remain about the unhoused population who 
generally do not have as many secondary outlets. I attempted to gather as much data from 
secondary accounts, such as from social activists, yet there remains a risk that I might 
have missed some nuances in my analysis.  
 Third, typical of a qualitative study, the certain limitations to the transferability of 
my analysis applies. Eugene is a specific context, thus, extrapolation to other 
communities and cities should be measured. For instance, the specific history of Eugene 
as both a hippie enclave and a parochially conservative allowed for certain dynamics that 
might not be found in other cities such as predominately liberal Los Angeles, California 
or other locations in the Middle East and Asia.  I enhanced transferability through 
expounding on context and incorporating verbatim quotes in the presentation of the 
findings. I also employed a multiple case study design in order to enhance replicability. I 
also followed the recommendation in Langley (1999) in combining different strategies 
for process analysis including narrative and temporal bracketing in addition to grounded 
theory methods. 
5.5   Validation, Future Application, and Boundary Conditions 
No theoretical model is universal across all settings, and the emergent two-phase 
model of legitimation I propose in this study is no exception. In validating and future 
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application of this model, I advise close attention to the two main concepts in my 
analysis: proto-institutions and contestations.  
 Proto-institutions is a broad theoretical concept that encompasses many social 
arrangements. It is best understood in relation to the more commonly used concept of 
institutions, defined as widely diffused and taken-for-granted social entities with 
entrenched self-activating and self-reproduction mechanisms (Lawrence et al. , 2002). 
Established Institutions have acquired a large measure of cognitive legitimacy where 
their existence and the flow of resources they need to operate are more or less secure 
(Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Jepperson, 1991).  
Proto-institutions are any social arrangements has the potential to become an 
institution. They yet lack the diffusion and different types of resources needed to reach an 
institutionalized state. Such a social entity is, thus, subject to the process of legitimation 
and institutionalization as it moves from emergence, barely diffused and weakly 
entrenched, to taken-for-grantedness (Scott, 2013; Suchamn, 1995).  
The dynamics of legitimation I propose in my model would be pivotal for these 
proto-institutions, be it a practice, a technology, an organizational form, a policy, or any 
other social entity that seek satisfies these conditions. Scholars employing the two-phase 
legitimation model in this study needs to pay close attention to a) identifying the proto-
institution, b) detailing how it develops over time through the course of the legitimation 
process, and c) analyzing the flow of resources at the different phases.  
Second, the goal of my analysis was to capture how legitimation is contested 
among multiple stakeholder communities. Issue fields offered a relational space to 
capture the dynamics between the different stakeholders because a focal issue precipitates 
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polarization between the stakeholders the formation of distinct communities with 
possibly conflicting narratives (Zietsma et al., 2017; Hoffman, 1999). Broadly, I would 
argue that the two-phase legitimation model is highly applicable to similar issue fields 
where stakeholder communities are contesting a proto-institution. 
I would, however, emphasize an important caveat. The legitimation process as I 
identify it is embedded in the local; social interactions, local events, history, local culture, 
and the relationships between the different stakeholder communities. The model is more 
applicable in fields bounded by local geographical locations, where these social 
interactions can be captured in details. Thus, I would advise scholars to engage deeply 
with the field and the relationships within to a) identify the stakeholder communities 
engaged with the proto-institution, b) construct an in-depth understanding of the local 
history and events, and c) emphasize changes in the nuances of interactions and 
contention. These steps are crucial to capture the phases of legitimation as they unfold in 
a dynamic field, contentious social relationships, and a developing proto-institution.  
The above discussion outlines the boundaries of my analysis. The two-phase 
model of cannot explain legitimation in settled fields and other situations where 
contestations between the stakeholder communities are limited, for instance, in fields 
where the distribution of capital and power is highly concentrated such as policies under 
oppressive governments. Further, my model will also be difficult to justify in the absence 
of firsthand data and field research. Thus, applying the two-phase legitimation model 
using archival analysis as the main source of data would be problematic as archives are 
likely to privilege certain stakeholders over others. Similarly, contexts, where access to 
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firsthand data from certain stakeholder communities is limited due to physical or 
institutional barrier, can be challenging to analyze.  
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VI.   CONCLUSION 
No concept is more central to institutional research than legitimacy (Barley, 2017), and 
yet for more than five decades, and despite major strides and contributions, there 
remained a few dark corners in the body of knowledge we amassed on this concept 
(Deephouse et al., 2017; Suddaby et al., 2017). In my dissertation, I integrated state-of-
the-art knowledge in the field with extensive field work to unpack the complex dynamics 
of the legitimation process. I adopted an inductive approach with an innovative design, 
combining embedded multiple case studies (Yin, 2009; Eisenhardt, 1989), with an 
interpretive grounded theory analysis (Gioia et al., 2012). I investigated how new social 
entities are evaluated by multiple stakeholder communities in a contested field, focusing 
on the issue of homelessness in Eugene, Oregon. My goal was to explain the interactions 
between the different component of legitimation, subject, sources, criteria, and context, 
and how they evolved and changed over time.  
 Based on my data analysis, I developed a two-phase legitimation model that 
accounts for the development of new social entities, what I term proto-institutions 
(Zietsma and McKnight, 2009). In Phase-1, the proposed model of the new entity is 
evaluated by the multiple stakeholder communities in the field based on the narrative 
every stakeholder constructs to define the issue. These narratives frames how the 
stakeholder communities approach the negotiation process over the new model and 
engenders the legitimation criteria used for debating any points of contention with other 
stakeholder communities. A similar process occurs when the proto-institution is re-
evaluated for possible diffusion. However, the stakeholder communities incorporate 
performance assessment of the outcomes of proto-institution into the new interpretations 
of the issue, resulting in possible variations in how they define the issue and the actions 
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possible around it. The contested negotiation around the future of the proto-institution is, 
thus, evaluated based on the new narratives.  
 My dissertation makes three major contributions to legitimacy research. I provide 
an emergent model for legitimation that accounts for the interpretive nature of 
legitimation as a socially-constructed process. Through accounting for all stakeholder 
communities in the field over the different phases of the process, I contribute to our 
limited understanding of how multiple sources legitimate a contested social entity, 
through presenting a relational-based view rooted on interpretations of the field and the 
relationships between the stakeholder communities. I also expand our knowledge on the 
dynamic nature of issue interpretation through untangling the various narratives and how 
they change over time I also make contributions to issue fields, social movement research 
and studies of the empirical context of grand challenges.  
 
262 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: PROTOINSTITUTIONS TARGETING HOMELESSNESS IN 
EURGNE 
Proto-
institution 
Date Implemented Pluralism Performance Novelty Goal Range 
CAHOOTS NA Eugene City Council 
Non-profits and 
activists 
NA Old 
Concept 
Immediate 
 Occupy 
Medical 
2011 Non-profits and 
activists 
The Unhoused 
One operating; 
rapid growth 
New 
Concept 
Immediate 
Dusk-to-Dawn 2015 Eugene City Council 
Non-profits and 
activists 
Neighborhood 
Associations 
Three sites, 
Slow growth 
New 
Concept 
Immediate 
Car Camping 
Program 
2009 Eugene City Council 
Non-profits and 
activists 
Neighborhood 
Associations 
The Unhoused 
Business 
43 sites, easy 
diffusion 
Old concept Immediate 
Rest-Stop 2013 Eugene City 
Council 
Non-profits and 
activists 
Neighborhood 
Associations 
The Unhoused 
Four operating 
sites; slow 
contested 
diffusion 
New 
concept 
Temporary 
Tiny Home 
Villages 
2013 Eugene City 
Council 
Non-profits and 
activists 
Neighborhood 
Associations 
The Unhoused 
Business 
community 
One operating 
site 
Two in 
development; 
slow diffusion 
New 
Concept 
Temporary 
Housing 
First/FUSE 
2015 Eugene City 
Council 
Non-profits and 
activists 
Business 
community 
Two-person 
team. No 
growth, early 
stage 
New 
Concept 
Long-term 
Ward 9 2017 The unhoused 
Non-profits and 
activists 
Struggling New 
Concept 
Long-term 
Affordable 
Housing 
2010 Eugene City Council 
Business community 
Non-profits and 
activists 
Neighborhood 
associations 
Six projects, 
Slow growth 
Old 
Concept 
Long-term 
Renters’ Union 2018 The unhoused 
Non-profits and 
activists 
Embryonic New 
Concept 
Long-term 
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APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
Typical Interview Protocol 
N.B. These list is not conclusive. It was often the case that the informants went on 
tangents that I entertained as they gave me access to more information or more depth into 
their meaning-making process. These are the questions that I asked from everyone.  
Questions: 
• First, I’d like to hear a little about you. 
• How did you get involved with the Homelessness issue around Eugene? 
• In your opinion, who are the key players around the issue? how do they interact 
• How do you think the current measures address the problem? 
• What are your thoughts on the Rest-stop program? 
• What are your thoughts on the Tiny House villages? 
• As part of these efforts, how do you feel they actually address the problem? 
• How inclusive is the decision-making process on the local level? 
• What do you think should be done? 
• How does the current approach affect the local tensions between communities? 
• What role, if any, do you think for-profit organizations should play in this social 
issue? 
• Who do you think I should talk to next? 
 
Questions added in later rounds 
• Following Occupy, how did you perceive the city’s handling of the issue before 
the task force? 
• Who are we, the homeless, in your perception? Who are the unhoused population 
in Eugene 
• So where'd the idea come from for Opportunity Village, to shape it? 
• How would you evaluate ….?  
• So how do you see the future of that program and the rest stop? Do you think it 
has capacity to grow? 
• How do you feel about the culture in Eugene? Do you think it has a role in how 
the issue is perceived, or managed? 
• Why do you keep doing what you do?
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APPENDIX C: SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS 
 
ID Affiliation Proto-institutions Group Date Duration 
1 NP Independent All Social Advocates 10/13/2017 1:57 
2 NB Church Tiny Home Social Advocates 10/18/2017 0:46 
3 YC SVDP All Social Advocates 1/13/2018 1:40 
4 NW City Manager Office All Government 1/22/2018 1:08 
5 YQ Chamber of Commerce All Business 4/25/2018 0:32 
6 RF Independent All Social Advocates 4/25/2018 1:25 
7 NB2 Tiny Village Tiny Home Social Advocates 4/30/2018 1:07 
8 YS City Council All Government 5/1/2018 1:26 
9 SP City Council All Government 5/2/2018 1:05 
10 GE City Council All Government 5/2/2018 1:00 
11 RF2 Independent All Social Advocates 5/9/2018 0:51 
13 SG Whiteaker Rest-Stop Neighborhood Associations 10/16/2018 0:40 
14 AAN1 Whiteaker All Neighborhood Associations 10/16/2018 0:40 
14 RS Southeast Rest-Stop Neighborhood Associations 10/16/2018 0:17 
15 LD Downtown Rest-Stop Neighborhood Associations 10/16/2018 0:48 
16 SS Occupy Medical Occupy Medical Social Advocates 10/17/2018 1:00 
17 NBE River Road Rest-Stop Neighborhood Associations 10/17/2018 0:48 
18 LC CALC Tiny Home Social Advocates 10/17/2018 0:53 
19 NN Occupy Medical Occupy Medical Social Advocates 1/3/2019 1:04 
20 NS Independent Rest-Stop Social Advocates 1/9/2019 0:58 
21 NR CLDC All Social Advocates 1/9/2019 0:48 
22 AN Independent Rest-Stop Social Advocates 1/9/2019 0:58 
23 IP Bethel Rest-Stop Neighborhood Associations 1/13/2019 0:32 
24 YP Local government All Government 1/16/2019 1:03 
25 EM1 HRC All Social Advocates 1/17/2019 0:42 
26 AM Independent Tiny Home Social Advocates 1/17/2019 1:08 
27 BT1 Tiny Village Tiny Home Homeless 1/21/2019 0:16 
28 AT3 Tiny Village Tiny Home Homeless 1/21/2019 0:20 
29 AT2 Tiny Village Tiny Home Homeless 1/21/2019 0:23 
30 AT1 Tiny Village Tiny Home Homeless 1/21/2019 0:43 
31 YB Independent All Social Advocates 1/24/2019 1:12 
32 SM1 HRC All Social Advocates 1/24/2019 1:12 
33 IN NHS Rest-Stop Social Advocates 1/24/2019 1:12 
34 LW1 Independent All Social Advocates 1/30/2019 1:10 
35 CJ1 Independent Rest-Stop Social Advocates 1/30/2019 1:01 
36 JAT Occupy Radio Occupy Medical Social Advocates 1/31/2019 0:48 
37 KEB1 CSS Rest-Stop Social Advocates 2/15/2019 1:13 
38 NS2 NHS Rest-Stop Homeless 3/3/2019 0:46 
39 NN2 NHS Rest-Stop Homeless 3/3/2019 0:46 
40 MN1 NHS Rest-Stop Homeless 3/3/2019 0:46 
41 EN1 NHS Rest-Stop Homeless 3/3/2019 0:46 
42 YJ1 NHS Rest-Stop Homeless 3/3/2019 0:46 
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APPENDX D: THE ANTI-CAMPING ORDINANCE 
4.815 Prohibited Camping.  
(1) As used in this section:  
(a) "To camp" means to set up or to remain in or at a campsite. Eugene Code 4-82 
8/31/2018  
(b) "Campsite" means any place where any bedding, sleeping bag, or other 
material used for bedding purposes, or any stove or fire is placed, established or 
maintained for the purpose of maintaining a temporary place to live, whether or 
not such place incorporates the use of any tent, lean-to, shack, or any other 
structure, or any vehicle or part thereof.  
(2) It is found and declared that:  
(a) From time to time persons establish campsites on sidewalks, public rights-of-
way, under bridges, and so forth;  
(b) Such persons, by such actions create unsafe and unsanitary living conditions 
which pose a threat to the peace, health and safety of themselves and the 
community; and,  
(c) The enactment of this provision is necessary to protect the peace, health and 
safety of the city and its inhabitants.  
(3) No person shall camp in or upon any sidewalk, street, alley, lane, public right-
of-way, park or any other publicly-owned property or under any bridge or viaduct, 
unless otherwise specifically authorized by this code or by declaration of the 
Mayor in emergency circumstances.  
(4) Upon finding it to be in the public interest and consistent with council goals 
and policies, the council may, by motion, exempt a special event from the 
prohibitions of this section. The motion shall specify the period of time and 
location covered by the exemption.  
(Section 4.815 amended by Ordinance No. 19163, enacted July 11, 1983; and 
Ordinance 20062, enacted September 16, 1996, effective October 16, 1996.) 
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APPENDIX E: CITY ORDINANCE ALLOWING THE REST-STOP PROGRAM 
ORDINANCE NO. 20517 
AN ORDINANCE CONCERNING PERMITTED OVERNIGHT SLEEPING; AMENDING 
SECTION 4.816 OF THE EUGENE CODE, 1971; AND PROVIDING A SUNSET DATE FOR 
UNCODIFIED PROVISIONS. 
The City Council of the City of Eugene finds as follows: 
A. Section 4.816 of the Eugene Code, 1971 (EC) provides for the regulation of overnight 
sleeping. 
B. In order to create additional sleeping options for people who are homeless, Ordinance 
No. 20484 was adopted temporarily allowing overnight sleeping in a tent where 
overnight sleeping would be allowed in a vehicle. The sunset date of that provision was 
extended to December 31, 2014 by Ordinance No. 20501. Ordinance No. 20503 was 
adopted allowing overnight sleeping in a "Conestoga hut" where overnight sleeping 
would be allowed in a vehicle. That Ordinance will sunset on October 1, 2013. EC 4.816 
should be amended to make those provisions permanent. 
C. In addition, a pilot program expanding the permitted overnight sleeping provisions 
should be established and remain in effect until March 31, 2014, which will allow the 
City to monitor the program to determine whether it should be made permanent, revised 
or abandoned. 
NOW, THEREFORE, 
THE CITY OF EUGENE DOES ORDAIN AS FOLLOWS: 
Section 1.        The findings set forth above are adopted. 
Section  2.         Subsection (1) of EC 4.816 is amended to provide as follows: 
4.816 Permitted Overnight Sleeping. 
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this code: 
(a) Persons may sleep overnight in a vehicle in a parking lot of a religious institution, place of 
worship, business or public entity that owns or leases property on which a parking lot and 
occupied structure are located, with permission of the property owner. The property owner may 
not grant permission for more than six vehicles used for sleeping at any one time.  For purposes 
of this subsection (1), the term "vehicle" includes a car, tent, camper, trailer, and Conestoga hut. 
(b) Persons may sleep overnight in the back yard of a single family residence in a residential 
zoning district, with permission of the owner and tenant of the residence.  Not more than one 
family may sleep in any back yard, and not more than one tent or camping shelter may be used 
for sleeping in the back yard.  As an alternative, but not in addition to sleeping overnight in the 
back yard, not more than one family may sleep in a vehicle, camper or trailer parked in the 
driveway of a single family residence in a residential zoning district, with permission of the 
owner and tenant of the residence.  For purposes of this subsection, "family" means persons 
related by blood or marriage, or no more than two unrelated adults. 
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(c) Persons may sleep overnight in a vehicle, on a paved or graveled surface located on a vacant 
or unoccupied parcel, with the permission of the property owner, if the owner registers the site 
with the city or its agent.  The city may require the site to be part of a supervised program 
operated by the city or its agent.  The property owner may not grant permission for more than six 
vehicles used for sleeping at any one time. 
Section 3. The following provisions are adopted as a pilot program and shall sunset and be 
repealed on March 31, 2014, unless extended or made permanent by future Council action: 
Permitted Overnight Sleeping Pilot Program. 
(1) Up to 15 persons may sleep overnight in vehicles, as that term is defined in section 4.816(1 
)(a) of this code on property authorized pursuant to Section 4 of this ordinance. 
(2) No site may be used for overnight sleeping pursuant to subsection (1) of this section unless 
one or more entities enters into the agreement with the City referenced in Section 4 of this 
ordinance and one or more entities other than the City provides, at no cost to the City, adequate 
garbage, toilets and supervision.  The entity providing supervision shall work with surrounding 
and nearby neighbors (businesses or residences) to address any concerns. 
Section 4. The City Manager shall recommend to the City Council one or more proposed sites for 
the pilot project authorized by Section 3 of this Ordinance. Any such site may not be located in a 
residential area or close to a school, and must be owned or leased by the City of Eugene, a 
religious institution, a non-profit organization, or a business if the business is located on property 
zoned commercial or industrial. Before a proposed site may be used, the site must be approved by 
the City Council by motion and an agreement must be executed between the City and the entity 
referred to in subsection (2) of Section 3 above. Such an agreement may include but is not limited 
to provisions concerning (a) supervision, (b) selection of the individuals who may camp at the 
site, (c) number of continuous days that someone may camp at the site, (d) hours that people may 
stay at the site in addition to 9:00 p.m. to 7 a.m., (e) structures and other items that may be placed 
on the site, and (f) closure of the site for non-compliance with the terms of the agreement. 
Section 5. Due to the inclement weather and the need to provide assistance to homeless persons 
as soon as possible, pursuant to the provisions of Section 32(2) of the Eugene Charter of 2002, 
with the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the  City  Council,  upon adoption by 
the Council and approval by the Mayor, or passage over the Mayor's veto, this Ordinance shall 
become effective immediately. 
Passed by the City Council this 
25th day of September, 2013 
Approved by the Mayor this 
25" day of September, 2013. 
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